


OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds

Somalia - Country Report

November 2019

Management, Funding and Implementation of the Evaluation

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Cover Photo: SOYDA (Somali Young Doctors Association). SHF Project: Provision of integrated life saving Emergency Response (WASH, Nutrition, Health, Food Security and Education) to internally displaced persons and host communities program in Afgooye corridor. Credit: OCHA/Matija Kovac

Somalia Country Report: Executive Summary

Evaluation purpose

1. The evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) has two main purposes: to improve accountability and learning, and to examine the results of the humanitarian action supported by CBPFs between 2015 and 2018, with the purpose of drawing lessons on what has worked well. It also seeks to identify challenges to the effective functioning of CBPFs in order to provide recommendations on how to continue to strengthen them as a funding mechanism in support of timely, coordinated and principled humanitarian response for affected people.

2. The evaluation of the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF) is the first of five country case studies and was undertaken during the inception phase. A two-week trip was conducted by two members of the evaluation team who undertook interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) with key stakeholders in Kenya and Somalia including with communities which had received SHF-funded assistance.

Summary of findings

3. The findings of this case study suggest that the SHF is a well-led and managed fund that is able to deliver timely and coordinated humanitarian assistance that contributes to saving lives. The Advisory Board (AB) and Humanitarian Funding Unit (HFU) has worked with stakeholders over the period under evaluation to improve the timeliness, inclusiveness and effectiveness of the fund.

4. SHF funding is closely aligned with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), particularly the provision of lifesaving and life-sustaining assistance, and the fund has been effective in identifying and responding to emerging humanitarian needs. Between 2015 and 2018, the HFU has strengthened fund allocation processes and by promoting integrated or multi-cluster programs, has increased joint working across clusters which deliver programs that are more relevant to the needs of crisis-affected communities. The way in which the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the HFU have ensured complementarity between the SHF and Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funding serves to further enhance fund effectiveness.

5. The SHF has contributed to strengthening the HC's role but has, in turn, benefitted from strong leadership at all levels – the HC, the Advisory Board, OCHA, and the HFU. This has enabled the fund to be strategic in its allocations, which has ensured that, even though SHF funding has been a small proportion of overall HRP funding, it has been able to '*punch above its weight'* and contribute to saving lives.

6. One challenge with the fund's success, linked to the lack of adequate development funding and limited resilience funding, is that it is under pressure to expand its remit. The SHF has demonstrated that it can act early, if donor funds are available, as it did in the case of the 2017 drought response. It also encourages partners to adopt sustainable approaches in their programming wherever possible. However, the fund's success is also in part a consequence of its focus and this evaluation echoes the views of many of those interviewed, that it should continue to have a humanitarian focus, albeit one guided by the HRP.

7. The SHF's robust risk management systems have created a virtuous circle, building donor confidence and leading to increased contributions that then enable the SHF to achieve its outcomes and have a greater impact on the lives of crisis-affected communities. These systems have also enabled the SHF to increase funding to local and national NGOs (NNGO) significantly while providing assurance to donors that their funds are well managed. This has encouraged donors seeking to meet their Grand Bargain commitments on direct funding to NNGOs to contribute to the SHF. More importantly, being able to fund a diverse range of partners, including those with greater access and closer links to communities, means that the SHF is better positioned than some donors to respond and bring attention to the greatest needs. One challenge that the SHF has faced with implementing risk management mechanisms, has been the delay and difficulty of putting in place long-term agreements for capacity assessments, third-party monitoring and remote calling, but this is related to broader UN-Secretariat procurement issues as well as a dearth of qualified bidders.

8. The delivery of principled humanitarian assistance in Somalia is a vexed issue and the SHF is not immune to the difficulties faced by the broader humanitarian community. The ability of SHF-funded NGOs to work on the edges of

NSAG-held territory is a significant benefit, but it makes it complex to deliver principled programmes in practice. In the context of the localization agenda, it is important to ensure that NNGOs that are able to access these areas receive the support that they need to put in place adequate security measures and also to operationalize humanitarian principles. This is an issue that the humanitarian community as a whole must work to address.

9. The evidence available to the evaluation team suggests that the SHF has contributed to a range of responses including rapid and slow-onset in addition to long-term displacement; evidence from the SHF-funded response to cyclone Sagar shows that assistance arrived at the right time, just when short-term relief after the cyclone had ended. The projects were appropriate and relevant, usually addressing the top priority of the community (such as livelihoods or the restoration of basic services), and thereby making a difference to people's lives.

10. However, while cross-cutting issues such as gender, age, disability and protection are addressed in the SHF project proposal format, practice across SHF partners was variable. The failure to consult women and provide them with access to feedback and complaints mechanisms was a common feature across the reviewed projects. This is a reflection of the inequities in Somali society and highlights the need for a more concerted effort to engage with women and girls. The weakness in operationalizing cross-cutting issues is perpetuated by the fact that funding decisions are based on technical issues and delivery capacity, by the limited capacity for monitoring how partners are mainstreaming these issues, and by the limited requirement to report on them.

11. In conclusion, the findings of the case study suggest that, in large part, the SHF has delivered timely and coordinated[1] assistance for saving lives, alleviating suffering and preserving human dignity. In the period under evaluation, the SHF has benefited from strong leadership and has strengthened its management which has played an essential part in refining allocation and disbursement processes to increase both their speed and effectiveness.

Recommendations for the SHF[2]

#	Recommendation	Responsible/ Priority
1	**Recommendation:** There is both an appetite and scope for the AB, led by the HC, to focus greater attention on cross-cutting issues. This could include the development of guidance for the SHF that outlines priorities for action and moderates expectations of what the fund is able to achieve. It could also outline the resources required to strengthen the delivery of CBPF commitments for gender, PwD and AAP and protection.	AB led by HC
	Explanation: There was significant interest from members of the AB about their engagement and support, at a strategic level, for a cross-cutting issues such as gender and PwD. At the same time, the evaluation highlighted challenges in achieving aspirations to deliver against these priorities which would warrant greater focus.	
2	**Recommendation:** A timetable should be outlined for the procurement of audit and monitoring services. In the absence of these services, the AB should agree an interim strategy which addresses the gap in service provision and the implications it has for risk management.	OCHA Procurement and Asset Management Unit, HFU, AB led by HC
	Explanation: OCHA's procurement of services for audit, risk management and monitoring is not timely and has implications for the SHF's ability to monitor and manage risk. It is now urgent that a plan is in place with a timeframe for delivery. This should be shared with and if it is satisfactory, approved by the AB.	

[1] The evidence gathered by this evaluation on the use of humanitarian principles is far weaker than it is for issues of timeliness and coordination, and there is scope for the SHF to strengthen assurance.

[2] Please note that these recommendations are relevant to the SHF but issues that have more general relevance across CBPFs and which will be addressed in the Global Synthesis Report are outlined in Section 5.2.

3	**Recommendation:** As part of its promotion of best-placed actors, the SHF should ensure that it provides adequate funding for security-related costs particularly for NNGOs working in volatile parts of the country. It should also explore the potential that exists to strengthen knowledge about how to operationalize humanitarian principles with service providers in coordination with the clusters and HCT.	HFU, AB led by HC
	Explanation: SHF funding for NGOs working on the edges of NSAG-held territory play a key role in meeting the needs of some of the most vulnerable communities, however, the SHF (and all donors) has an ethical responsibility to ensure that local and national NGOs that are able to access these areas receive the funding that is required to manage risk appropriately.	

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Acronyms

AA Administrative Agent
AAP Accountability to Affected Populations
AB Advisory Board
AMISOMAfrican Union Mission in Somalia
CBPF Country-Based Pooled Fund
CERF Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF Common Humanitarian Fund
CPF Common Performance Framework
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERF Emergency Response Fund
FEWS Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGD Focus Group Discussions
FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
FTR Fund Transfer Request
FTS Financial Tracking Service
GAM Gender with Age Marker
GB Grand Bargain
GMS Grant Management System
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HFU Humanitarian Financing Unit
HNO Humanitarian Needs Overview
HoO Head of Office
HPC Humanitarian Program Cycle
HRP Humanitarian Response Plan
IAHE Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCG Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
IDP Internally Displaced Person
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
KII Key Informant Interviews
MA Managing Agent
MPTFO Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
NDP National Development Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NNGO National Non-Governmental Organization
NSAG Non-State Armed Group
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODSG OCHA Donor Support Group
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIOS Office for Internal Oversight Services
OPR Operational Peer Review
oPt occupied Palestinian territories
PFWG Pooled Fund Working Group
PSEA Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PwD Persons with Disabilities
RA Reserve Allocation
RC Resident Coordinator
RR Rapid Response (CERF)
RWG Risk Working Group
SA Standard Allocation
SG Secretary-General
SHF Somalia Humanitarian Fund
SO Strategic Objective
SPEGS Strategy, Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section
SRC Strategic Review Committee
ToR Terms of Reference
UFE Underfunded Emergencies (CERF)
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme

Glossary of terms

Accountability	The Operational Handbook highlights that there are two types of accountabilities in relation to CBPFs. The first relates to the ability of CBPFs to achieve their objectives (as illustrated by the operational impact model) as humanitarian financing mechanisms. The second is of recipient organizations to deliver project results.
Accountability to affected populations	Accountability to affected populations (AAP) is an active commitment to use power responsibly by taking account of, giving account to, and being held to account by the people humanitarian organizations seek to assist[1]. , The Inter-Agency Standing Committee has endorsed four commitments on AAP and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA). These are described under the four headings of leadership, participation and partnership, information, feedback and action, and results.[2]
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	Established in 2005 as the UN's global emergency response fund, CERF pools contributions from donors around the world into a single fund allowing humanitarian responders to deliver lifesaving assistance whenever and wherever crises hit. CERF has a US$1 billion annual funding target and is fully un-earmarked to ensure funds go to meet the most urgent, lifesaving needs.[3]
Country-Based Pooled Funds	CBPFs are established by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) when a new emergency occurs or when an existing humanitarian situation deteriorates. Contributions from donors are collected into single, un-earmarked funds to support local humanitarian efforts. Funds are directly available to a wide range of relief partners at the front lines of the response through an inclusive and transparent process in support of priorities set out in crisis-specific Humanitarian Response Plans.[4]
Humanitarian action	Humanitarian action comprises assistance, protection and advocacy in response to humanitarian needs resulting from natural hazards, armed conflict or other causes, or emergency response preparedness.[5]
Humanitarian principles	Underlining all humanitarian action are the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These principles, derived from international humanitarian law, have been taken up by the United Nations in General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114. Their global recognition and relevance are furthermore underscored by the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief and the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability. The General Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of promoting and respecting these principles within the framework of humanitarian assistance.[6]
Grand Bargain	The Grand Bargain is an agreement between more than 30 of the biggest donors and aid providers, which aims to get more means into the hands of people in need. It includes a series of changes in the working practices of donors and aid organizations that would deliver an extra billion dollars over five years for people in need of humanitarian aid. These changes include gearing up cash programming, greater funding for national and local responders and cutting bureaucracy through harmonized reporting requirements[7].

[1] IASC (no date) Accountability to Affected Populations: A brief overview.

[2] IASC (2017) Commitments on Accountability to Affected People and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, November 2017, IASC Task Team on Accountability to Affected Populations and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

[3] OCHA (2019) About CERF, January 2019.

[4] OCHA (2019) About CBPFs, 16 January 2019.

[5] IASC (2015) Introduction to Humanitarian Action: A Brief Guide for Resident Coordinators, October 2015.

[6] Adapted from OCHA (2012) OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles, June 2012.

[7] See https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3861.

Localization	Localizing humanitarian response is a process of recognizing, respecting and strengthening the leadership by local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations and to prepare national actors for future humanitarian responses.[8]
Operational impact	The 2015 CBPF Policy Instruction defines operational impact as the provision of timely, coordinated, principled assistance to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.[9]
Risk Management	According to the Operational Handbook, risk management aims to provide a specific set of decision-making tools to support the achievement of strategic outcomes in a transparent manner. Risk management includes risk identification, risk analysis and the development of mitigation strategies to manage residual risks. Partner risk management focuses on tailoring grant management procedures according to the capacity and performance of partners. Funding decisions should take into account risk analyses at both levels suggesting the appropriate assurance mechanisms. CBPF risk management procedures do not apply to UN agencies, only to other types of partners.

[8] Fabre, C. (2017) Localising the response: World Humanitarian Summit, Putting Policy into Practice. The Commitments into Action Series, Paris: OECD.

[9] OCHA (2015) Policy Instruction: Country-Based Pooled Funds, Ref.2015/01.

1. Introduction, approach and context

This section introduces the evaluation, provides a summary of the approach used for the case study and gives a brief background to the humanitarian situation and the SHF. A description of the methodology and the context are provided in annexes 4 and 5 respectively.

1.1. Introduction

12. The evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) has two main purposes: to improve accountability and learning, and to examine the results of the humanitarian action supported by CBPFs between 2015 and 2018,[3] with the purpose of drawing lessons on what has worked well. It also identifies challenges to the effective functioning and provides recommendations on how to continue to strengthen the CBPF as a funding mechanism in support of timely, coordinated and principled humanitarian response for affected people. The evaluation will contribute to greater transparency and accountability for key stakeholders.

13. The evaluation of the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF) is the first of five country case studies and was undertaken during the inception phase. A two-week trip was conducted by two members of the evaluation team who undertook interviews and FGDs with key stakeholders in Kenya and Somalia including with communities which had received SHF-funded assistance.

1.2. Approach

14. The team used a mixed-methods approach for data collection and analysis which included document review (see annex 3 for a bibliography), project-related data analysis, semi-structured key informant interviews (see annex 2 for a list of participants) and gender disaggregated focus-group discussions with communities. A summary of evidence sources for the evaluation is provided in Table 1. A more detailed outline of the methodology is available in annex 4.

Table 1: Summary of data collection methods and sources

Tools and methods	Description
Document and literature review	37 documents cited in this case study report plus a document repository containing 1,627 documents.
Key informant interviews	99 informants from Nairobi (Kenya), Mogadishu (South Central) Hargeisa and Awdal (Somaliland). 36% female and 64% male.
Community engagement	132 community members from 4 SHF.-funded projects affected by Cyclone Sagar from Awdal, Somaliland

15. The findings of the case study, presented in the sections below, are structured according to the evaluation matrix which is reproduced in annex 1.

1.3. The humanitarian context in Somalia

16. Somalia remains one of the most complex and long-standing humanitarian crises in the world and. The most significant humanitarian crisis during the evaluation period was the drought, which in 2017 affected an estimated 6.7 million people were in need of assistance,[4] more than half the population. While 2018 saw some improvements in the food security outlook, mainly due to the above-average rainfall and sustained humanitarian response, such gains are fragile, and serious protection concerns persist and humanitarian needs in Somalia remain high. Climatic shocks, armed conflict and violence are key drivers of humanitarian needs and human rights violations. In 2018, it was estimated that one

[3] During the evaluation period, CBPFs were operational in the following countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Myanmar, Pakistan, occupied Palestinian territory, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen. The Colombia fund closed at the end of 2018. The Haiti fund closed in 2015 and is not part of this evaluation.

[4] OCHA Somalia (2017) *Humanitarian Dashboard, July 2017*.

third of the total population, or 4.2 million people, were still in need of humanitarian assistance and protection.[5] Along with humanitarian action, substantial investment in resilience-building and development solutions are considered critical in order to address and reduce humanitarian needs in Somalia (see annex 5 for a more detailed context analysis).

1.4. Background to the SHF

17. The Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) had been in operation since June 2010 when the HC established it as an upgrade to the existing Humanitarian Response Fund. The Somalia CHF was intended to provide larger and more strategic funding to high-priority, underfunded projects in the Consolidated Appeal, through semi-annual allocations, to support the response to the most urgent needs, as well as the ability to respond to new emergencies via a reserve funding envelope. In 2016, as part of standardizing OCHA-managed pooled funds, the Somalia CHF was renamed as the Somalia Humanitarian Fund or SHF. Table 2 provides a summary of key facts about the SHF.

Table 2: SHF at a glance, 2015-2018[6]

SHF	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total annual contributions ($ millions)	36.1	26.1	56.9	54.3
No. of donors	8	8	14	12
No. of projects	79	107	163	120
No. of people reached (millions)	No data	No data	6.6	1.1[7]
No. of implementing partners	34	38	68	58
SHF as a % of total contributions to the HRP	8.8	5.2	5.5	6.0

1.5. Timelines of SHF allocations

18. Table 3 provides an overview of the humanitarian timeline for the period under evaluation alongside SHF and Central Emergency Response Funds (CERF) allocations.[8] This should be read in conjunction with the findings of the case study which are outlined in the section below.

[5] OCHA Somalia (2017) *Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan*, 2018, November 2017.

[6] Data obtained from the SHF annual reports for 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018.

[7] This figure suggests a reduction in the number of people reached in 2018 compared with prior years but this is due to a change in how the figures were calculated. In response to donor requests for greater clarity on results reporting, CBPFs changed how they reported these in 2018. Rather than reporting results based on the year in which the funding was allocated, the annual reports showed results reported in 2018, regardless of whether the projects had been funded in 2017 or earlier or 2018.

[8] The timeline is a snapshot of key events and does not seek to provide a comprehensive overview.

Table 3: Timeline of SHF allocations, 2015-2018

Date		Humanitarian event (appeal/crisis)[9]	CERF allocations (RR[10]/UFE[11])	SHF SA	SHF RA
Dec 2014		2015 HRP launched, 3,2 million in need, 2.76m targeted, $862.5m required			
Feb 2015		Somali and Yemeni nationals flee the crisis in Yemen		Feb 2015 $18.3m	
Apr 2015		Attacks on UN in Garowe force UN to review operations in Somalia			March 2015 $1.3m, food security. $1.3m, WASH
Jul 2015		Start of military offensive in South and Central Somalia	Aug 2015 $5.3m RR, Refugees	Aug 2015 $5.3m	
Sep 2015		Drought in Somaliland	Sep 2015 $20m UFE		
Oct 2015		Flooding due to heavy El Nino rains			
Nov 2015		2016 HRP launched, 4.9m in need, 3.5m targeted, $885m required			
Dec 2015		Conflict in Gaalkayo displaces over 90,000 people		Dec 2015 $5.5m	
Jan 2016		Response to Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD)/cholera	Mar 2016 $12.9m RR, AWD		Jan 2016 $0.6m, AWD
Feb 2016		Humanitarian agencies start to respond to drought in Puntland and Somaliland		Mar 2016 6.5m	Mar 2016 $0.25m, IDP water $0.25m, Support
Apr 2016		Drought situation deteriorates from severe to extreme			May 2016 $0.5m, Education
Jun 2016		Floods start to subside in Belet Weyne		Jun 2016 $7m	Jun 2016 $0.4m, Floods $1m, Support
Jul 2016		Refugee returns from Kenya to Somalia despite the drought			Jul 2016 0.2m Support
Aug 2016		Food security situation worsens with 5m people estimated to be food insecure		Sep 2016 $7m	Aug 2016 $0.5m, Assessment
Nov 2016		2017 HRP launched, 5m in need, 3.9m targeted, $864m required			
Jan 2017		FSNAU/FEWSNET issues famine alert		Jan 2017 $25m	

[9] Dates and descriptions of humanitarian events and CERF/CHF/SHF allocations taken from Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overviews, Humanitarian Response Plans and Somalia CHF/SHF Annual reports (see bibliography in annex 5).

[10] CERF Rapid Response (RR) grants provide support when a new crisis hits, when an existing emergency deteriorates significantly or in response to time-critical needs, OCHA (2019) About CERF, January 2019.

[11] CERF Underfunded Emergencies (UFE) grants provide support for critical needs in underfunded and often protracted crises. These are allocated during two rounds per year, OCHA (2019) About CERF, January 2019.

Feb 2017		Operational Plan for Famine Prevention (Jan – Jun 2017), $825m	Feb 2017 $18m UFE, Famine		Feb 2017 $0.7m, Assess-ment
Mar 2017		UN Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator visit Somalia	Apr 2017 $15m RR, Famine		Apr 2017 $6.2m, AAP[12]
May 2017		Revised 2017 HRP launched, 6.7m in need, 5.5m targeted $1.5bn required			Jun 2017 $6.2m, drought $0.1m, Support[13]
Aug 2017		National median GAM 17.4 % surpasses the emergency threshold of 15 %			Aug 2017 9.9m, Drought
Sep 2017		1,029,000 internal displacements since November 2016			Sep 2017 $1m, Measles
Dec 2017		2018 HRP launched, 6.2m in need, 5.4m targeted, $1.5bn required		Nov 2017 $12m	Nov 2017 $0.9m, Support[14]
Jan 2018		End of threat of famine declared			
Apr 2018		Flooding in southern and central areas of Somalia	Apr 2018 $12m RR, drought	Mar 2018 $22m	
May 2018		Cyclone Sagar in Somaliland and Puntland	May 2018 $6m RR, Floods		May 2018 $1m, Floods
Jun 2018		830,000 flood-affected and 300,000 dis-placed			June 2018 $3.5m, Cyclone
Aug 2018		Increase in forced IDP evictions with 204,000 in the first half of 2018			Jul 2018 $7.5m
Nov 2018		4.2m people estimated to require assis-tance in 2019		Nov 2018 $18m	Oct 2018 $1.3m Floods

[12] AAP refers to accountability to affected populations; support was provided by the SHF for the Common Feedback Project. See https://relief-web.int/report/somalia/humanitarian-common-feedback-project-accountability-affected-people-communication.

[13] Support provided by the SHF for the REACH joint assessment. See http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resourcedocuments/reach_som_report_joint_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_october_2017.pdf.

[14] Provision of support by the SHF to enable programmes through funding the UN Department for Safety and Security, the International NGO Safety Organisation and the NGO Consortium.

2. Inputs: Is the management of the fund fit for purpose and does it operate efficiently?


This section of the report focuses on the inputs to the Fund which include financial contributions, management actions and implementation capacity.

2.1. Resource mobilization

2.1.1. Donor contributions

19. The number of SHF donors and their level of contributions increased dramatically between 2016 and 2017 (see Figure 1 below), in response to the 2017 drought. Although the number of donors decreased in 2018, the SHF retained the funding level achieved in 2017 which had increased significantly on the prior year due to additional contributions for the drought response. Maintaining this level of funding despite an improvement in the humanitarian situation is an indicator of the level of confidence that donors currently have in the SHF.

Figure 1: Donor contributions to the SHF, 2015-2018[15]



20. The Somalia HRP more than doubled in size between 2016 and 2017, and so despite the increase in contributions to the SHF, the Fund has some way to go in order to meet the Secretary-General's (SG) aspiration for CBPFs to account for 15 per cent of HRP funding (see Table 4). However, the percentage has increased over the last three years and, in 2018, accounted for 6 per cent of HRP funding.[16] Given the history of the fund and the challenges implicit in delivering a timely and effective response in Somalia, many of those that participated in the evaluation spoke of it '*punching above its weight*' in terms of the contribution that it had made. While the adoption, by the SG, of a funding target offers an incentive for expansion, there is limited understanding about the basis for this and, as a consequence, it is limited in its ability to incentivize donor engagement.

Table 4: SHF funding as a share of HRP contributions, 2015-2018

	2015	2016	2017	2018
HRP contributions	$386m	$498.6m	$1.03bn	$899.9m
SHF as a % of total contributions to the HRP	8.8%	5.2%	5.5%	6%

[15] Data obtained from OCHA GMS and downloaded on 27 May 2019

[16] While the percentage decreased significantly from 2015 to 2018, it is noteworthy that the HRP contributions were less than half those received in 2018.

21. The widely held perception that the international humanitarian community's response to the 2011-12 famine was not timely[17] has resulted both in the refinement of monitoring and early warning mechanisms and a willingness by donors to act on the information they provide. This is encouraging given that the sector is often criticized for its inability to learn from prior practice. This led to a comparatively timely donor response to signs of deterioration in the food security situation linked to the successive failure of seasonal rains across large parts of Somalia (and the broader region) in 2017. Interviews highlighted a commitment by donors to provide funding to the revised HRP,[18] which was extended to the SHF, since they considered that it was well-positioned to play a role in addressing humanitarian needs.

Good practice: The 2017 drought led to timely collective action by donors to provide funding to the SHF since they considered it was well-positioned to play a role in addressing humanitarian needs.

22. Risk management is a second factor that has influenced donor contributions during the period under evaluation. This is hardly surprising given the challenging operational environment, but donor confidence was adversely affected by cases of fraud and mismanagement and adverse audit findings outlined in the previous Common Humanitarian Fund evaluation, which focused on the period 2011-2015.[19] The increase in donor contributions has mirrored the establishment of a strengthened risk management framework (see section 2.2 below).

23. Another important element in the widening of the SHF donor base is the fund's success in directly funding local and national NGOs (NNGOs).[20] Despite their Grand Bargain (GB) commitment, the majority of donors lack the capacity to fund NNGOs directly[21] even though NNGOs are frequently better able to reach those in greatest need of assistance in the Somalia context (section 3.3 examines funding to NNGOs in greater detail).

2.1.2. Resource mobilization strategy

24. The SHF has a Resource Mobilization Approach[22] dating from October 2017.[23] Its primary objective is to offer a '*financing tool that works*'. Interviews noted that, while there was interest in expanding the donor base (the third objective of the strategy), there was an acceptance that the SHF was not always a good match with new or non-OECD/DAC donors that prefer greater visibility, which is not easily achieved through a pooled fund. In recognition of this, the SHF's second resource mobilization objective is to further develop its core support base and the SHF has been making progress towards this.

Lessons: There is an acceptance that the SHF, and pooled funds generally, are not always a good match with new or non-OECD/DAC donors that prefer greater visibility which is not easily achieved through a pooled fund.

25. Figure 2 shows that the modest increase in the number of SHF donors in 2017-18 has made it less vulnerable to funding shifts by the big three contributors (Germany, Sweden and the UK). This is important given that one of these (the UK) has significantly reduced its contribution compared with pre-2015 levels. This is in part, a consequence of DFID strengthening its own humanitarian funding modalities, which has increased its ability to provide direct funding. It also highlights the importance of the SHF continuing to broaden its core donor base and increase the contribution-size from across its donors in order to reduce its dependence on the large donors.

[17] See for example, Slim, H. (2012) *IASC Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, Synthesis Report*, June 2012.

[18] OCHA (2017) Somalia *Humanitarian Response Plan, May 2017 Revision*.

[19] Fisher, M. (2015) *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund, Country Report: Somalia*, May 2015, KonTerra Group.


[20] For purposes of consistency, local and national NGOs will be termed as NNGOs in this report.

[21] For the purpose of this report, 'as directly as possible' includes funding channelled through a pooled fund that is directly accessed by national and local responders. It does not include funding via a single intermediary (i.e. via a UN agency).

[22] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *Resource Mobilization Approach*, October 2017.

[23] The strategy expired in December 2018 and has not been updated for the current year.

Figure 2: Donor contributions to the SHF, 2015-2018[24]



26. It is noteworthy that integral to the Resource Mobilization Approach is a Communications and Visibility Strategy that seeks to promote the SHF among donors and demonstrate its impact. The SHF has been proactive in pursuing this through its Twitter account, which has significant following in Somalia as well as among humanitarian staff, donors and supporters. While this evaluation could not assess the impact of the communications work undertaken, it was of a high quality and had kindled significant interest.

Good practice: Communications strategies which include the use of Twitter or Facebook have the potential to engage donors that contribute funds, in addition to communities who receive services. As a consequence, they can provide an important accountability function in addition to strengthening the profile of the pooled fund.

2.1.3. Multi-year contributions

27. The SHF's 2018 Annual Report highlighted that the lack of predictability in the timing and size of donor contributions limited the fund's ability to optimize allocations in relation to both seasonal requirement and the wider humanitarian program cycle. This has been an ongoing challenge that was also raised in the 2017 annual report. By contrast, in 2016, the SHF was able to allocate around 43 per cent of total contributions in the first quarter because of a combination of contributions at the end of 2015 and funding early in 2016.[25] Multi-year donor commitments can offer much-needed predictability and donor interviewees stated that they were advocating for this with their headquarters. Switzerland has agreed a 12-year commitment to the SHF for a total contribution of CHF 18 million, the UK has recently concluded a three-year commitment (2015-2017, $4 million/year), and Ireland has a two-year commitment in place (2018-2019, $3.6 million/year). Such multi-year commitments are important as they provide a level of assurance that HFU cost plans can be funded in addition to providing confidence that SA are funded and can be launched in a timely way.

Good practice: Current multi-year funding commitments which have been made by Switzerland and Ireland offers the SHF greater predictability in funding and can strengthen the timeliness of allocations.

[24] OCHA GMS.

[25] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *SHF 2016 Annual Report*.

2.2. Risk management

28. Risk management has been a significant focus of the SHF during the period under evaluation as the HFU has sought to build on the positive findings of the 2015 evaluation which endorsed the progress that had been made and judged that '*OCHA had taken some robust steps to evaluate their partners and to mitigate the risks of working remotely.*'[26]

29. The CBPF guidelines lay the foundation for risk management in the SHF. These were initiated in Somalia in February 2015 and were fully rolled out by early 2016. The operational modalities determine the control mechanisms that will be applied according to the partner's risk level, including funding tranches, reporting, monitoring, and maximum budget amount. The guidelines include strengthened compliance measures to ensure that outstanding high and medium risk audit issues and reporting requirements are fulfilled prior to funding a partner again.

30. A 2013 Manual[27] articulated the accountability framework for the SHF and this was updated with an SHF Accountability Framework in January 2019.[28] The SHF's management uses a risk-based approach, which implies that a thorough analysis of risks has been undertaken and that adequate assurance modalities have been identified and implemented to mitigate these risks. The SHF Accountability Framework consists of interlinked pillars that include implementing partner capacity, performance assessment and risk rating; project monitoring (field and remote); financial spot checks; reporting (financial and programmatic); and project audits.

2.2.1. Capacity assessment and due diligence

31. The purpose of the capacity assessment and due diligence component of the accountability framework is to acquire a portfolio of eligible partners, mitigating risks by examining their capacity and identifying gaps for capacity improvements. From an initial series of assessments undertaken by a private audit firm in 2013, the SHF has undertaken further rounds periodically. The evaluation found that these assessments were both rigorous and comprehensive. Importantly, they are also contextually relevant, being undertaken by a company that has a deep understanding of the operating environment in Somalia. Interviews highlighted that, over time, fewer serious concerns have arisen from the assessments.

32. Interviews with UN agencies including the Risk Management Unit in Mogadishu identified ongoing efforts to develop a collective risk management strategy for donors, the UN and NGOs. There have also been discussions about harmonizing capacity assessments because some UN agencies apply the Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT)[29] while some might use the SHF assessment and still others have their own individual approaches. Particularly when UN agencies have the same partner, it would be more efficient to have a single capacity assessment. OCHA is an active member of the Risk Working Group (RWG), comprising UN agencies that meets monthly. It uploads capacity assessments into the RWG database where members share information on contractors, key staff, risk assessments, capacity assessments and performance ratings.

33. The 2015 evaluation noted that NGO partners who did not pass the OCHA capacity assessment could still be implementers for UN agencies or INGOs receiving SHF funding. OCHA has little direct control over this because accountability for implementation remains with the primary funding recipient. While this continues to be the case, the shift in the SHF guidance from sub-granting to funding NNGOs directly means that this rarely occurs.

34. In exceptional cases, partners may receive funding without having undergone a full capacity assessment; this has occurred in a limited number of cases and in situations where immediate life-saving response was required but other eligible SHF partners were not available. OCHA conducted a pre-assessment of these partners and initiated a full assessment that was in process when funding was approved. Partners were treated as high risk, with additional assurance activities put in place.[30] Under the circumstances, and given the mandate of the fund, the team considers this course of action to be justified.

[26] Fisher, M. (2015) *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund, Country Report: Somalia*, May 2015, KonTerra Group.

[27] CHF Somalia (2013) *Accountability System Manual*, July 2013.

[28] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Accountability Framework*, 5 January 2019.

[29] See https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/HACT-2014-UNDG-Framework-EN.pdf.

[30] United Nations Board of Auditors (2018) Management letter on the External Audit of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Somalia and Ethiopia Country Office for the year ended 31 December 2017, May 2018.

35. NNGOs, in particular, attached considerable importance to the capacity assessments and were keen to be assessed. This is not only because of the importance of the SHF as one of the only sources of direct funding, but also because many other potential donors considered SHF capacity assessments as an entry point for discussions with would-be partners. While NGOs do not always pass the capacity assessment, the success rate has increased since the first batch of assessments occurred in 2013.

36. The significant appetite of NNGOs for undergoing capacity assessments has presented a dilemma for the SHF; it needs to balance its requirement for strong implementing partners and its commitment to strengthen localization with the importance of managing the fund efficiently[31] and having a manageable partner base. The team accepts that balancing these tensions successfully is not an art rather than a science and that the HFU should focus on ensuring that the fund has sufficient geographic coverage and diversity among its partners to enable it to achieve the operational impact statement of providing '*timely, coordinated and principled assistance*'.[32]

37. The SHF has also faced a challenge in contracting a company to conduct the capacity assessments. The HFU worked with UN Secretariat's Procurement Division in the Department of Management in New York for a year on the contract but the requirement for the selected company to be able to travel to all parts of Somalia disqualified all applicants except one. As a result, the Procurement Division cancelled the process. This has left the SHF unable to conduct capacity assessments since 2018 and has created considerable frustration among NNGOs, particularly in Somaliland. Unaware of the reason for the lack of capacity assessments, they felt that they were being deliberately excluded from the chance to become eligible for SHF funding as well as other donor funding. The HFU is addressing the problem by trying to piggyback on a UNICEF contract with the preferred capacity assessment company while initiating a new procurement process.[33]

2.2.2. Monitoring, spot-checks and audits

38. The HFU develops a monitoring plan for each allocation that is informed by the risk rating of the partner, the project activities and location. It has adopted three project monitoring approaches; remote call monitoring (RCM), third-party monitoring (TPM) and direct monitoring by OCHA staff who may be accompanied by cluster focal points.

Table 5: The use by SHF of monitoring modalities, 2016-2018[34]

Monitoring type	2016		2017		2018	
	Planned	Done	Planned	Done	Planned	Done
Total # Partners/SHF projects	38 partners/ 107 projects		68 partners/ 163 projects		58 partners/ 120 projects	
1. Direct monitoring visits	3	3	18	18	72	74
2. Ad-hoc visit	2	2	11	11	14	14
3. Third-party	18	18	11	11	15	15
4. Remote call	n/a	n/a	64	66	55	55

39. Table 5 above presents an analysis of the achievement of the HFU by monitoring modality against requirements for the period under evaluation and shows the increase in monitoring activities with time. The HFU frequently uses them in combination, with remote call monitoring supplementing direct visits and TPM to increase coverage in rural areas that are less accessible. The addition of a national Monitoring and Evaluation manager in October 2017, who is able to undertake low profile missions and is able to access large parts of the country, has significantly strengthened the SHF's monitoring capacity and the recruitment of two further national posts (one for monitoring and a second to support financial spot-checks) will further bolster this.

[31] Each capacity assessment costs approximately $10,000 to undertake.

[32] OCHA (2015) *Policy Instruction: Country-Based Pooled Funds*, Ref.2015/01.


[33] If a UN agency has a contract with an entity that went through a competitive process, OCHA can obtain permission from the agency to use the existing contract. The OCHA country office sends information about the agency and the contract, together with a justification for the request to piggyback, to the Procurement Division.

[34] Data was obtained from the relevant SHF Annual Report.

Good practice: The SHF's use of a menu of monitoring tools which includes direct monitoring visits, third-party monitoring and remote calls linked to an approach which selects tools in combination offers significant capacity to verify project implementation.

40. An external audit firm conducts independent audits of all SHF-funded projects. These are usually triggered within two months after approval of the final financial report. While the SHF has had a historic backlog of audits, the company made significant progress in 2018, undertaking 224 audits that accounted for 81 per cent of those that were required (of note is that it completed 21 out of 28 audits of high risk partners).[35] The 2018 SHF Annual Report lists this as an improvement on the previous year, although there is still some scope to continue to strengthen performance. Figure 3 below presents a comparative analysis of the SHF's compliance and risk management performance by modality between 2015 and 2018 (i.e. actual vs. required).

Figure 3: SHF compliance and risk management performance, 2015-2018[36]



41. The UN's procurement procedures pose one of the most significant challenges to the HFU's ability to undertake monitoring and compliance activities (interviews highlighted that procuring services through UNDP at country level had been much easier than doing this through OCHA New York). As noted in the previous section, the inability to put in place a contract for capacity assessments has affected the SHF's ability to take on new partners, particularly NNGOs. Delayed or incomplete procurement processes through the UN Secretariat's Procurement Division in New York have also affected contracts for the audit firm, call centre, and third-party monitors. At the time of the field visit in April 2019, the contract for the call centre had been finalized and the Procurement Division was finalizing the technical assessment of TPM companies.

Lessons: Given the important role played by contractors which includes remote call monitoring, third-party monitoring and audit services, it is essential that in future the HFU builds in adequate time to accommodate the UN's procurement processes. The experience of the SHF is important for CBPFs more broadly.

42. This evaluation considers that with the caveat outlined above, the HFU have established a mature approach to monitoring, spot-checks and audits. Not only is attention given to triangulation of data and in using a combination of monitoring approaches where this is necessary, but there is strong evidence of the data being analysed and used to manage partner and programme performance.

[35] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*.

[36] Comparable data for monitoring, financial reporting and audit is not available in the SHF Annual Reports for 2015 and 2016. The SHF laid the groundwork for financial spot-checks in 2016 which then commenced from 2017.

2.2.3. Performance management of partners

43. In line with CBPFs more broadly, the SHF has adopted a dynamic approach to partner performance management through the Partner Performance Index which is a process of continuous assessment based on the tools described in the previous section. The GMS aggregates the scores, including the last capacity assessment, information from credible external sources, and partner performance on each project (based on factors such as the results of monitoring visits and the timeliness of reporting). This assigns a rolling aggregate risk level for a partner (high, medium or low).

44. Communicating the findings of monitoring modalities, spot-checks, and audits to partners via GMS represents good practice. It ensures transparency and also enables the HFU to share and agree follow-up actions or sanctions with the partner. A review of summary comments from a recent round of monitoring highlighted their value in raising issues of concern and outlining partner actions and proposed changes to risk ratings as a consequence. Since issues identified by the monitoring modalities have a bearing on the partner's risk rating, this offers a level of transparency that partners appreciated. What is more problematic is that partners no longer have direct access to their risk rating on GMS. This makes it more difficult for them to track when their risk rating has changed.

2.2.4. Compliance issues

45. One key informant described the SHF's approach to issues of fraud and mismanagement as '*aggressive transparency*'. Six-monthly updates to donors on escalated accountability issues pertaining to individual SHF partners. These outline the actions taken and current status (including the partner's eligibility status). Partner names are redacted and the document is treated as confidential. In addition to these updates, alerts are provided when cases of fraud or mismanagement are discovered. For the SHF, it is a challenge to balance the conflicting requirements of promoting transparency with donors on the one hand and dealing responsibly with sensitive and potentially defamatory information on the other. This team considers that the SHF's current approach achieves a good balance.

46. During consultations with donors, they consistently considered the SHF to be more transparent in its reporting of compliance issues than other agencies that they fund. While a comparative analysis of risk management approaches is outside the scope of the evaluation, this constitutes an important finding for the evaluation.

47. The SHF has in place a process for addressing compliance issues; when compliance issues are identified, forensic or special audits may be commissioned by the CBPF-Section in order to determine if fraud or mismanagement took place and its extent. Efforts are made to secure repayment of ineligible expenditure and, in the case of Somalia, as a general rule, NGOs have been cooperative. If an NGO does not repay ineligible expenditures, it is deemed ineligible for future funding and so it tends only to be those that are deliberately fraudulent that do not repay. For most partners, the SHF is too important an income stream to risk ineligibility. In addition, changes in an NGO's SHF eligibility is like to have implications for other donor funding.

48. As a general comment, and without disclosing details, recent compliance issues are now largely linked to a lack of capacity or weak control frameworks rather than efforts to defraud. While this shift cannot be attributed solely to the SHF, the routine use of rigorous capacity assessments and monitoring processes is likely to have had some bearing on the perceived reduction in attempts at fraud.



Good practice: The approach taken by the SHF and CBPF-Section in assessing, monitoring and communicating issues of fraud and mismanagement to donors is considered to be effective and constitutes good practice.

2.3. Implications of the global standardization of CBPFs

49. The implementation of the global standardization of CBPFs (as per the 2015 Policy Instruction, Operational Handbook, and Common Performance Framework) was rolled out during February 2016, when the accountability framework already in place for the SHF was migrated to the Operational Manual. One of the key benefits of the global standardization was considered to be the strengthened compliance measures and tools on fund management and accountability.

50. The implementation of the global guidance has been tempered by the SHF's need to modify core documents to ensure contextual relevance and to learn from past practice. This has meant that the SHF Guidelines have been periodically updated, which this evaluation considers to be prudent.[37]

51. Overall, there was positive feedback about the GMS, which was considered to have significantly strengthened flexibility and transparency. Most informants found the system relatively easy to use (even with limited internet speeds) and there are numerous examples in different sections of this report that attest to the benefits it offers by strengthening communication and transparency between the SHF and its partners, including for allocations, proposal development and review and risk management.

52. There has been considerable standardization of CBPFs, including agreement that OCHA will take on the Managing Agent (MA) role in the four countries where UNDP still has this. However, there continue to be country-level variations in responsibilities for the Administrative Agent (AA). In Somalia, the MPTFO is mandated as AA. The evaluation was tasked with examining this role through an efficiency lens. In Somalia, interviews and process analyses highlighted a number of areas where the arrangement had implications for the speed of disbursement to NGOs and their implementation.

53. The CBPF-Section in New York sends a Fund Transfer Request (FTR) to the MPTFO to cover payments to NGOs and only countersigns grant agreements with NGOs and initiates disbursements once it has received the funds. This has raised concerns about the additional effort that results from the use of two separate financial systems within the MPTFO and OCHA. In 2018, the MPTFO processed 98 per cent of FTRs within the agreed five-day timeframe and 81 per cent of these within three days. This was reflected in interviews with the HFU and recipient organisations, which found that the transfer of funds from the MPTFO to OCHA for disbursement added a minimum of three days to the process. However, it could be longer for individual partners because the MPTFO has asked the SHF to process NGO grants in batches, when feasible. The SHF has complied with this request but was concerned that this contributed to bottlenecks because proposals finalized swiftly sometimes had to wait for others that might take longer to refine and finalize. Overall, while the MPTFO has processed FTRs quickly, having to go through its offices adds extra steps to the disbursement process and creates additional workload for the HFU and OCHA.

54. Dividing responsibilities between two entities also militates against either OCHA or the MPTFO having comprehensive oversight of SHF funding to UN agencies. This is because, while the MPTFO is responsible for financial oversight, OCHA being present on the ground monitors programmatic implementation. Currently, the MPTFO receives certified financial reports from the UN agencies on a quarterly basis but OCHA would need to transfer them across to the GMS to make them available to the HFU. Therefore, the HFU has requested UN agencies to submit financial reports at country level, which they have agreed to do although this is not an obligation.

2.4. Capacity of the humanitarian system

2.4.1. Leadership and management of the SHF

55. There was broad consensus about improvements in the leadership and management of the SHF over the period under evaluation. In Somalia, the HC is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). Interviewees regarded the recently departed HC/RC/DSRSG as committed to the task of leadership and oversight of the fund and ably supported by the OCHA Head of Office (HoO) in this task. The HoO had also provided robust defence for the SHF when this was necessary, which has created space for the fund to adapt and grow. Given the challenges faced by the fund in 2011/12 and the decrease in donor confidence, this support was considered to be essential.

[37] The SHF Operational Manual was released in May 2017 and was updated in 2018 and 2019.

56. The role of the AB is to determine strategic focus, oversee the process, manage risk and review activities. In the case of the SHF, the evaluation found both a willingness and capacity to do this. Members of the AB were clear about their role and committed to playing it; in fact, there was a significant interest from non-members to join the AB, which underlines the level of importance attached to it. Importantly, the SHF has a diverse AB with equal representation from the UN (four persons), NGO (four persons comprising two INGO members, one NNGO member plus the Somalia NGO Consortium lead) and donor representatives (four persons). Evidence from the interviews suggests that this diversity is an important strength of the group.

57. While the AB's role is clearly outlined in the SHF Operational Manual, there was an appetite from some members to engage in more detailed discussions of technical issues such as risk management or fraud and of thematic priorities such as gender, disability or the specifics of some of the responses. At present, it was felt that there is limited space in the regular AB meeting agenda for these issues to be discussed. This issue will be examined across the other case studies with a view to identifying good practice.

58. The HFU's competence and capacity is fundamental to a CBPF's effectiveness and, in the case of SHF, the team has transitioned over time to its current composition (see Figure 3). While it will only be possible to undertake a comparison of management models in the global synthesis report after all the case studies have been completed, there are some aspects of the SHF that are potentially relevant for the evaluation:

- The majority of HFU staff is currently based in Nairobi, albeit with travel undertaken into Somalia. The exception to this is the accountability team, which is responsible for monitoring and evaluation, and which is based in Mogadishu. While there has been a general shift of humanitarian staff into Somalia over the last year, the nature of the role that the HFU staff play means that their current location (and mobility) currently meets the needs of the fund.
- A significant number of the team have been in place for a considerable length of time. This means that not only do they have a good understanding of how the fund works and considerable institutional memory, but also that they are well placed to support others. Feedback on the support that the HFU staff provide was consistently positive.
- Over time, the HFU has played a more visible role in supporting decision-making processes, such as in Strategic Review Committees in the clusters, where they are now members rather than facilitators. Several interviewees considered this a positive change and felt that it was well positioned to play an objective and impartial role in addition to facilitating the process.

Good practice: There was broad consensus that the use of HFU staff in decision-making processes such as SRCs offers both hands-on technical support but also provides reassurance about impartiality. HFU staff were considered to play an '*honest-broker*' role.

59. Overall, informants considered that the HFU had become stronger with time and while some concerns were expressed about its capacity at the start of the period under evaluation, at the present time, there is broad recognition that its current knowledge and capacity is an asset to the SHF.

Figure 4: SHF Humanitarian Financing Unit structure[38]





Figure 5: SHF management costs (HFU actual expenditure), 2015-18[39]



60. HFU costs have fluctuated over the years and, as a consequence it is not possible to identify any specific trends (see Figure 4). Of note for this evaluation is the increase in costs (in absolute terms) in 2018 which was reported to be as a consequence of the inclusion of SHF accountability costs, including the procurement of third-party monitoring, remote call centre and capacity assessment services, that were costed separately in previous years.

61. With the structure of the HFU in mind, while offering value for money is important, this evaluation believes that cost is an unhelpful performance indicator as strong management and robust monitoring and risk management processes are key to the success of a CBPF and it is important to encourage adequate investment in these systems.

[38] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *HFU Organogram*, March 2019.

[39] Data obtained from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*. The grade of each post in the UN Common System is indicated in brackets beside the job title. Posts outlined in red are based in Mogadishu, Somalia. All other posts are based in Nairobi, Kenya.

2.4.2. The capacity of the clusters to manage allocations

62. The ICCG and individual clusters play a strategic role in ensuring linkages between the fund, the HRP and cluster strategies, and an operational role in providing technical expertise and supporting the process of project prioritisation, review and revision. The clusters were broadly supportive of their engagement in these tasks, linked to their recognition of the fund's importance. However, there was less clarity in defining responsibilities for monitoring programme quality. While the HFU team is able to provide a verification function, it is not staffed by sector specialists and so can only engage to a limited extent on issues of technical quality. The HFU M&E officer has tried to overcome this, to some extent, by engaging in joint monitoring missions with a cluster focal point, but this has been dependent on staff availability. There were differing opinions about whether this was a task that the clusters should support, with some being quite clear that their function did not extend to monitoring programme quality. The 2019 SHF Operational Manual notes the potential for clusters to contribute to monitoring and evaluation in a number of ways that include '*participating in inter-agency project visits'* but there is no suggestion that this is an obligation.

63. Beyond the SHF, cluster coordination in Somalia is a challenge because of geographic constraints (the national cluster has representatives based both in Mogadishu and Nairobi) and the limited capacity available at a regional level where clusters are frequently led by voluntary focal points. Despite this, clusters have made significant efforts to engage consistently in SHF processes and have performed them well.

2.4.3. The capacity of partners to deliver SHF projects

64. Ultimately, the SHF can only meet its objectives if it is able to identify partners that have access to areas where there is the greatest humanitarian need, and that have capacity to deliver timely and coordinated programmes. Section 3.3 below addresses how the SHF selects the best-placed partners and supports localization but it is important to note that it has made efforts over the last five years to increase the number and diversity of partners eligible to receive SHF funding.

65. As noted in section 2.2.1, when disasters have occurred in areas where SHF-eligible partners are limited, the fund has been proactive in engaging additional partners and in fast-tracking capacity assessments when needs have been time-critical.

66. One of the main challenges with responding to humanitarian needs in Somalia is that some of the most critical needs are in territory controlled by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG) which are the areas that are also most difficult for agencies to access with principled assistance (section 5.2 discusses the issue of humanitarian principles in further detail). While it was not possible during the evaluation to undertake a detailed examination of SHF coverage, the team interviewed several NNGOs that work around the fringes of these areas and had received SHF funding to address humanitarian needs and so the evaluation can say that the SHF has made considerable efforts to ensure assistance can be provided as close to those who need it as is feasible.

3. Activities and outputs: To what extent are CBPFs supporting partners to meet the most urgent humanitarian needs in a way that is timely and is consistent with Grand Bargain priorities?


This section of the report examines the fund's performance in delivering key activities and outputs, including the identification of priority needs, selecting the best-placed partners, supporting the delivery of program quality, and responding to the needs of affected populations.

3.1. Contextually relevant and in line with HRPs

3.1.1. Alignment with the HRP and strategic priorities

67. As indicated in Figure 5 below, the SHF is integral to the HRP and, between 2015 and 2018, it accounted for between five and nine per cent of total HRP funding (with the 2015 contribution accounting for the highest percentage of 8.8 per cent when the HRP budget was just under a third of its size in 2018).

Figure 6: HRP appeal and contributions, SHF contributions and CERF allocations, 2015-18[40]



68. The finding of the evaluation is that the SHF is predominantly aligned with the HRP and its strategic priorities. Standard Allocation (SA) strategies have a foundation in the HRP and are explicitly linked to the strategic objectives (SO) outlined in the document. Departures from these may occur when new emergencies are targeted by Reserve Allocations (RA), although in the case of the SHF, these have still broadly been aligned with the SO.[41]


69. While SHF annual reporting on how each of the allocations have met specific HRP SO has been inconsistent across the evaluation period, 2018 offers the clearest illustration of how the allocations have contributed to the achievement of the HRP. While 75 per cent of SHF projects were linked to individual HRP projects, close to 87 per cent ($48 million) of the allocated funds targeted assistance to IDPs and drought response, which were central components of the 2018 HRP (see Figure 6). All allocations responded to either one or more of the first three strategic objectives in the HRP.

70. Of particular note is the contribution made by the SHF in prioritising an integrated approach to the 2017 nutrition crisis. In doing so, the SHF supported the delivery of the HRP's second strategic objective (SO2) to reduce emergency levels of acute malnutrition by strengthening nutrition sensitive and integrated programming.

[40] HRP budgets and contributions and SHF contributions obtained from SHF Annual Reports 2015-2018. Data on CERF allocations obtained from https://cerf.un.org/what-we-do/allocation-by-country/2018.

[41] It is noteworthy that the HRP SOs themselves are quite broad in nature.

Figure 7: Links between SHF Standard Allocations and the 2018 HRP strategic objectives (SO)[42]



SO1: Provide life-saving and life-sustaining integrated multi-sectoral assistance to reduce acute humanitarian needs and reduce excess mortality among the most vulnerable people.

SO2: Nutrition: Reduce emergency levels of acute malnutrition through integrated, multi-sectoral response. Enhance integration of Nutrition, WASH, Health and Food Security programs to strengthen nutrition sensitive programming.

SO3: Support provision of protection services to affected communities, including in hard-to-reach areas and in IDP sites, targeting the most vulnerable, especially those at risk of exclusion.

SO4: Resilience: Support the protection and restoration of livelihoods, promote access to basic services to build resilience to recurrent shocks, and catalyze more sustainable solutions for those affected, including marginalized communities

71. The support provided by the SHF to the protection-focused SO is of note, given that it only received 20.7 per cent of its HRP funding requirements.[43] Drawing on guidance from the protection cluster, the SHF allocations were directed to respond to protection risks and threats faced by communities including IDPs, marginalized communities and people with special needs. Protection principles were also incorporated in most sections of the 2018 SHF allocation strategies (i.e. humanitarian needs analysis, promoting activities across clusters and detailed instructions in the allocation guidance section). This strengthened the SHF's ability to target the most vulnerable, enhance safety and dignity, and help protect the rights of beneficiaries.

Good practice: The support provided by the SHF to the protection-focused SO is of note, given that it received only modest funding in the 2018 HRP. Approximately 15 per cent of the 2018 SHF allocations contributed to this SO.

72. The Operational Manual suggests a 75:25 split between SA and RA but management strives to prioritize funds on a rolling basis, as they come in in order not to '*sit on money*'. As a general rule, a contingency envelope of between $2 and £3 million is maintained. Allocations are then triggered based on needs and inter-agency contingency plans, but are also reflective of donor funding timelines or discussions about funding which are based on consultation, financial years and historical contribution trends.

73. In 2017, about 95 per cent ($53 million) of the allocated funds were channelled through collectively prioritized famine-prevention activities and allocation rounds.[44] The SHF also demonstrated its ability to provide a flexible response capacity and to respond to changes in HRP priorities when, in May, the revised HRP shifted towards a more targeted approach that prioritized integrated action and supported greater proximity of interventions to those in need. To ensure close alignment with the adjusted HRP priorities, the SHF actively promoted integration of response in the second half of 2017. The adaption of allocation processes to bring clusters together to prioritize an integrated multi-cluster response improved efficiency and strengthened a comprehensive approach to famine prevention.

[42] Data obtained from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*.

[43] https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/644/summary.

[44] Data obtained from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *SHF Annual Report, 2017*.

74. The examples above demonstrate the SHF's ability to address both established and emerging priorities, which is a strength. The SHF's ability to be flexible enough to respond to shifting priorities throughout the year makes it an important operational response capacity for the HRP.

3.1.2. Transparent identification of high-quality projects

75. There is a well-established process of agreeing allocations for the SHF, which plays an important role in ensuring alignment with HRP priorities. Standard allocations are based on multi-cluster assessments as well as Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) data, together with vulnerability indicators (seasonality issues, forecasts and assessments). The prioritization process includes a discussion of hard-to-reach and under-served areas (based on an analysis of funding). The data and analyses lead to the identification of priority regions and clusters in Allocation Strategies. Over the evaluation period, these strategies have become more prescriptive in order to provide a clear focus on humanitarian needs and the partners best placed to meet those needs. The AB discusses the allocation strategies and asks questions but allows the HFU and clusters to determine operational details.

76. The SHF ensures the selection of high-quality projects and the best placed partners through the strategic and technical review of projects. The HFU conducts the first review of project proposals to ensure that they meet the allocation guidelines. This reduces the overall number of submissions and, thereby, the workload of the review committees. The general view was that the review processes are fairly impartial and that there are measures in place to avoid conflicts of interest, including ensuring that SRCs have a broad composition and taking an average of the project scores that each SRC member gives. The HFU has also developed a checklist to guide SRCs and participates in the reviews to increase transparency. In some cases, a high scoring project might not be funded for operational reasons such as avoiding duplication in the same geographical location. The reasons for this are reflected in SRC meeting minutes to ensure transparent decision-making. Following the strategic review, the technical review committee examines technical aspects of the proposal while the HFU as well as the finance team in the CBPF-Section in New York review the project budget.

77. Integrated or multi-cluster programming is one way in which the SHF has sought to increase the relevance and quality of projects. In line with the revised HRP of May 2017, the SHF began financing integrated responses through the first RA in May 2017, allocating funding envelopes for groups of clusters as well as individual clusters.[45] The SHF is flexible about the modalities used to deliver multi-cluster projects, such as a small number of partners working to deliver multi-cluster projects in a specific area of operation or the deployment of Integrated Emergency Response Teams (IERT) for life-saving health, WASH, shelter/NFI and nutrition response (with the option of incorporating food security and protection depending on critical needs in the selected areas) or partners targeting the same beneficiaries with several, multi-cluster activities.[46] This approach continued through both SAs and RAs until the first SA in 2019, when the SHF reverted to allocating funding envelopes by cluster.

78. The integrated approach is more relevant for responding to the needs of affected communities, who do not experience needs in sectoral siloes, and is therefore deemed to deliver greater impact for beneficiaries. It has also been a niche area for the SHF, since the way in which it operates means that it can promote multi-cluster working and multi-sectoral responses on a larger scale than bilateral donors. However, the approach has also been challenging with NGO partners often being specialized and therefore finding it harder to perform equally strongly across several sectors. The siloed nature of cluster system also makes it more difficult to review and approve multi-cluster projects. The GMS reflects the cluster system, requiring partners to select only one main cluster for a proposal and thereby makes integrated programming more difficult. This can be overcome by allocating a percentage of the project to different clusters and then ensuring that the proposal makes the link across them but this is an administrative hurdle.[47]

[45] It is noteworthy that the integrated approach is a requirement for some allocations, but not for others.

[46] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *SHF Reserve – Integrated Response Allocation Strategy*. Somalia Humanitarian Fund, June 2017.

[47] It is reported that progress has subsequently been made towards accommodating multi-cluster approaches as the proposal template has been upgraded to include multiple clusters e.g. while the activities across clusters for a multi-sector project are inter-linked, each cluster has a log-frame with further linkages shown in the other sections of the proposal.

Lessons: The practice, by the SHF, of promoting and supporting integrated programmes is good practice, but the process through which they do this also offers important lessons for CBPFs more broadly.

79. In line with the HRP and international humanitarian programming timeframes, SHF allocation strategies have historically focused on a maximum project length of 12 months. However, given the long-term nature of the crisis in Somalia, the SHF has sought to improve the relevance and quality of projects by providing explicit guidance that, wherever possible, partners should adopt strategies that are sustainable and will contribute to longer-term change. The most frequently cited example of this is the prioritization of boreholes over water trucking.[48]

80. In 2019, the strategy for the first standard allocation included a focus on recovery and resilience. As part of this, it provided for the HC to approve projects longer than 12 months '*in exceptional cases*' albeit with agreement that the SHF will not cover full management components, but only cover specific programmatic activities beyond 12 months (maintenance, monitoring, community participation etc.).[49] In a chronic context like Somalia, this is vital for more sustainable activities such as drilling boreholes (which can require up to 12 months) and then monitoring water quality, establishing water committees and putting in place mechanisms to maintain the boreholes (which can take an additional six months). Nutrition programs that extend beyond 12 months do not only deliver continuity of services and greater impact (by incorporating both prevention and response) but also deliver better value for money because they do not need to incur the costs of closing down a project, letting go of staff, etc. only to start over again with a '*new*' project.

3.1.3. The use of cash and vouchers in line with Grand Bargain commitments

81. The SHF has financed cash and voucher-based assistance throughout the evaluation period, mainly in food security. For example, the 2015 annual report refers to supporting livelihoods through cash-for-work interventions while the 2016 annual report notes that SHF funding enabled improved access to food through conditional and unconditional cash transfers for 28,121 people.[50] However, it was only able to start tracking the use of cash and vouchers systematically in 2018, with the inclusion of a cash marker in the GMS. At least 11 per cent of SHF's 2018 allocations ($5.5 million) were channelled as cash assistance, enabling people to access services. For example, cash assistance increased immediate access to food, facilitated access to safe water in areas of severe water shortages and allowed beneficiaries to purchase emergency shelter and NFI kits.[51] Box 1 below describes how SHF-financed unconditional cash transfers made a difference to people's lives.

Box 1: Making a difference through unconditional cash transfers



The 2011-12 drought and famine drove Enab and her family, hungry and destitute, to settle in El-dibir village. Before the 2018 drought, she supported her six children and bed-ridden husband from a small income that she earned through buying and selling meat. The drought wreaked havoc on livestock and Enab could no longer earn enough to sustain the family. Food and water became very expensive. Enab explained, *"My children were hungry and I was afraid for their lives. I could no longer feed them, so I had to send them away to live with their relatives in Mogadishu."*

In July 2018, the SHF funded Adeso to provide unconditional cash transfers to 6.600 families, including Enab's. The money helped buy essential food and water for her family and medicine for her husband. *"The money was used for life-saving purposes. When I received the cash, there was no food in our house,"* she said.

[48] For example, throughout 2018 in Sool and Sanaag, SHF funding was used to drill and equip strategic boreholes, which not only contributed towards sustainable access to safe water but was also cost effective in comparison with water trucking.

[49] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF 1st Standard Allocation 2019*, 12 March 2019.

[50] Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund (2016) *2015 Annual Report* and Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *2016 Annual Report*.

[51] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*.

3.2. Effectiveness and efficiency of processes to allocate and disburse funding

3.2.1. Efficiency and timeliness of SHF allocation and disbursement processes

82. The SHF Operational Manual outlines the workflow for both SAs and RAs, with an indicative number of working days for each step.[52] In the case of SA, the steps from the development of the allocation strategy to disbursement of the first tranche should take 56-63 working days while, for RA, these steps should take 32-37 working days.

83. In the Common Performance Framework (CPF) for 2018, the SHF set itself targets for the average duration of allocation processes from the launch of an allocation strategy to the HC's approval of selected projects. These were 50 days for SA and 30 days for RA. The SHF made two SAs and three RAs in 2018 and achieved an average of 35 days from allocation launch to project approvals for the SA and only 17 days from launch to project approvals for RA (see Table 1 below).

84. The SHF was able to exceed its targets because it has worked with stakeholders to fine-tune various aspects of the allocation and disbursement process and improve efficiency. The starting point is the preparation of the allocation strategy, which interviews suggested has become more prescriptive over time. Given the engagement of the clusters and the fact that priorities must be consistent with the HRP (particularly for SA), this tighter prioritisation is considered to be helpful because it reduces submissions from partners that are working in sectors or geographic regions that are outside of the allocation strategy. Cluster coordinators who had been in post for the period under evaluation viewed the reduced number of submissions positively, as they were able to focus more of their time on issues of quality.

Good practice: The SHF was able to exceed its targets for the timeliness of SAs and RAs because it has worked with stakeholders to fine-tune various aspects of the allocation and disbursement process and improve efficiency by prescribing priority issues/areas in the allocation strategies.

85. Once the allocation strategy has been launched, the HFU maintains a timeline of key steps in the process, which offers the evaluation a resource to review issues of timeliness; a comparison of performance across the period under evaluation is provided below (see Table 6).

Table 6: Average numbers of days for SHF allocation processes, 2016-18[53]

Key steps in the allocation process	2016		2017		2018	
Standard Allocation/Reserve Allocation	SA	RA	SA	RA	SA	RA
Allocation launch to HC approval of selected projects[54]					35	17
Proposal submission to IP signature of grant agreement	58	58	42	33	45	29
Proposal submission to disbursement	71	71	62	48	67	47
Executive Officer signature to disbursement	12	12	11	10	8	8

86. The table reveals that there was a significant reduction in the average number of days for the main steps in the allocation process between 2016 and 2017. Between 2017 and 2018, there was a slight increase in the average number of days from proposal submission to implementing partner signature and also to disbursement. One potential explanation for the increase is that all the SHF allocations in 2018 promoted integrated or multi-cluster programming. While this delivers benefits for affected communities, it requires lengthy consultations to develop the interventions, joint planning at ICCG level as well as multi-cluster review and project selection processes.[55] The SHF was able to reduce the average number of days taken from Executive Officer signature to disbursement in 2018 mainly by providing accurate due diligence information, necessary for the quick disbursement of funds to partners, in a timely way.[56]

[52] SHF (2019), *Somalia Humanitarian Fund Operational Manual*, April 2019.

[53] Data obtained from Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) SHF Annual Report, 2018 and Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) SHF Annual Report, 2017

[54] Data for 2016 and 2017 not reported in Annual Reports.

[55] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*.


[56] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*.

3.3. The promotion of best-placed partners and support for localization

3.3.1. Use of procedures to identify the best-placed partners to meet humanitarian needs


87. The SHF is committed to working with partners best placed to respond to humanitarian needs. It recognizes that NNGOs tend to have greater access than international organizations in the difficult operating environment in Somalia, can offer greater proximity to affected communities, and are more likely than international organizations to continue to work when there is insecurity. As a result, the SHF has taken proactive measures to increase support to NNGOs. This includes making support for local partners, '*if, when and where feasible*', and also direct implementation through international and national NGOs part of the allocation principles in strategy documents in 2017 and 2018. The principles in the strategy document for the first SA in 2018 stated that the SHF should strive to channel at least 30 per cent of available funding to national partners, '*if, when and where feasible*'. The SHF's motivation in promoting direct implementation, rather than sub-contracting, is to strengthen the capacity of NNGOs and also to ensure that they receive the 7 per cent program support costs directly, which they can use to strengthen the organization.[57] The HFU has also encouraged the cluster system to promote NNGO partners in the project selection process, for example, by giving additional weighting to NNGO proposals. As a result, as Figure 7 below illustrates, SHF funding to NNGOs increased significantly in 2017 to 38 per cent of allocations and again in 2018, to 46 per cent of allocations.

Figure 8: Percentage of funds allocated per type of partner/year, 2015-18[58]



88. The SHF's efforts to engage with NNGOs also led to a significant increase in the number of NNGO partners eligible to receive SHF funding between 2016 and 2017, from 31 to 66. By comparison, the number of eligible INGO partners remained steady from 2015 to 2018 and increased slightly only in 2018 (see Figure 8).

Figure 9: Eligible SHF NGO partners per type/year, 2015-18[59]



[57] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *Role of SHF in Promoting Localization*.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Data obtained from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*.

89. As described in section 2.2.1, all NGOs must undergo a capacity assessment to be eligible for SHF funding. Cluster coordinators recommend NNGOs that participate actively in coordination meetings for capacity assessments, which is conducted by a private company. This can put cluster coordinators under pressure. Among some Somaliland NGOs there was a perception that cluster lead agencies were biased against them because when they implement projects for UN agencies, the UN agencies report on their work as part of the agencies' overall program. Therefore, the NGOs were not named in 3W reporting and felt that they were not receiving due credit for their work. The capacity assessment is also a means of strengthening NGO partners since all assessed partners receive comprehensive feedback on the review of their systems. Also, NNGOs that receive SHF funding can demonstrate their capacity to implement activities to other donors. In Somaliland, in particular, NNGOs viewed the SHF as one of the few potential sources of regular funding and their UN agency partners encouraged them to apply to the SHF as a consequence.

90. Donors were very supportive of the SHF's efforts to increase direct funding to NNGOs. This helps them to deliver on their Grand Bargain commitment despite the inability of most bilateral donors to finance NNGOs directly. They also appreciated the SHF's robust risk management and accountability measures, which are based on risk and performance information rather than partner type (INGO or NNGO).

91. While the SHF has increased partnerships with NNGOs, working with these partners is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, and '*the overarching objective of the Fund remains to channel funds through partners best placed to implement prioritized activities in a timely, efficient and accountable manner*'.[60] Several interviewees noted potential challenges with increasing direct funding to NNGOs. One is that NNGOs might have access to hard-to-reach areas but not the technical capacity required to deliver a project. Clusters prioritizing access then need to find ways to provide technical support, such as linking the NNGO to an INGO. Another is that NNGOs that have close links to affected communities and are able to deliver on the ground might not have the skills to write good quality proposals and reports. This can require clusters and the HFU to engage more with NNGO partners to improve the quality of proposals and thus slow down the proposal review process. Also, smaller NNGOs may have less capacity to deliver assistance at scale. This can lead to the SHF making a larger number of small grants, which has implications for the workload and capacity of the HFU.

3.3.2. Inclusion of, and support for, local and national actors

92. Localization goes well beyond funding to NNGOs and the SHF has sought to include and support them in a number of ways. One of these is to ensure NNGO representation on the AB, which has one NNGO member and a representative of the Somalia NGO Consortium. In addition, the Somalia NGO Consortium held quarterly meetings with the HC that included issues relating to the SHF. This improved dialogue, transparency and information sharing with the NGO community broadly. The SHF also provides training and support to NGO partners on administrative and financial requirements, including proposal writing, budget guidance, using the GMS, etc. NNGO partners were very appreciative of this support although there was also some appetite for more programmatic support.

93. Some clusters provide technical training to NNGO members. For example, the WASH cluster is working with a local NGO to train NNGOs on borehole rehabilitation. It is also encouraging INGOs to strengthen NNGO capacity, including with some SHF funding. The food security cluster has also provided training to NNGOs and appreciated that SHF funding was enabling the organizations to put the training into practice. In the shelter cluster, NNGOs are required to attend technical training courses in order to receive SHF funding and this encourages them to attend.

94. The government is an important actor for the localization agenda but attempts to politicize assistance in Somalia have posed a barrier to involving them in prioritization processes. However, the government is growing increasingly vocal and interested in the SHF, leading to discussions about how to inform or engage with them. There was a suggestion that the SHF could proactively inform relevant authorities about funding decisions and the evidence base for those decisions in order to avoid misunderstandings and frustration. The education cluster encourages partners to inform regional governments about planned activities and this has been well received.

[60] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *Role of SHF in Promoting Localization* and Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *SHF and Localization – Lessons learned from 2017, pg. 1*.

3.4. Responding to the needs of affected people

3.4.1. Projects based on coordinated and participatory needs assessments

95. As noted in section 3.1.2, SHF allocation strategies are based on a range of needs analyses and data. At individual project level, the proposal format in GMS requires partners to describe the needs assessments on which the project is based. There is an assumption that partners consult affected communities about their priorities as well. During FGDs with communities at SHF-funded project sites, the team found that the level of consultation varied. In most (but not all) cases, men tended to be consulted more than women. It should be noted that, although the team was able to consult 132 women and men at six project sites, this is a very small sample of the number of projects that the SHF funded in 2018 and of the total number of SHF beneficiaries.

3.4.2. Identifying those most in need, including marginalized groups

96. Based on partner interviews and project visits, the team identified that SHF partners usually work with community elders and/or line ministries to identify beneficiaries, including the most vulnerable. In project proposals on GMS, partners can use the section on '*description of beneficiaries*' to list beneficiary selection criteria that prioritize the most vulnerable or marginalized, such as households that have people with disabilities or women and child-headed households or GBV survivors. In the reporting format, under '*affected persons*', partners can list the numbers of different types of beneficiaries that they have reached, such as pastoralists or pregnant and lactating women or children under five.

97. During the FGDs, participants were generally of the view that those most in need had received assistance. For example, at one project site, female FGD participants stated, "*The elders know the needs of the people and they selected the households. We are happy that those most in need received assistance. All the households that received help have elderly or weak people or orphans or mothers with a lot of children.*" At another project site, where the SHF partner had only been able to assist 40 of the 60 households, male FGD participants listed families with orphans, people with mental health problems, the elderly, people who had not received other assistance, and families who had lost all their livestock as criteria for selecting these households.

98. Aside from particularly vulnerable households or individuals within communities, there are nearly two million people living in hard-to-reach, conflict-affected, rural areas in southern and central Somalia, and in the contested Sool and Sanaag regions in the north. With limited access to humanitarian assistance, these crisis-affected and marginalized communities are disproportionally affected by food insecurity, malnutrition, disease outbreaks and inadequate WASH services. Communities in hard-to-reach areas also experience additional and very specific protection concerns.[61] Section 4.1.1 discusses the SHF's contribution to assisting these communities that are most in need but also the hardest to reach.

3.4.3. Taking account of gender, age, disability and mainstreaming protection

99. It is positive that the project proposal format in GMS includes sections on key aspects of quality programming such as gender, protection mainstreaming and accountability to affected populations (AAP). As of 2019, each proposal must have a Gender with Age Marker (GAM) reference number and the partner needs to select a GAM code for the project. In addition, partners are expected to list the numbers of women, men, boys and girls with disabilities who will benefit from the project. However, some interviewees felt that the GAM is based on self-assessment and is a mechanical approach to obtaining a score that is not necessarily reflected in project implementation. Prior to 2019, the quality of what partners wrote in proposals to justify the gender marker code varied considerably. This is also true of what partners write about protection mainstreaming. Due to the short timeframe for reviewing project proposals, the protection cluster is unable to review the protection-mainstreaming component in all SHF proposals. Perhaps one reason that these sections of the proposal are of variable quality is that they do not appear to be used to assess project quality and therefore do not influence funding decisions. Another major challenge with ensuring that the proposal sections on gender, disability and protection mainstreaming are not simply a box-ticking exercise is that partners are not required to report on how they have mainstreamed gender and protection or addressed the needs of people with disabilities.

[61] OCHA (2017) *Somalia 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview*.

100. A review of SHF projects funded in 2018 showed that partners generally assigned them a high gender marker code and made laudable statements about how they were addressing gender-related issues. However, FGDs at project sites highlighted that while women benefitted from project activities (whether the distribution of food or goats), they were generally excluded from involvement in the project cycle. One partner described the challenge with involving women in decision-making. They consult a community about its priorities in an open forum and request equal participation from women and men. However, men are the gatekeepers and the ones who are vocal in meetings. It was clear from the FGDs that implementing organizations did not speak separately to women even though one partner noted that it was possible to hire female staff to do this (since 50 per cent of the staff for its girls education program was female).

Lessons: Both this evaluation and the previous one, undertaken in 2015, have raised concerns about the limitations of the Gender Marker (now the Gender and Age Marker). Discussions with men and women in SHF-funded project sites as part of this evaluation show that while women are benefitting from projects, there is scope for far greater engagement with them throughout the project cycle.


101. The protection cluster has provided a definition of protection mainstreaming but admitted that operationalization was very limited. However, the WASH cluster has been proactive in promoting protection mainstreaming. It has developed a latrine safety index with four indicators – lockable doors, lighting at night, gender-separation and a hand-washing point. Latrines are expected to have at least two or more of these components to be deemed safe. In some parts of the country, women were walking over 30 minutes to access a water point so the cluster made it a strategic objective to reduce the walking distance to water points. The cluster has provided training and is trying to monitor compliance with protection requirements though this is a challenge.

102. The protection cluster is also working with UNHCR and the Norwegian and Danish Refugee Councils (with funding from the US government) on a Protection Monitoring System. It has developed a methodology for a harmonized protection monitoring system. The cluster is encouraging the SHF to fund only organizations that conduct protection monitoring in line with this methodology and avoid overlaps. During the first SA in 2019, the cluster asked specific SHF partners to revise their proposals or add areas where there are gaps in monitoring as long as they were trained in the methodology.

3.4.4. Accountability to affected populations

103. SHF partners are required to describe how they will ensure AAP in proposals and then to report on what they did. However, this varies considerably across partners. In the case of one of the projects that the team visited, the partner had simply copied the AAP section from the proposal and pasted this into its report, which did not reflect the partner's efforts. Also, the AAP sections of project proposals describe activities as if the project is starting completely from scratch and there are no existing mechanisms, even if SHF funding is complementing or continuing another project. This risks setting up parallel structures that only last for the lifespan of the project, rather than building inclusive structures and processes over time.

Box 2: Results from participatory exercise with women and men during FGDs



104. As mentioned in section 3.4.1, the FGDs suggested that SHF partners tended to focus more on men than women in project consultations. Even when partners consulted both men and women, it was men who were provided with partner contact details in case of any problems while women were unaware of how to raise concerns. The difference between levels of consultation and information sharing, including on complaints mechanisms, is illustrated by the results of a participatory exercise with women and men at the same project site (see Box 2).

105. In the women's FGD (on the left), both community consultation and engagement with women (gender sensitivity) were rated extremely low, as shown by the marks at the base of the lines. This was explained by the women's comments that, "*Organizations only talk to the men. We don't even know when meetings take place between the organizations and the men. The men just come and tell us that an organization is going to do this or that. This is typical of Somali culture. We are told to go and get a photo taken or to stand in line and get registered. We stand in the sun to get registered but then not everyone is registered.*" In the men's FGD, participants expressed great satisfaction with the level of consultation, information shared and information about making complaints, indicated by marks at the outer edges of the relevant lines.


3.5. Outputs

106. While this review has focused attention on the activities of the SHF, it is the results that are of greatest importance, particularly in the context of a dynamic humanitarian crisis. Rather than replicate the data on outputs and project achievements from the SHF annual reports, this section focuses on summarizing the number of people assisted over the evaluation period. The tables below provide an overview of the what the fund has achieved in each of the years under evaluation.

Challenge: When reviewing output data for the SHF, it is important to note that the 2018 beneficiary numbers are presented differently to previous years because CBPFs changed how they reported results in 2018. Rather than reporting results based on the year in which the funding was allocated, the annual reports showed results reported in 2018, regardless of whether the projects had been funded in 2017 or 2018. This explains the differences in the numbers of beneficiaries in the graphs below.
It is also important to bear in mind that in its reporting, the SHF does not routinely address duplication of beneficiary data and so while the cluster totals are accurate, aggregation of this data will double- or triple-count beneficiaries that received services from multiple clusters.


107. Figure 10 shows the number of people receiving SHF-funded assistance by cluster. The most significant result from the perspective of the evaluation is the predominance of multi-sector assistance provision, being assistance provided by two or more clusters. Outside of this, health and WASH were the clusters that assisted the greatest numbers of affected people (see figure 10).

Figure 10: Beneficiaries supported through SHF-funded projects by cluster, 2015 - 2018[62]



108. Figure 11 below provides a gender- and age-disaggregated overview of the total number of people reached with IHF support from 2015-18. The data reveals the significant reach achieved by the SHF in its provision of humanitarian services.

Figure 11: Total beneficiaries reached by the IHF, 2015-2018[63]




109. Figure 12 below provides context to the beneficiary numbers given above by providing an analysis of beneficiaries targeted against those that were reached for each of the years under evaluation.

[62] Data obtained from the CBPF Business Intelligence Portal, November 2019.

[63] Ibid.

Figure 12: Analysis of HRP beneficiary data with SHF beneficiaries targeted and reached, 2015 – 2018[64]



110. While the likelihood of duplication of beneficiary numbers means that it is not possible to compare what the SHF has achieved against the totality of needs that existed, the data does provide an indication of the cumulative number of people that received assistance from the SHF.

[64] Data obtained from the CBPF Business Intelligence Portal, November 2019.

4. Outcomes: In what ways do CBPFs contribute to the outcomes of strengthening humanitarian coordination and leadership?

The 2015 Policy Instruction anticipated that CBPFs would contribute to the achievement of three outcomes, i.e., improved response, better coordination and strengthened leadership. This section focuses on the CBPF's contribution to the latter two outcomes while the next section examines its contribution to improving humanitarian response.

4.1. Better coordination

111. The SHF has made a significant contribution to enhancing coordination and collaboration. This is due to several different factors that have strengthened coordination between humanitarian partners or between clusters.

4.1.1. Increased collaboration between humanitarian actors

112. For humanitarian actors, the diverse representation of the AB has made it an important operational forum. The participation of NGOs (including the Somalia NGO Forum), UN agencies, donors and the HC crosses traditional fault lines. The AB offers NNGOs an important '*seat at the humanitarian table*' and involvement in strategic decisions on humanitarian priorities, including sectors and geographies, and on '*best-placed*' partners. This addresses some of the historic power imbalances in the humanitarian ecosystem. The evaluation found a strong sense of purpose within the SHF AB, in addition to a more nuanced understanding of the strengths (and weaknesses) of different partners, which offered the potential to leverage the best from each.

4.1.2. Strengthened coordination mechanisms


113. The reliance of CBPF allocation processes on the cluster system has long been considered a means of strengthening coordination, but it has also been recognized as a challenge, particularly when a large number of proposals require review and revision. There have also been instances when mistrust between humanitarian partners or in the transparency of processes, has actively undermined coordination. While review processes can still create some disharmony, the SHF has been fairly successful in reducing the volume of proposals for review (as a consequence of strong allocation prioritization processes). It has also had some success in promoting transparent review processes (to the extent possible given the competitive nature of the humanitarian system). As a consequence, there was broad consensus from across clusters on the overall positive contribution of the SHF.

114. In addition to strengthening coordination within clusters, the SHF has influenced integration between clusters. This is particularly important given that it has been challenging to deliver integrated responses in a humanitarian architecture that is organized according to response sectors. The SHF was not the instigator of integrated programming, but by ring-fencing funding for '*integrated allocations*', it has played a significant role in strengthening inter-cluster coordination. In 2017, the SHF allocated almost half of its available funds ($25 million out of $57 million) through the integrated multi-cluster response.

115. This approach has empowered cluster coordinators and the ICCG, giving them the flexibility to define and prioritize the required response. It has provided the opportunity to enhance convergence and synergies in the response, as well as increase the focus of SHF allocations (see Figure 12).[65] While feedback from clusters suggested that integrated programming required more intensive discussions because it involves reaching consensus on prioritization across clusters, it was considered to have enhanced programming and was only possible as a result of strong collaboration between clusters.

[65] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *2017 SHF support for integrated response: Lessons learned concept note*, January 2018.

Figure 13: Integration as a proportion of all SHF allocations in 2017[66]



4.1.3. Coordination of SHF with the HRP and emerging humanitarian priorities

116. The primary objective of the SHF is to 'support life-saving and life sustaining assistance to the most vulnerable groups, based on the most urgent humanitarian needs as defined in the HRP or in response to sudden onset emergency needs.'[67] The 2018 Annual Report shows that a significant majority of the fund was allocated either directly for specific HRP projects or for broader HRP strategic objectives and that all allocations responded to either one or more of the first three HRP strategic objectives.[68]

117. While the statistics are helpful, they do not satisfactorily tell the story of how the SHF has been used to bolster underfunded aspects of the HRP or to respond to newly emerging priorities; this is better achieved by referring to the humanitarian timeline outlined in Table 3 which indicates a strong correlation between shifts in humanitarian need and disaster events, and SHF allocations. While the focus of the SAs has been on buttressing the HRP and responding to priorities identified in it, RAs have been used in a more agile and responsive way, with an emphasis places on addressing disasters and humanitarian needs as they have occurred.

4.2. Strengthened leadership

4.2.1. HC's engagement in the SHF

118. The HC's leadership of the SHF is essential for the performance of the fund as he has responsibility for a number of aspects of the fund allocation and disbursement process. The HFU plays an important Secretariat function and, as a consequence, the Fund Manager plays an important role in supporting SHF leadership, as does the OCHA HoO who manages the Fund Manager and also deputises for the HC in his/her absence.

119. Interviews during the inception phase highlighted the influence that the HC's competence, capacity, professionalism and personality had over the management of CBPFs, and which can play a dominant role in determining the effectiveness of the fund – either positively or negatively – irrespective of the clarity of the Operational Guidance or the soundness of the allocation and disbursement processes.

[66] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *ICCG Retreat Humanitarian Financing Session*, April 2018.
[67] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017), *SHF Operational Manual*, February 2018. This also applies to the 2018 and 2019 manuals.
[68] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018*, April 2019.

120. This evaluation found that the SHF has benefitted from a strong fund management team, capable support from the OCHA HoO, and an HC who has sought to prioritise leadership of the SHF. There was broad consensus among evaluation participants that this mix of personality, capacity and engagement provided an important foundation for success.

121. An interview with the HC highlighted his familiarity with pooled funding, having managed CBPFs in previous leadership roles. He has a sound understanding of the SHF's role and emphasized the symbiosis of the HC role and a well-managed pooled fund; HC leadership of the SHF gives it credibility, but at the same time the fund also strengthens his credibility and legitimacy because it offers an opportunity to maintain relevance and to stay operationally engaged in a dynamic humanitarian situation. It also provides a forum in which the HC can meet with donors and senior agency staff that is focused on implementation rather than policy. At the time of the country visit, there was a change in humanitarian leadership, and continued collaboration will be key to the fund's success in the future.

Lessons: The effectiveness of the SHF can be attributed, in large part, to having sound leadership, strong fund management, an engaged AB and the support of clusters. As a consequence, the Somalia country study offers an important benchmark for the evaluation team.

4.2.2. Decision-making, governance and accountability

122. The SHF benefits from a governance structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities; while these have been refined in successive Operating Guidelines, the changes have been modest and have largely focused on strengthening process issues.

123. Consistent with the global guidelines, the overall management of the SHF rests with the HC[69] with the AB playing an advisory role. The HC makes final decisions on projects recommended for funding, and '*funding decisions can be made at the discretion of the HC, without a recommendation from the AB, for circumstances which require an immediate response.*'[70] It is also within the HC's authority to reject overall recommendations from the review committees. Although the SHF guidelines do not refer to it, the global Operational Guidelines state that '*the HC's responsibilities are explicitly stated in the HC Compact with the ERC.*'

124. Interviews with AB members highlighted clarity about roles and responsibilities and broad satisfaction with the level of participation that they had in decision-making processes, with a good balance achieved between consultation and decision-making. There was generally positive feedback received about the smooth running of the SHF. The evaluation noted that there was significant competition for seats on the AB across all members (NNGOs, INGOs, UN and donors), which was interpreted as an indication of the favourable way in which these stakeholders perceive participation on the Board.

4.2.3. The complementarity of the SHF with other funding modalities

125. From the perspective of complementarity, the most important link for the SHF is with CERF funding since combining allocations offers an opportunity to increase efficiency as well as strengthen fund effectiveness. In this respect, the SHF has performed extremely well, with evidence throughout the period under evaluation of efforts to coordinate the allocations (see Table 8).

[69] The 2017, 2018 and 2019 SHF Operational Guidelines state that *'final decision-making authority rests entirely with the HC.'*

[70] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019), *SHF Operational Manual*

Table 7: Complementarity between SHF and CERF funding in Somalia, 2015-18

Year	The nature of CERF/SHF complementarity
2015	Allocation strategies were not available for 2015, but all the main clusters report CERF/SHF complementarity either through a shared approach to targeting the same areas (but funding different aspects of the response) or by targeting SHF and CERF funding separately to different priority areas.
2016	The CERF provided $12.9 million for the Somalia response in 2016. The two funds jointly supported the scaling up of humanitarian response to the worsening drought conditions in Puntland and Somaliland, and response to AWD/cholera in southern and central Somalia.
2017	As the drought situation worsened and the risk of famine escalated in the first quarter of 2017, the SHF complemented CERF grants by allocating some $27 million through its 1st Standard Allocation round by the end of April to scale-up famine prevention efforts in priority regions. The prioritization of the SHF allocation was aligned closely with that of CERF grants ($33 million) from the underfunded emergencies (UFE) and rapid response (RR) windows, concurrently using country-level coordination fora to collectively determine priority locations, activities and joint focus. This improved efficiency, complementarity and prevented overlap; the advantages of both pooled funds were leveraged to provide a coordinated response – CERF for UN agencies, who are de facto primary input suppliers, and the SHF for NGOs, who are both frontline responders and partner with UN agencies.
2018	Through a Reserve Allocation, the SHF released $1 million in May 2018 for integrated child protection and education interventions in response to floods, complementing the CERF RR grants for flood-affected areas.

126. Of particular note is the production of joint allocation strategies, which have assisted in identifying priorities and clarifying the added value of each of the funds; an example of this is the integrated approach that was adopted for the first SHF Standard Allocation of 2017 and the CERF Underfunded Emergencies Allocation. The HC and the HFU sought integration between the two through a single strategic focus and leveraging complementarities. This also helped to ensure a timely response because the integrated and simultaneous strategic prioritization reduced the time required to identify priority activities and areas of implementation. It also used the comparative advantages of both mechanisms by using the CERF for UN agencies primarily to cover UN direct operational costs; procurement of bulk supplies for lifesaving response (to be channelled through SHF-funded and other partners) in order to benefit from the economies of scale; and, logistical support. The SHF prioritized direct funding to NGO partners to ensure the best value-for-money.[71]



Good practice: The SHF has performed well in exploring opportunities for complementing CERF funding. Integrated allocation strategies show a strategic approach to leveraging the specific attributes of each of the funds to focus partners efforts towards achieving common humanitarian outcomes.

127. In a country where there is significant reliance on Official Development Assistance, coordination with other funding instruments is also important, and the HC/RC/DSRSG function in Somalia is well-placed to do this as the nexus in his responsibilities offers an opportunity to use the SHF in a way that complements funding modalities across the broader aid architecture. However, despite the importance of this, it has proved to be a complex task. While a route to achieving complementarity exists in theory, it has taken time for this to be translated into a coherent approach.

128. Following the 2017 drought, a Drought Impact and Needs Assessment informed the development of a Resilience and Recovery Framework (RRF). Prepared in August 2017, the RRF identifies the root causes of recurrent drought and provides a strategy for medium-term recovery and long-term resilience[72]. This has prompted the development of four collective outcomes as a way to ensure alignment and complementarity between the RRF and HRP. These are aligned

[71] Somalia Humanitarian Fund, Central Emergency Response Fund (2017) Integrated Approach to CERF-2017-UFE and SHF-2017-SA1 Allocations, 19 January 2017.

[72] The NDP, led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, covers the fiscal period 2017 to 2019. It is Somalia's first NDP since 1986. The implementation bodies responsible for the NDP are nine pillar working groups (PWGs) which includes a resilience PWG.

with the results framework of the National Development Plan (NDP) and the Sustainable Development Goals. The programming and prioritization process under the RRF is the first real attempt in Somalia to align all stakeholders— humanitarian, recovery, and development— behind drought-related recovery and resilience building efforts. Where less progress has been achieved has been in operationalizing these links and interviews with the Resident Coordinators Office and the HC/RC/DSRSG identified a series of challenges which still had to be overcome.

129. A more detailed analysis of the implementation of the New Ways of Working in Somalia is outside the scope of this evaluation but, in practical terms, there is limited scope for SHF-funded programmes to segue into longer-term funding while the alignment described above is still a work in progress. This has led to pressure being placed on the SHF by implementing agencies keen to contribute to longer-term outcomes to cover some of the gaps; at the governance level, however, there is broad consensus that it would be ill-advised for the SHF to try to fill these gaps. The evaluation concurs with this view.

5. Contribution to improved response and operational impact

This section examines the extent to which the SHF has contributed to improving humanitarian response (which is the third outcome anticipated in the 2015 Policy Instruction), including by supporting principled humanitarian action. It also assesses how the SHF has delivered the operational impact statement, i.e., the provision of timely, coordinated, principled assistance to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. The section draws on available evidence to respond to evaluation question 1 on the extent to which the fund has made a difference to people's lives.

130. This report has already addressed a number of components of the operational impact statement. Section 3.2.1 discussed the **timeliness** of the SHF's allocation and disbursement processes. Section 4.1 examined the fund's contribution to strengthening **coordination** while section 3.1.1 outlined how the fund aligns with HRPs, which are designed to provide a coordinated response. Section 3.4.1 touched on the issue of whether projects are based on coordinated needs assessments. Since **principled** assistance has not been addressed by the evaluation questions examined in earlier sections of the report, this is covered in section 5.2 below.

131. Quality programming that takes account of gender, age, PwD and protection concerns and that is accountable to affected populations is essential for **alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity**. Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 examined the extent to which the SHF is supporting these aspects of quality programming.

132. Humanitarian actors do not generally collect outcome and impact data for the often short-term projects that they implement and this is also the case with CBPF partners. A review of outcome statements and indicators in the GMS demonstrates that these are output-focused, such as the '*improved access of safe water through rehabilitation of 23 shallow wells'* or do not specify how they will have any measurable impact, e.g., '*Vulnerable pastoral livestock assets and economic status improved*' or '*The predictability and effectiveness of multi sectoral interventions at site-level and/or areas of concentration of sites are strengthened'*. This means that the evaluation has not been able to draw upon systematic evidence about the outcomes and impact of SHF projects.

133. The SHF, like all other CBPFs, contributes to the HRP's strategic objectives. However, the indicators for monitoring these objectives are output indicators, such as the '*number of affected people supported in livelihoods inputs and training per season'* or '*coverage of measles vaccination in children below one year'*.[73] Therefore, there is no systematic data on outcomes or impact at the response level either for the evaluation to use.

134. There is also no quantitative data on the number of lives saved or the alleviation of suffering or how humanitarian actors maintained human dignity for the humanitarian response as a whole although it is possible to use available evidence to infer the contribution of humanitarian assistance to these results. Data on how humanitarian assistance has made a difference to people's lives is qualitative, such as success stories and individual project examples.

135. Given the data limitations outlined above, the section below uses mainly qualitative data to describe how the SHF has contributed to an improved humanitarian response and made a difference to people's lives.

5.1. Improving the relevance and effectiveness of humanitarian response and making a difference to people's lives

136. At an outcome-level, the relevance of the SHF to humanitarian response in Somalia is indicated by its geographical and sectorial priorities, and the evaluation sought to examine the extent to which allocation strategies matched shifts in humanitarian need during the period under evaluation. The timeline outlined in Table 3 illustrates how SHF allocations have responded to extreme weather events, particularly food insecurity and changes in vulnerability (see Box 3).

[73] HCT (2018) Somalia 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan - Revised, July 2018, Humanitarian Country Team

Box 3: The relevance of SHF assistance to humanitarian response[74]

At a macro-level, the SHF has been consistent in responding to the changing nature of needs in Somalia; allocations in late 2016 and 2017 were shaped by the plight of drought-affected people, with almost 95 per cent ($53 million) of the funds being channelled through collectively prioritized famine prevention activities. RAs responded to more localized crises that included the outbreak of Acute Watery Diarrhoea in January 2016, floods in Belet Weyne in June 2016, the effect of Cyclone Sagar in June 2018 and the floods in South Central Somalia in October 2018. As the size of the Reserve is modest, the SHF tended to support rather than lead the response, but it has consistently made a contribution, even for emergencies that attracted limited funding, such as the response to Cyclone Sagar. For example, in 2018, the SHF supported flood preparedness in priority regions of Hiran and Middle Shabelle, enabling the swift distribution and pre-positioning of emergency shelter kits and non-food items.

137. An analysis of the effectiveness of the SHF-funded projects draws on a mix of primary data (key informant interviews, project visits and FGDs with aid recipients) and secondary data (documents) to examine how the SHF has sought to address critical humanitarian needs in order to make a difference to people's lives. It demonstrates that the SHF has responded to a variety of different types of crises including: Rapid response disasters (5.1.1); slow onset crises (5.1.2), and; long-term displacement (5.1.3). Examples of SHF allocations in response to each of these response types are given below.

5.1.1. Responding to a rapid onset disaster

138. In mid-May 2018, tropical cyclone Sagar hit coastal areas of Somaliland and Puntland, causing widespread destruction and affecting around 168,000 people. The Awdal region of Somaliland was the most affected. Before the cyclone, households had been trying to recover from a prolonged drought that had adversely affected their livelihoods. The SHF made a RA of $3.5 million to respond to the disaster, finalizing the allocation strategy towards the end of June.[75]

139. The SHF planned to target the most vulnerable individuals and households in the worst-affected areas through a three-pronged approach that would allocate:

- Up to 45 per cent of the funding ($1.6 million) for a **rehabilitation package** that would cover the emergency rehabilitation of prioritized communal infrastructure. This was expected to focus primarily on the education, health and nutrition, and WASH sectors.
- Up to 15 per cent of funding ($525,000) for **Integrated Emergency Response Teams** that would undertake mobile outreach in health, nutrition and WASH
- Up to 40 per cent of funding ($1.4 million) for **integrated activities** across the food security and livelihoods, shelter-NFI, protection and camp coordination and camp management sectors. This would include protection mainstreaming through existing community structures.

140. The evaluation team focused its community engagement and project visits on the SHF's cyclone Sagar response from mid-2018. Since the SHF-funded projects were in secure (if often remote) areas in the Awdal region of Somaliland, the team was able to visit four projects and conducted participatory FGDs with 132 participants from local communities to assess the timeliness and relevance of the response. All the projects were current, enabling the team to gather real-time feedback from project partners and communities (see Box 4).

[74] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) SHF 2017 Annual Report, April 2018.

[75] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) SHF-funded Response to Cyclone Sagar, 25 June 2018.

Box 4: Findings from focus group discussions

Although SHF-funded projects started a few months after the cyclone, the assistance came at the right time for communities. In the immediate aftermath of the cyclone, they had received relief assistance from various entities, including the government. However, this relief assistance ended, leaving communities still in need. In one FGD, a group of women receiving vouchers for food assistance explained, "*After the cyclone, we received a lot of assistance – there was a plane from Djibouti with rice and the government also provided help. Then the assistance stopped and we were desperate by the time the vouchers came*".

In the FGDs, both men and women often noted that the project being reviewed had met their top priority and they were very grateful for the assistance provided. Communities had highlighted the need to rehabilitate infrastructure (for example, restore water supplies and repair damaged schools) and also to re-establish livelihoods destroyed by the cyclone. The SHF-funded projects addressed these needs and FGD participants found them to be relevant and in line with their priorities. For example, women in one FGD stated that the community had highlighted water provision as its highest priority when the SHF partner came to consult with them. They were grateful for the INGO's rehabilitation of a water point because, otherwise, they had to walk through the night to collect water.

As outlined in section 3.4.2, FGD participants provided details of the criteria that SHF partners had used to identify the most vulnerable individuals and households and to target their assistance. However, as described in sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, SHF partners performed less well in taking account of gender issues and ensuring women's participation in accountability and feedback mechanisms. In the projects visited, partners tended to equate women's participation with ensuring that women benefitted from assistance. Therefore, even when partners assigned projects a high gender marker or GAM code, in practice, they tended not to involve women in decision-making or to make an effort to consult women separately. This also meant that women were less likely to have information about how to provide feedback on projects or make complaints.

141. The team visited projects under the rehabilitation package as well as food security and livelihoods projects. Box 5 below outlines how a food security and livelihoods project had made a difference to people's lives.

Box 5: Timely response making a difference to people's lives







One of the livelihoods projects that the team visited was timely from a seasonal perspective. Female participants in one of the FGDs described how the community had cleared land and sowed the seeds that it received. It then received water pumps and pipes just when the seedlings required irrigation (see photo at top left). At the time of the team's visit to the project site, the community had a large crop of watermelons, grown from the seeds provided by the SHF-funded project (see middle photo on the left). Those who had received goats also felt that these had been provided at the right time, when vegetation had started growing again after the cyclone so that the goats had enough to eat and had reproduced.

This project had made a real difference to the lives of vulnerable individuals who had lost their livelihood because of the cyclone, as described by one FGD participant:

I used to work on rain-fed agriculture. After the cyclone, most villagers left because they had lost all their crops. The village was so beautiful before the cyclone but it destroyed everything. The government found the community and saw the damage that the cyclone caused. When I heard from the Ministry of Agriculture and the village elders that ADO was going to provide assistance, I was the first to return to the village and register for the project. Before ADO arrived, we had no assistance. ADO provided $5 as cash for work so that people built a small dam or shallow well. ADO provided support based on people's previous means of livelihood. There were three groups in the community - farmers who used irrigation (received seeds plus pumps), farmers who used rainwater (received seeds and help with a water pan) and pastoralists (received goats). They provided seeds for onions, watermelons and vegetables so that we could restart rain fed agriculture. There are 12 people in my household and I take care of my elderly mother so I am very happy that ADO has provided water for cultivation. I am very grateful to ADO.

5.1.2. Responding to a slow onset crisis

142. In the years since the 2011-12 famine, a range of stakeholders have worked together to make significant progress in predicting, understanding and responding to food insecurity in particular. This meant that data was available to support an early response to the drought in 2016-17. As a result of the failure or below average performance of the 2016 and 2017 rains, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance reached 6.7 million by mid-2017. In May 2017, there were warnings of an elevated risk of famine. The number of people in need had declined to 5.4 million by the end of 2017, partly due to the humanitarian response from national and international actors, which was scaled up and sustained in 2017, with up to 3.2 million people receiving assistance on a monthly basis.[76] As described in Box 6 below, the SHF was one of the first to respond to the drought, as early as the beginning of 2016, and it also continued to make allocations to target the worst affected areas during 2016 and 2017.

143. One factor that made the SHF's response to the drought successful was its ability to draw on a range of partners (both local and international) to identify those best placed to respond in areas of greatest need. This meant that it had greater scope than many other funding modalities to focus on those in greatest need, irrespective of their geographic location.[77] During the 2011-12 famine large numbers of people were forced to travel from rural parts of the country to neighbouring countries in order to seek aid. By contrast, in 2016 and 2017, people in need had greater access to assis-

[76] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *SHF Annual Report, 2017*

[77] It is important to acknowledge here that there continue to be some areas in Somalia, particularly in South Central, but also in the north of Puntland, that continue to be largely inaccessible, even to local NGOs.

tance within the country, which is broadly credited as having played an important role in averting famine-like conditions. While this shift is attributable to many different factors, including improvements in the security situation, the significant expansion in NNGO partnerships as a key pillar in the scale-up of humanitarian assistance was an important one. While there has not been an inter-agency evaluation of the 2017 response, the real time review of DFID's drought response encapsulates a challenge that many donors and international organizations faced; '*[without] a broader set of actors, DFID's response will struggle to align with the geographic or ethnographic contours of the crisis, to access new rural areas or even to engage with a different set of implementing local partners. Moreover, this general difficulty with access pushed the aid response towards the islands of government control, in particular the towns.*'[78]

Box 6: A timely response to growing food insecurity in Puntland and Somaliland[79][80][81]



At the beginning of 2016 when the situation in Puntland and Somaliland regions was deteriorating due to drought, the SHF was instrumental in kick-starting a lifesaving response. The Fund's allocation of $6.5 million was among the first sources of funding to assist people affected by severe drought conditions in northern Somalia. This allocation, complemented by $11 million in CERF Rapid Response funding, was set aside for programming and needs as captured in the '*Drought and El Niño Call for Aid*', which prioritized the worst drought-affected areas, including Awdal, Bari, Nugaal, Sanaag, Sool and Woqooyi Galbeed regions. The allocation financed approximately 31 food security, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, and WASH interventions. The allocation sought to fill gaps in meeting urgent, life-saving needs with multi-sectoral responses. This was because areas where food insecurity had deteriorated also faced water shortages and the impact on malnutrition levels required preventative nutrition support.

As drought conditions deepened in the North and spread to other parts of the country at the end of 2016, the SHF made a RA of $4.1 million in December. This was complemented by the first SA in 2017 of $25 million and followed by RAs in June and August that were increasingly targeted towards the worst affected areas, as information and analysis of areas of extreme vulnerability improved.

144. The SHF also strengthened its drought response by supporting '*enabling*' projects that were designed to better understand needs and to strengthen targeting and response. This included:

- Support for the FSNAU, which ensured the continuity of services in humanitarian data collection and analysis to inform decision-making in 2016;
- Funding for joint needs assessments in drought-affected areas in June 2017. It also provided funding for a project supporting the system-wide common feedback initiative in April 2017 to inform decision-making on response.

145. The SHF also funded Radio Ergo as an enabling project in 2017. Box 7 below describes how this made a difference to people's lives both during and after the drought.

[78] Dubois, M., Harvey, P. and Taylor, G. (2018) *Rapid Real-Time Review: DFID Somalia Drought Response*, Humanitarian Outcomes, January 2018.

[79] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *SHF 2016 Annual Report,* April 2017. Photo (credit: Matija Kovac, UNOCHA) is of SHF-funded protection activities for those displaced by drought in Tawakal IDP settlement, Belet Weyne (Hiraan). The project was implemented by Comitato Internationale per lo Sviluppo del Poppoli (CISP) and Hiraan Women Action on Advocacy for Peace and Human Rights (HIWA).

[80] OCHA (2016) *Draft Somalia Humanitarian Fund Strategic Reserve Allocation 2016*, March 2016.

[81] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *SHF Annual Report, 2017*

Box 7: Radio Ergo making a difference to farmers lives[82]



Abdi Shukri Duale Dinbil is an agro-pastoralist living in Elberde district of Bakool region of Somalia. He and 20 other farmers living in the district meet to listen to the farming program broadcast by Radio Ergo, which the SHF funded in 2017. Although this seems like a social event, it has had a major impact on the community's food security and resilience. Ergo makes daily broadcasts across Somalia, using shortwave radio to reach rural areas that are not covered by local FM radio stations. It focuses on the drivers of the humanitarian situation and provides critical information to help people make informed decisions about their lives.

According to Abdi, "*If it was not for Ergo, the farms would have produced little or nothing. At the end of May 2017, I was measuring how insects had ravaged my farm and, at the same time, I was listening to the radio and a program about agriculture came on. I had no pesticides at the time. They talked about how to treat the plants to prevent insects from damaging them using a simple method without chemicals.*"

Ergo has inculcated a sense of ownership among listeners, ensuring the project's continued success. "*We think that the radio belongs to us because it addresses issues that touch our lives particularly. During the last drought, for example, Ergo was the only station focusing on the situation. There was a diarrhoea outbreak in Elberde that killed hundreds of people. The radio gave tips on how to prevent it. They explained how to collect and conserve water after the drought ends and encouraged people not to cut down trees. As a result of that, our elders came together in October and made a decision to discourage cutting down trees. They held a meeting and told people the significance of the messages aired by the radio and the need to follow them,*" explained Abdi.

5.1.3. Responding to long-term displacement

146. Somalia has faced a long-term internal displacement crisis, driven by conflict, climatic shocks, recurrent droughts, a lack of livelihood opportunities and evictions.[83] In 2018, there were an estimated 2.6 million IDPs living in around 2,000 settlements across Somalia (see Annex 5). Of these, 45 per cent had been displaced for three years or more.[84] Continued armed conflict and insecurity, as well as recurrent climatic shocks, limit the possibility of returning to areas to origin. However, even where violence has stopped or climatic shocks have reduced, many IDPs did not wish to return, partly because of limited social services and livelihood opportunities. A rising trend of forced evictions in 2018 was one of the most immediate protection threats to IDPs and poor households. The forced evictions were both a cause and multiplier of the displacement crisis. [85]

147. The SHF has regularly allocated funding to respond to the needs of IDPs across a range of sectors. The RA that kick-started its drought response in January 2016 also set aside $5.9 million for a life-saving and life-sustaining integrated response in IDP settlements and host communities with malnutrition rates that exceeded the 15 per cent emergency threshold. It prioritized the food security, health, nutrition and WASH clusters, with the shelter, education and protection clusters expected to provide complementary services.[86] The SHF made further allocations for support to IDPs in April, June and September 2016. In 2017, the first RA in June focused on IDP sites while the second RA combined a focus on famine prevention with targeted assistance to IDPs, including the newly displaced. The second SA in 2017 allocated $8.7 million to sustaining famine prevention by focusing response on selected IDP settlements in five areas in Somalia.[87] The first SA in 2018 allocated funding for integrated response to selected regions with the highest levels of displace-

[82] Source: Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) SHF Annual Report, 2017. Photo from Radio Ergo.
[83] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) SHF Annual Report, 2018
[84] Humanitarian Country Team (2019) 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia, November 2018.
[85] Humanitarian Country Team (2019) *2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia*, November 2018.
[86] OCHA (2016) *Draft Somalia Humanitarian Fund Strategic Reserve Allocation 2016*, March 2016.
[87] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) *2nd SHF 2017 Standard Allocation round: Allocation strategy paper*, 28 November 2017.

ment, malnutrition rates above the emergency threshold and lower than national average access to WASH services.[88] While RAs in 2018 responded to rapid onset and other crises, the second SA focused mainly on an integrated humanitarian response in IDP settlements.

148. SHF annual reports for 2017 and 2018 provide several examples of how SHF-funded projects have provided life-saving and emergency assistance to IDPs in sectors such as health, nutrition, shelter and WASH. Box 8 below provides two examples of the longer-term effects of SHF-funded assistance to IDPs.

[88] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *1st SHF 2018 Standard Allocation round: Allocation strategy paper*, 27 February 2018.

Box 8: Strengthening IDP community capacities[89][90]



In Somalia, issues of land ownership are linked to clan politics and have been one of the main drivers of conflict and the related humanitarian crisis in Somalia. IDPs are then often displaced multiple times due to evictions. Evictions of IDPs from private lands affected over 5,000 people in Kismayo in 2016 and 2017. A 35-year old single mother of nine children from the marginalized Somali Bantu community was displaced from Lower Juba region due to conflict. Living in over-crowded IDP camps in Kismayo, she was evicted three times. "The last time I was evicted, I took the children to the side of the main road and hoped no one will evict us there," she said."

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) implemented an SHF-funded project that ensured that 2,050 families received land title deeds in 2017. This was the first time that people had received title deeds as legal proof of their ownership of land since the collapse of the central government in 1991. The project provided legal training and assistance to IDPs, combined with advocacy with the government. The municipality issued the title deeds to families particularly vulnerable to eviction, mainly women. The mother now owns her own land with a permanent shelter constructed with IOM's support. "In the Somali community, women are marginalized and you will not see many women land owners. There are more men who own land than women. This is the first I have seen a piece of land belonging to me and with a legal document," she explained.

IDPs in Somalia often live in sub-standard conditions in crowded settlements and remain at high risk of diseases outbreaks, forced evictions, discrimination and gender-based violence (GBV). They lack adequate protection and durable solutions and largely dependent on humanitarian aid. With SHF funding, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) established camp governance structures at Syl IDP settlement in north Gaalkacyo, to improve living conditions of 1,800 displaced people and strengthen community self-management. It established a camp management committee to improve coordination, service delivery and site safety.



Before the establishment of the committee, coordination between the sole chairperson and community members was inadequate. DRC provided a range of training to the chairperson and committee members. "We gained skills on how to manage the settlements in terms of site maintenance, sanitation, security, awareness raising and ways to resolve conflicts," the chairperson explained. The camp committee also strengthened IDP protection. Before that, community residents and leaders had no knowledge on how to report GBV incidents or refer protection cases to the relevant actors. However, the chairperson felt that, after the training, "We are well equipped to do referrals and advocate for the GBV victims. We hold regular meetings with DRC staff to share our needs, challenges and gaps." DRC works with partners to fill the gaps and ensure that IDPs can access services safely. The empowered community-based governance structure also ensured equal gender representation without discrimination and with respect to those living with disabilities. According to the chairperson, "We advocate for the most vulnerable - those with specials needs or marginalized groups, as well as anyone else at the site."

By strengthening communication channels and information sharing between communities and partners, the project visibly improved living conditions for IDPs at Syl settlement, as they gained safe access to services and assistance.

[89] Source: Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) *SHF Annual Report, 2018.* Photo of DRC case worker making note of the needs identified by camp management committee members during a monthly meeting is courtesy of DRC.

[90] Source: Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2018) *SHF Annual Report, 2017.* Photo of women IDPs receiving their land title deeds is courtesy of NRC.

5.2. Contributing to providing principled assistance

149. The provision of '*timely, coordinated and principled assistance*' lies at the heart of the CBPF impact statement, and while the evaluation can draw on tangible evidence to determine issues of timeliness and coordination, an examination of principled assistance is more complex. With regard to the provision of principled assistance, it is important to note that for some of the principles, particularly those of independence and neutrality, it is impossible to judge the SHF in isolation as it is inextricably linked, through the HRP, and external perceptions more broadly, to the wider humanitarian community. That said, it is possible to make some specific judgments based on primary evidence collected during this evaluation in addition to presenting broader findings which are supported by secondary evidence (see Table 7).

Table 8: The provision of principled humanitarian assistance by the SHF[91]

Principle	Finding
Humanity	Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.
	There is strong evidence of the SHF being used to address urgent humanitarian needs as outlined in sections 3 of this report.
Impartiality	Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.
	The evidence presented in section 3.1 and 3.4 of this report suggests that prioritisation and allocation processes for both the Standard and Reserve Allocations of the SHF have ensured that it is targeted towards those in greatest need. However, there are a number of challenges that affect all members of the humanitarian community which include the following; (i) the influence and control of roads by state and non-state armed groups, (ii) the influence and control of NSAGs in areas where humanitarian needs tend to be the greatest and, (iii) the influence of clan gatekeepers in government, humanitarian agencies and IDP camps who control and/or may influence the provision of assistance. While at a collective level, the humanitarian community has made efforts to better understand and address access challenges, through the work of the Access Working Group, for example, it is far harder to judge adherence by individual agencies and humanitarian staff.
Independence	Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
	It is important to note that for some of the principles, particularly those of independence and neutrality, it is not possible to examine CBPFs in isolation because they are linked inextricably to the wider response. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some specific judgments based on a mix of the primary and secondary evidence that the team collected. While concerns of a historical nature were raised which brought into question the separation of humanitarian and economic or clan-based activities, the SHF's rigorous approach to due diligence and monitoring have provided some level of assurance of the independence of partners implementing SHF-funded projects. However, this is a challenging issue in the context of aid provision in Somalia, particularly in areas of limited access.
Neutrality	Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature
	There are many challenges associated with neutrality in Somalia which are outlined above. SHF partners draw on the same resources and use the same strategies as members of the humanitarian community more broadly to strengthen perceptions of their neutrality which includes the use of the OCHA-led Civil-Military Working Group.

[91] An overview of the humanitarian principles is provided in the glossary at the end of this report. The definitions used in the table are available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/oom-humanitarianprinciples-eng-june12.pdf.

150. SHF partners acknowledged the importance of humanitarian principles in theory, but it was more difficult to determine practice, particularly among agencies working on the edges of NSAG-held territory. At the same time, the evaluation acknowledges the challenges that these agencies face, particularly as interviewees highlighted how they have paid a high price for their commitment to assisting communities on the edge of crisis.[92] These agencies are frequently overlooked and under-supported in terms of investment in adequate security infrastructure, resources for responsible risk management, and provision of security training. While there is an understandable motivation to drive overhead costs down, it is essential to balance this against the operational requirements for frontline humanitarian staff to be trained and supported to ensure that they can work safely and effectively.

151. In examining the contribution made by the SHF to the provision of principled assistance, it is also important to highlight its support for an enabling environment which includes services which may assist in understanding and analysing humanitarian needs and strengthening access to those who require assistance. In 2018 alone, the SHF allocated funds to vital services provided to humanitarian stakeholders by the Somalia NGO Consortium and International NGO Safety Organization, as well as for logistics through the UN Humanitarian Air Service to support the movement of humanitarian staff, supplies and other cargo areas inaccessible due to insecurity.

[92] A number of agencies interviewed spoke of attacks on their staff or resources as well as broader challenges associated with working in proximity to NSAGs.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

Based on the evidence presented in previous sections of the report, this section seeks to draw conclusions and provides a number of recommendations to strengthen the SHF.

6.1. Conclusions

152. The findings presented in previous sections point to the SHF being a well-led and managed fund that is able to deliver timely and coordinated humanitarian assistance that contributes to saving lives. The AB and HFU have worked with stakeholders to improve the timeliness, inclusiveness and effectiveness of the fund.

153. During the period under evaluation, the HFU has strengthened fund allocation processes and by promoting integrated or multi-cluster programs, has increased joint working across clusters. Integrated and/or multi-cluster programming is also more relevant for addressing the needs of crisis-affected communities. The way in which the HC, OCHA and the HFU have ensured complementarity between the SHF and CERF funding serves to further enhance this. SHF funding is closely aligned with the HRP, particularly the provision of life-saving and life sustaining assistance, and the fund has been effective in identifying and responded to emerging humanitarian needs.

154. The SHF has contributed to strengthening the HC's role but has, in turn, benefitted from strong leadership at all levels – the HC, the Advisory Board, OCHA, and the HFU. This has enabled the fund to be strategic in its allocations, which should ensure that, even though SHF funding has been a small proportion of overall HRP funding, it has been able to '*punch above its weight'* and contribute to saving lives. It is also noteworthy that the AB has itself become a strategic operational forum.

155. One challenge with the fund's success, linked to the lack of adequate development funding and limited resilience funding, is that it is under pressure to expand its remit to support anticipatory financing at one end of the spectrum, and resilience building at the other. The SHF has demonstrated that it can act early, if donor funds are available, as it did in the case of the 2017 drought response. It also encourages partners to adopt sustainable approaches in their programming wherever possible. However, the fund's limited size in relation to needs outlined in the HRP raises questions about whether it should widen the range of activities that it supports.

156. The SHF's robust risk management systems have created a virtuous circle, building donor confidence and leading to increased contributions that then enable the SHF to achieve its outcomes and have a greater impact on the lives of crisis-affected communities. These systems have also enabled the SHF to increase funding to NNGOs significantly while providing assurance to donors that their funds are well managed. This has encouraged donors seeking to meet their Grand Bargain commitments on direct funding to NNGOs to contribute to the SHF. More importantly, being able to fund a diverse range of partners, including those with greater access and closer links to communities, means that the SHF is better positioned than some donors to respond to the greatest needs. One challenge that the SHF has faced with implementing risk management mechanisms, has been the delay and difficulty of putting in place long-term agreements for capacity assessments, third-party monitoring and remote calling, but this is related to broader UN-Secretariat procurement issues.

157. Section 5.2 highlighted the challenges of delivering principled humanitarian assistance in Somalia and the SHF is not immune to the difficulties faced by the broader humanitarian community. It is positive that the SHF funds NGOs working on the edges of NSAG-held territory and/or supporting those displaced by Al Shabaab. However, in the context of the localization agenda, there is a greater need to ensure that local and national NGOs that are able to access these areas receive the support that they need to put in place adequate security measures and also to operationalize humanitarian principles. This is an issue that the humanitarian community as a whole must work to address.

158. As described in section 5.1, the evidence available to the evaluation team suggests that the SHF has contributed to a range of responses including rapid and slow-onset in addition to long-term displacement; evidence from the SHF-funded response to cyclone Sagar shows that assistance arrived at the right time, just when short-term relief after the cyclone had ended. The projects were appropriate and relevant, usually addressing the top priority of the community (such as livelihoods or the restoration of basic services), and thereby making a difference to people's lives.

159. It is positive that the SHF project proposal format provides space for applicants to state how they are addressing gender and age, disability, protection mainstreaming and AAP, all critical to maintaining human dignity. However, the humanitarian community as a whole is weak at doing more than paying lip service to these issues. As a result, the project visits and FGDs as well as a review of project documents showed variable practice across SHF partners. The failure to consult women and provide them with access to feedback and complaints mechanisms was a common feature across the reviewed projects. This reflects the inequities in Somali society and highlights the need for a more concerted effort to engage with women and girls. The weakness in operationalizing cross-cutting issues is perpetuated by the fact that funding decisions are based more on technical issues and delivery capacity, by the limited capacity for monitoring how partners are mainstreaming these issues, and by the limited requirement to report on them (currently, of the cross-cutting issues, partners are only required to report on AAP activities and this is not always examined or challenged).

160. In conclusion, the findings of the case study suggest that, in large part, the SHF has been effectively in delivering '*operational impact*' in delivering timely and coordinated[93] assistance for saving lives, alleviating suffering and preserving human dignity. In the period under evaluation, the SHF has benefited from strong leadership and has strengthened its management which have played an essential part in refining allocation and disbursement processes to increase both their speed and effectiveness.

161. This section has outlined the evaluation's main conclusions about the SHF's operation. The next section lists targeted recommendations that could help to strengthen further how the fund works.

6.2. Recommendations

162. Based on the findings of the evaluation and the statements in the section above, a small number of recommendations are proposed to help strengthen the functioning of the SHF.

#	Recommendation	Responsible/ Priority
1	**Recommendation**: There is both an appetite and scope for the AB, led by the HC, to focus greater attention on cross-cutting issues. This could include the development of guidance for the SHF that outlines priorities for action and moderates expectations of what the fund is able to achieve. It could also outline the resources required to strengthen the delivery of CBPF commitments for gender, PwD and AAP and protection.	AB led by HC
	Explanation: There was significant interest from members of the AB about their engagement and support, at a strategic level, for a cross-cutting issues such as gender and PwD. At the same time, the evaluation highlighted challenges in achieving aspirations to deliver against these priorities which would warrant greater focus.	
2	**Recommendation:** A timetable should be outlined for the procurement of audit and monitoring services. In the absence of these services, the AB should agree an interim strategy which addresses the gap in service provision and the implications it has for risk management.	OCHA Procurement and Asset Management Unit, HFU, AB led by HC
	Explanation: OCHA's procurement of services for audit, risk management and monitoring is not timely and has implications for the SHF's ability to monitor and manage risk. It is now urgent that a plan is in place with a timeframe for delivery. This should be shared with and if it is satisfactory, approved by the AB.	
3	**Recommendation:** As part of its promotion of best-placed actors, the SHF should ensure that it provides adequate funding for security-related costs particularly for NNGOs working in volatile parts of the country. It should also explore the potential that exists to strengthen knowledge about how to operationalize humanitarian principles with service providers in coordination with the clusters and HCT.	HFU, AB led by HC

[93] The evidence gathered for the use of principles is far weaker than it is for issues of timeliness and coordination, and there is scope for the SHF to strengthen assurance.

	Explanation: SHF funding for NGOs working on the edges of NSAG-held territory play a key role in meeting the needs of some of the most vulnerable communities, however, the SHF (and all donors) has an ethical responsibility to ensure that local and national NGOs that are able to access these areas receive the funding that is required to manage risk appropriately.	

6.3. Issues for consideration and further analysis in the Synthesis Report

163. It is recommended that the SHF considers the issues outlined below which will be examined during subsequent country visits and will be addressed in detail in the Global Synthesis report. These issues will not be reiterated in successive country reports, but additions will be made as new issues arise.

#	Issue
1	**Implications of the shift towards funding local NGOs:** While NNGOs frequently have greater proximity to those in greatest need, several interviewees noted potential challenges with increasing direct funding to NNGOs; That NNGOs might have access to hard-to-reach areas but not the technical capacity required to deliver a project and it can be a challenge for clusters to provide this; NNGOs have close links to affected communities and are able to deliver on the ground might not have the skills to write good quality proposals and reports. This can require clusters and the HFU to engage more with NNGO partners to improve the quality of proposals but slows down the proposal review process; Some NNGOs may have less capacity to deliver assistance at scale. This can lead to the SHF making a larger number of small grants, which has implications for the workload and capacity of the HFU.
2	**The management and administration of CBPFs**: There are a number of different approaches to the management and administration of the CBPFs through a combination of support provided by OCHA, UNDP and the MPTFO. As outlined in the ToR for the evaluation, findings of the five case studies, feedback from CBPFs more broadly, and evidence collected from interviews with stakeholders in Geneva and New York will be used to determine the comparative timeliness and efficiency of different approaches.
3	**Verification of programme delivery versus monitoring technical quality:** At the root of a number of the recommendations for the SHF and the Global Synthesis Report is the issue of reporting. At present, efforts are focused on verification of programme delivery which provides a rudimentary assurance function, albeit an important one. The challenge this poses is that it provides limited evidence that programmes meet technical quality standards, that they take adequate account of cross-cutting issues such as gender, age and disability, and that they are delivered in a way that is consistent with humanitarian principles. To attain this level of oversight would require a far greater level of resourcing, both for the HFU, but potentially also for the clusters which lead on programme quality standards.

Annex 1: Evaluation matrix

Presented below is the evaluation framework, consisting of evaluation questions, sub-questions, indicators, data sources and analytical methods.

Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators
IMPACT	
EQ1: To what extent do CBPFs make a difference in the lives of affected people by addressing the differentiated needs of vulnerable groups?	
1.1 To what extent do CBPFs contribute to the provision of timely and principled assistance to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity?	• Evidence that CBPF-funded projects have contributed to saving lives • Evidence that CBPF-funded projects have contributed to alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity regardless of gender, age, disability, ethnicity or other factors. • Evidence that the selection and implementation of CBPF-funded projects adhere to the humanitarian principles • Evidence of the timeliness of proposal review and disbursement • Evidence of the timeliness of project implementation (in relation to the starting point of the crisis)
OUTCOMES	
EQ2: In what ways do CBPFs contribute to strengthening the outcomes of humanitarian response, leadership and coordination and to what extent are CBPFs likely to remain relevant for future humanitarian contexts?	
2.1 Improved response: To what extent are CBPFs able to meet newly emerging needs in a timely and flexible manner and to identify and adapt to future changes?	• Evidence of mechanisms for identifying newly emerging needs in ongoing crises and in new contexts • Evidence of the timeliness of proposal review and disbursement in response to new emergencies • Evidence of the flexibility of CBPFs to adapt to changes in context • Evidence of CBPF ability to adopt new technology and innovate • Evidence of CBPF management capacity to scan the horizon and of flexibility to adapt to changes • Evidence of the extent to which CBPFs have enabled donors to improve the flexibility and reach of unearmarked humanitarian funding
2.2 Better coordination: How do CBPFs contribute to a coordinated humanitarian response?	• Evidence of the contribution made by CBPFs to increasing collaboration between humanitarian actors (local, national, international) and coordination within the humanitarian system (clusters) • Evidence that HCs and CBPF Advisory Boards ensure that CBPF-funded projects are coordinated with the broader humanitarian response when making funding decisions and are implemented in line with the HPC • Evidence that donors take account of CBPF funding when making funding decisions
2.3 Strengthened leadership: To what extent do CBPFs strengthen the leadership of the HC?	• Evidence of ways in which CBPFs strengthen the leadership and coordination function of HCs • Evidence of strategic decision-making processes • Evidence that the HC adheres to the Operational Handbook for the CBPFs.
2.4 To what extent do OCHA and HCs use CBPFs strategically?	• Evidence that HCs take account of other mechanisms and sources of funding (including bilateral funding) during CBPF allocations • Evidence that HC decisions are based on the comparative advantage of CBPFs and other funding mechanisms • Evidence that CBPFs are meeting urgent, prioritized needs • Evidence that OCHA has an organization-wide approach to humanitarian financing?
ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS	
EQ3: To what extent are CBPFs supporting partners to meet the most urgent humanitarian needs in a way that is timely and is consistent with HRP priorities and cross-cutting issues?	

3.1 To what extent do CBPFs respond to the most urgent needs of people and communities affected by crisis?	• Evidence that CBPF projects are informed by coordinated and participatory needs assessments • Evidence that CBPF prioritization processes identify the greatest humanitarian needs including those of marginalized groups • Evidence that CBPF selection and implementation processes take account of gender, age and disability issues, as well as broader inclusiveness issues • Evidence that CBPF partners involve affected populations in the project management cycle. • Evidence that accessible mechanisms are in place for information sharing and for feedback and complaints
3.2 To what extent are CBPFs aligned with Humanitarian Response Plans, prioritized against needs and relevant to the context?	• Evidence that CBPF funding is aligned with HRPs and/or similar strategic plans • Evidence on whether CBPFs allocate funding for more than 12 months against multi-year HRPs • Evidence that clusters are effective in their prioritization and selection of CBPF projects • Evidence that projects take account of relevant quality standards in their design • Evidence that CBPFs promote the use of cash and vouchers where relevant
3.3 To what extent do CBPFs employ effective disbursement mechanisms and minimize transaction costs?	• Evidence that CBPF disbursement mechanisms are timely and aligned with project implementation • Evidence that CBPF disbursement procedures and reporting requirements are designed to minimize transaction costs • Evidence that CBPF decision-making processes are transparent
3.4 To what extent and in what ways do CBPFs promote the use of the best-placed partners and strengthen localization?	• Evidence of outreach at country level to national and local actors • Evidence of inclusion of local and national actors in CBPF decision-making processes • Evidence that CBPFs have procedures in place to select the most appropriate partners • Evidence that CBPF partners are responding to identified humanitarian needs • Evidence of targeted training and support to NNGOs throughout the programme cycle • Evidence that CBPF documentation and guidance are available in national languages
INPUTS	
EQ4: Is the management of CBPFs fit for purpose and do they operate efficiently?	
4.1 To what extent do CBPFs support overall resource mobilization for HRPs?	• Evidence of HC/HCT efforts to raise funds for CBPFs • Level of CBPF funding to HRP projects • Evidence on whether CBPFs are able to mobilize multi-year contributions from donors against multi-year HRPs
4.2 Are CBPFs managing risks appropriately, and is there sufficient oversight and accountability, including monitoring and reporting systems?	• Evidence that CBPFs have risk management systems in place • Evidence that CBPF accountability and oversight mechanisms operate effectively • Evidence that CBPF managers are adequately resourced to ensure oversight and accountability, including monitoring and fraud case management • Evidence that CBPF reporting systems strike a balance between accountability and minimising transaction costs
4.3 Has the global standardization of CBPFs (as per the Policy Instruction, Operational Handbook and Common Performance Framework) increased efficiency?	• Evidence of added value of harmonization resulting from the global standardization of CBPFs • Evidence of the added value of the GMS • Evidence of the functionality and transparency of Umoja • Evidence that global standardization has reduced management costs of CBPFs • Evidence that global standardization has reduced transaction costs for fund recipients over the evaluation timeframe • Evidence that harmonization of CBPFs is balanced with flexibility to adapt to local contexts • Efficiency implications of different fund management structures
4.4 Is there sufficient capacity in the humanitarian system to manage CBPF processes and deliver CBPF projects?	• Evidence that capacity at a global level is adequate to lead, manage and retain oversight of the CBPFs • Evidence that the capacity of the HC, the Advisory Board, OCHA (the HFU) at a country-level is adequate to fulfil their governance, management and technical advisory roles • Evidence that the clusters are able to meet their strategic and technical review responsibilities • Evidence that the quantity and quality of humanitarian partners is sufficient to deliver high quality CBPF projects

Annex 2: Interview participants

Listed below are persons consulted during the Somalia case study visit. A total of 98 persons were interviewed, 36 per cent of whom were women.

Abdiaruz Goulyz, Admin & logistics, PENHA
Abdifatah Aden Abdallah, Project Officer, ADO
Abdihakim Noor, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, HFU, OCHA
Abdilahi Hassan, Country Director, HAVOYOCO
Abdillehi Ibrahim, Deputy Programme Manager, ADRA
Abdimajid Ali, Project Manager, SVO
Abdirahman Jowhar, Engineer, ADRA
Abdishakur Julub, Executive Director, ASAL Youth
Abdullahi Muhamed Ali, Executive Director, New Ways Organisation
Adam A. Ali, Executive Director, BVO
Afifa Ismail, Deputy SHF Manager, OCHA
Ahmed Adan, Head of Resource Mobilisation, ActionAid
Ania Zolkiewska, Head of CMCoord and Access Unit, OCHA
Anna Maria Geller, Cluster Co-Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council
Awks Abdullahi Adan, ICCG Support, OCHA
Axmed Nuur, Senior Programme Coordinator, WVI
Barnabas Asora, Head of Programmes - Somalia, Norwegian Refugee Council
Bavo Christiaens, Fund Portfolio Manager, MPTFO
Bernard Mrewa, Food Security Cluster Coordinator (WFP)
Bilan Osman, Embassy of Sweden
Binyam Gebru, Head of Health, Nutrition and WASH, Save the Children
Charles St. George, Head of Office (a.i.), Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Christine Uyoga, Programme Officer, Denmark Embassy
Christophe Beau, Protection Cluster Coordinator
Danie Kuria, CCCM Cluster Coordinator, IOM
Daud Jiran, Country Director, Mercy Corps
Degan Ali, Chief Executive Officer, ADESO
Deqa Saleh, Cash and social protection advisor, ADESO
Dr Essa Nur Liban, Project manager, Candlelight
Eva Kiti, National Humanitarian Affairs Associate. OCHA
Evalyne Lwemba, National Humanitarian Affairs Associate, OCHA
Faiza Mohamed, Admin/finance, BVO
Frederic Patigny, WASH Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
George Conway, HC/RC/DSRSG (a.i.)
Guled Osman, Country Director, Action Against Disasters Somalia (AADSOM)
Halima Hassan Mohamed, Program Officer, AVORD
Hoodo Kayse, Health Officer, WVI
Hussein Ismail, Program Advisor, ADO
Iahli Patale, Head of Admin and Finance UNIT, OCHA Somalia
Isabella Garino, Head of Mission, CESVI
Ismail Ahmed, Programme Coordinator, BVO
Issack Maalim, Programme Manager, ADESO
Jade Cooper, DFAT, Australian High Commission
Jean-Baptiste Heral, Country Director, ACTED
Jeremy Shusterman, Chief PM&E Emergency Manager OIC (at time of interview), UNICEF Somalia
Jesper Moller, Representative, UNICEF Somalia
Jopheth Ounga, Head of Projects, Welthungerhilfe
Justin Brady, Head of Office, OCHA Somalia
Kevin MacKay, SomRep, World Vision
Khadar Mahmad, Director, ANPPCAN
Kristina Svedberg, Program Manager, Somalia, Embassy of the Netherlands
Lara Simpson, Deputy Country Director, ACTED
Laura Jepson, Deputy Country Director, Save the Children
Laurent Bukera, Representative, WFP Somalia
Lilian Kilwake, Embassy of Switzerland to Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia and Uganda
Linda Onyango, Support Services Associate, OCHA
Lisa Doherty, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Ireland in Kenya
Luiz Camargo, Country Director, ADRA
Madhav Bhandar, Partner, Baker Tilly Merali's
Marieke Denissen, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Horn of Africa, Embassy of the Netherlands
Marilynne Marshall, Risk Analyst, Risk Management Unit, RCO
Martin Cheruiyot, Finance Officer, OCHA
Mary-Bernadette Obadha, National Humanitarian Affairs Associate, OCHA
Matija Kovač, SHF Manager, OCHA
Merita Jorgo, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Risk Manager
Miriam Warhi, PSEA Taskforce, IOM

Mohamed Abdikadir Somo, Chief Executive, Ayuub
Mohamed Ali Yusuf, Project Manager, HAVOYOCO
Mohamed Dahir, Executive Director, HIJA Organisation for Welfare and Development
Mohamed Isak, WASH Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
Mohamed M. Awil, Area Coordinator, Islamic Relief
Mohamed Mohamud Ali, Project Manager, AVORD
Mohamed Yarrow Ali, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Peace and Democracy (CPD)
Mowlid M. Yousuf, Project Coordinator, GARSOOR
Mulugeta Shibru, Food Security Cluster Coordinator (WFP)
Nafisa Yusuf Mohamed, Director, NAGAAD Network
Nasra Ali Ismail, Deputy Director, Somali NGO Consortium
Nour Adan Shirdo, Executive Director, SAYS
Nurta Adan, Cluster Coordinator, Shelter
Ombretta Mazzaroni, Programme Specialist, UNICEF
Omer Jama, Director, TASCO
Patricia Agwaro, Humanitarian Affairs Specialist, OCHA
Peta Barns, Emergency Specialist, UNICEF
Peter De Clercq, HC/RC/DSRSG
Philippe Rougier, Head of Mission, Intersos
Richard Crothers, Country Director, International Rescue Committee
Robbert Van Der Steeg, Chief Executive Officer, Women and Child Care Organisation (WOCCA)
Sadia M. Ahmed, Country Representative, PENHA
Samuel Kihara, Accountability Officer, HFU, OCHA
Sarah Skovgard, Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
Seb Fouquet, Humanitarian Health and Resilience Team Leader, DFID
Sigurd Rothe, Policy Officer, Somalia Unit Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Simon Nziokah, Country Director, Danish Refugee Council
Siyad Ahmed Mohamed, Program Officer, AVORD
Slessu Ooko, Finance Director, ADRA
Solomon Ngari, DFAT, Senior Programme Manager, Australian High Commission
Svein Olav Svoldal, First Secretary, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Umikalthum Shukri Noo, National Humanitarian Affairs Associate, OCHA
Wan Suen, Programme Development and Quality Assurance Director, World Vision International

Annex 3: Bibliography

This annex outlines the texts cited in this report. A summary table is also provided of the documents that were submitted to the team and reviewed as part of the case study visit.

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Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017), SHF Operational Manual, February 2018.
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Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) Resource Mobilization Approach, October 2017.
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Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2017) SHF Reserve – Integrated Response Allocation Strategy. Somalia Humanitarian Fund, June 2017.
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Steets, J. et al (2018) Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts, GPPI and Humanitarian Outcomes, May 2018.
United Nations Board of Auditors (2018) Management letter on the External Audit of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Somalia and Ethiopia Country Office for the year ended 31 December 2017, May 2018.
UNDP (2018) Toward Drought Recovery and Resilience: The Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment and Recovery & Resilience Framework.

Description	Type of documents	#
Accountability framework	Field visits, spot checks, TPM, capacity assessments	478
Allocations	Allocation strategies, 2016-2019	183
Annual reports	Annual reports, 2010-2019	10
Common Performance Framework	Common Performance Framework	1
Communications	Social media strategy and accompanying documents	3
Evaluations, review and studies	2015 evaluation, OIOS reports, BOA reports	161
Governance	Advisory board and donor meetings, 2015-2018	602
HFU, OCHA Somalia	Organograms, workplans etc.	29
Localization	SHF localization documents	4
Partner surveys	Partner surveys for 2018 and 2019	5
Planning and lessons learned	Lessons learned from planning and allocation strategies	41
Resource mobilisation	Resource mobilisation approach	1
Rules, guidelines and procedures	Operational manuals (and pre-manuals), 2010-2019	96
SHF and fund complementarity	CERF, Aid Flows in Somalia, SomRep etc.	9
Somalia general	Evaluations, studies, research papers etc.	4

Annex 4: Evaluation purpose and methodology

This annex outlines the purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation and summarizes the tools that were used and participation of key informants. It should be read in conjunction with the inception report, which provides a more detailed explanation of the approach used by the evaluation team.

Evaluation purpose and scope

164. OCHA has commissioned this evaluation of the 18 CBPFs that it managed between 2015 and 2018,[94] in partnership with six CBPF donors.[95] It is committed to evaluating the CBPFs every three years and this is the first evaluation since they were standardized globally in a 2015 Policy Instruction and Operational Handbook.[96] Interviews during the inception phase highlighted that the evaluation provides an opportunity to take stock of standardization processes and consider how the CBPFs should now move forward, particularly in a fast changing humanitarian landscape.

Evaluation purpose and intended users

165. The evaluation has two main purposes – to improve accountability and learning, and examines the results of the humanitarian action supported by CBPFs with the purpose of drawing lessons on what has worked well. It also identifies challenges to the effective functioning in order to provide recommendations on how to continue to strengthen the CBPF as a funding mechanism in support of timely, coordinated and principled humanitarian response for affected people. It is anticipated that the evaluation will contribute to greater transparency and accountability for all stakeholders involved.[97]

166. At a global level, the intended users are the Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA, UNDP and MPTFO, Pooled Fund Working Group, CBPF/NGO platform, UN and NGO partner organizations, and OCHA Donor Support Group. At a country-level, the stakeholders have been identified as Humanitarian Coordinators, Humanitarian Country Teams, Advisory Boards, OCHA offices including Humanitarian Financing Unit, UNDP offices where they act as Managing Agent, representatives from the affected population, NGOs, including local NGOs, UN agencies and donor representatives.

Thematic scope

167. The evaluation assesses how CBPFs have performed against their strategic objectives and principles, as per the 2015 OCHA CBPF Policy Instruction. As required by the ToR, the evaluation also examines how CBPFs have performed against their three expected outcomes which include response, leadership, coordination and resource mobilization, and the five principles of inclusiveness, flexibility, timeliness, efficiency, and accountability and risk management in order to lead to the overall operational impact of CBPFs, the provision of timely, coordinated, principled assistance to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.

Evaluation approach and tools

168. The approach and tools have been described in detail in the inception report for this evaluation, which should be read in conjunction with this case study. A summary is provided below.

[94] During the evaluation period, CBPFs were operational in the following countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Myanmar, Pakistan, occupied Palestinian territory, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen. The Colombia fund closed at the end of 2018. The Haiti fund closed in 2015 and is not part of this evaluation. CBPFs are managed by OCHA. Some funds are administered by UNDP's Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office as "Administrative Agent" and for some funds, UNDP country offices act as "Managing Agent", i.e., they transfer money to NGOs.

[95] The evaluation is jointly funded by Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US.


[96] OCHA (2015) *Policy Instruction: Country-Based Pooled Funds*, Ref.2015/01.

[97] The full ToR for the evaluation is available at; https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/OCHA%20CBPF%20Evaluation%20-%20TORs%20%28final%29.pdf.

Analytical framework

169. Given the primary focus of this evaluation on practical solutions rather than theory, an analytical framework (see Figure below) is used that articulates the critical building blocks and enablers of success for CBPFs to deliver their intended impact.

Figure: Analytical framework for the evaluation



170. The framework presents a number of different factors for CBPFs that will combine at country-level to contribute to the delivery of timely, coordinated and principled humanitarian response for affected people.

Evaluation matrix

171. The evaluation examines the performance of CBPFs under four evaluation questions. Cutting across these are gender, AAP, humanitarian reforms and five CBPF principles.

- EQ1: Impact - To what extent do CBPFs make a difference in the lives of affected people by addressing the differentiated needs of vulnerable groups?
- EQ2: Outcomes - In what ways do CBPFs contribute to strengthening the outcomes of humanitarian response, leadership and coordination and to what extent are CBPFs likely to remain relevant for future humanitarian contexts?
- EQ3: Activities and outputs - To what extent are CBPFs supporting partners to meet the most urgent humanitarian needs in a way that is timely and is consistent with Grand Bargain priorities?
- EQ4: Inputs - Is the management of CBPFs fit for purpose and do they operate efficiently?

172. The draft evaluation matrix is included in annex 1, and includes the four evaluation questions and 13 sub-questions, indicators, methods and tools for data collection and analysis. It also provides the structure for this report.

Data collection methods and sources

173. The team uses a mixed-methods approach for data collection and analysis. While much of the data collected was qualitative, quantitative data was also gathered in the form of (i) financial and funding data, (ii) project-related data on age and gender, and (iii) metrics related to fund disbursement.

174. The main methods for data collection and analysis for the case study include the following:

- Document and literature review (see annex 3 for a bibliography);
- Financial and project-related data analysis;
- Semi-structured key informant interviews (see annex 2 for a list of interview participants);
- Gender-disaggregated community engagement.

175. A summary of the utilization of these methods is given in the table below.
Table: Summary of data collection methods and sources

Tools and methods	Description
Document and literature review	37 documents cited in this case study report plus a document repository containing 1,627 documents.
Key informant interviews	98 informants from Nairobi (Kenya), Mogadishu (South Central) Hargeisa and Awdal (Somaliland). 36% female and 64% male.
Community engagement	132 community members from 4 SHF.-funded projects affected by Cyclone Sagar from Awdal, Somaliland

176. The approach to the country visits is detailed in the box below.

Box: Country visit process

Preparation for the country included carrying out a light preliminary **desk review**, which focused on gathering evidence against the evaluation matrix to be explored in greater depth in-country. The team agreed an itinerary which included meetings with key stakeholders, field visits and community engagement prior to their arrival in country.
The visit commenced with a brief **kick-off meeting** in country with evaluation stakeholders to orientate the team to the national context, provide background on the evaluation approach, methods and tools, and to enable an initial exploration of key issues.

A series of **semi-structured interviews** with key in-country informants both at national and field level were undertaken, together with visits to project sites and **focus group discussions** with affected populations.
Towards the end of the visit, a **feedback workshop** was held with the Advisory Board (AB) and the Humanitarian Funding Unit (HFU), to present and discuss preliminary findings, to fill gaps in evidence, to check the validity of the findings, and to foster ownership.

Following the visit, the team produced a short **interim update**. A detailed data analysis was then undertaken which informed the preparation of this **country report**. The five reports will feed into a broader analysis for the **evaluation synthesis report**.

Gender and equity

177. The team applied a gender sensitive approach and sought to examine the extent to which the CBPF addresses issues of equity. Evaluation questions specifically refer to gender, inclusion and vulnerability and through the review of literature, key informant interviews, and direct engagement of the team with communities, the evaluation will seek to

analyse and assess the extent to which the differential needs, priorities and voices of affected people have been considered in the design, selection, implementation and monitoring of CBPF-funded projects. Where relevant, the IASC Gender Marker will be used as one means of verifying gender mainstreaming at a portfolio level.

Approach to confidentiality

178. The stakeholder analysis undertaken by the team highlighted the potential for some issues to be sensitive. In order to mitigate participants concerns and to maximize the opportunities to elicit relevant information, interviews were undertaken based on agreement that details will not be attributed to a specific person or agency. This approach was also adopted for community FGDs. Notes from the interviews and discussions were filed digitally in secure online storage.

Limitations and mitigation measures

179. The inception report identified a number of limitations linked to the quantity and quality of the evidence. It presented these alongside mitigation measures that sought to address them, to the extent possible (see Table).
Table: Limitations and mitigation measures

Limitation	Description	Mitigation measures
1. There is a lack of baseline data and variability in the monitoring data at the outcome and impact level	The model of Operational Impact outlined in the ToR anticipates that the CBPF contributes to a diverse set of humanitarian outcomes – including the humanitarian response, leadership and coordination - in addition to having operational impact on the lives of affected people. However, the monitoring data available for these aspects of the response is limited, and in situations where it does exist, it is likely to vary in quality and quantity. Moreover, at the country-levels, it will be difficult to construct a baseline which will make it difficult to evidence and attribute changes at the outcome or impact-level.	• A literature review was undertaken prior to embarking on the country visit in order to identify all potential sources of information including IAHEs, OPRs and other research and evaluation. • Contribution analysis does not require a baseline or control group to have been established at the start of an intervention. The CBPF model of Operational Impact offers a causal pathway which was used during the evaluation as a means of identifying whether and the extent to which the CBPF contributed to outputs, outcomes and impact (to the extent possible).
2. It will be complex to attribute specific changes to the CBPF	The CBPF plays a relatively modest role in funding humanitarian programs (in 2018, for countries that have an HRP, CBPF funding accounted for 8.6% of the total received).[98] It is most frequently used either to fund gaps in interventions, to provide funding in contexts when other sources of financing are not available or are not timely, or to offer seed funding for humanitarian priorities when alternatives are not available. As a consequence, it will be difficult to attribute specific changes to CBPF funding.	• To the extent possible, the approach taken to project sampling for the case studies identified and targeted projects that had a comparatively high proportion of CBPF funding in order to offer the greatest opportunity to isolate changes that are attributable to the CBPF. • Contribution analysis is particularly useful for complex interventions where assessment of sole attribution is difficult. It was undertaken in an iterative manner so that evidence was repeatedly collected and analyzed across the case studies in order to refine contribution narratives.

[98] Data obtained from GMS, June 2019.

3. Given the limited scope for community engagement and the limitations outlined above, it will be difficult to evidence operational impact	While the ToR for the evaluation highlights the importance of engaging with affected people in order to evidence the contribution made by the CBPF to making change in the lives of affected people (operational impact), there will be limitations in the extent to which the findings in one country can be extrapolated to demonstrate broader impact across all countries. CBPF-funded projects are sectorally diverse and are spread across a range of contexts, countries and conditions. Even with five case studies, the sample size will be modest and at best will provide a series of snapshots of the effect that the CBPF has had on the lives of affected people.	• The literature review sought to mine data from secondary sources (previous CBPF evaluations, HRP reports, IAHEs, OPRs and relevant research) in order to supplement primary data collected during the evaluation to strengthen the pool of evidence. • The consistent use of a common approach offered the best quality results and the selection of case study countries that permitted direct access to communities assisted the evaluation team in developing a narrative about how they had been affected by the CBPFs • Significant output data available for the CBPFs is contained in GMS and CBPF annual reports, which was analyzed and synthesized in order to provide a consolidated overview of the results achieved.

Annex 5: Humanitarian context

This annex outlines the context in which the evaluation is being undertaken including the humanitarian situation in Somalia, and an overview of the SHF.

Context of the humanitarian situation in Somalia

180. Somalia's complex and protracted crisis that began after the collapse of the central government is nearly three decades old, with a pattern of conflict and cyclical natural disasters feeding each other. Since the 1990s, Somalia has undergone four periods of protracted drought and two periods of famin[99]e against the backdrop of civil war. After the 2012 transition to a permanent government backed by the international community, the federal government, with support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has wrested control of significant territory in southern and central Somalia from the Al Shabab (AS). The latter, however, still holds parts of Central South Somalia where humanitarian access is restricted.Natural hazards and disasters are endemic in Somalia and affect millions of people every year. Some chronically impoverished and conflict-ridden communities are so vulnerable that even minor shocks, which continue to increase in frequency and impact, have devastating effects on their lives and livelihoods. Protection violations, including widespread human rights violations, instability and insecurity drive displacement and weaken the resilience of the most vulnerable. Exclusion and discrimination of socially marginalized groups contribute to high levels of acute humanitarian needs and lack of protection among some of the most vulnerable.



Map of Somalia


181. While humanitarian needs are significant, humanitarian access for both aid providers and those seeking assistance is extremely difficult in Somalia (see Figure opposite[100]); remoteness of, and inaccessibility to, conflict affected areas controlled by non-state armed actors has been a significant challenge. Road blockades, extortion and checkpoints have been common over the last four years. Bureaucratic impediments are also on the increase with disruptions, delays, intrusion in humanitarian facilities, arrests and detention of humanitarian workers and occasional temporary suspensions of humanitarian programmes which have hampered response.

[99] Famines in 1991–92 and 2011–12; drought and food crises in 1999–2000, 2006 and 2008, and a food crisis verging on famine in 2016–17.
[100] OCHA (2016) 2017 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, November 2016.

Conflict and displacement

182. As a result of conflict and recurring natural disasters, Somalia had 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2016, and another 1 million people were added to this during the drought of 2017, bringing the total number of IDPs to 2.1 million at the end of 2017.

183. Compounding the challenged posed by displacement, forced evictions from IDP camps have weakened efforts to assist IDPs and to find durable solutions. In the first half of 2018 alone, more than 200,000 people were forcefully evicted, mainly in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Gaalkayo[101]. Service delivery systems were further strained by the return of refugees and asylum seekers who had fled to Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen in 2016-2017. In 2018, an estimated 2.6 million IDPs[102] were living in displaced settlements, the majority of which were located in southern Somalia's Banadir, Lower Shabelle and Bay regions.



Humanitarian access and need in Somalia, 2017

Climatic conditions and food insecurity

184. During 2016 and 2017, consecutive failure of rains in three seasons (Gu 2016, Deyr 2016, Gu 2017)[103] led to severe drought in the country, reminiscent of the drought and famine of 2011-12[104]. As a large majority of Somalia's population is dependent on pastoralism and rain-fed agricultural activities for its survival, the drought led to a significant depletion of water resources for farming and livestock population. An estimated 926,000 people were displaced by the drought from November 2016-September 2017[105]. The number of severely food insecure people reduced by 52 per cent from 3.1 million in September 2017 to 1.5 million in September 2018, but the security outlook, particularly in north-eastern and central regions remains extremely fragile.[106]

185. The country also faced an Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD)/cholera outbreak in 12 of its 18 regions in 2017, with the fatality rate hitting 2.3 per cent at one point, more than double the emergency threshold. Flooding is another frequent cause of humanitarian need and, in 2018, flooding affected areas of Southern and Central Somalia and led to the displacement of 300,000. In May 2018, Cyclone Sagar affected both Somaliland and Puntland.

[101] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) SHF Annual Report, 2018.

[102] ibid.

[103] Gu (long rains, usually from April to June) and Deyr (short rains, usually October-November).

[104] In Somalia, by July 2011, 3.2 million people needed life-saving assistance as a consequence of famine. An estimated 2.8 million people in need were in the south. Displacement played a big part in people's survival choices in Somalia. Some 253,000 people fled as refugees to Kenya and Ethiopia, while 167,000 became internally displaced mostly in and around Mogadishu.

[105] Federal Government of Somalia & World Bank (2018) Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment, Synthesis Report, Volume I (2018).

[106] Somalia Humanitarian Fund (2019) SHF Annual Report, 2018.

Background to the Somalia Humanitarian Fund


Objectives of the SHF

186. The SHF funds activities that have been prioritized as the most urgent and strategic to address critical humanitarian needs in the country, in close alignment with the Somalia HRP; it also funds interventions in support of immediate response to sudden onset crises or at times of rapidly deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the country.

Management structure

187. The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for Somalia oversees the Fund and decides on the SHF funding allocations. The HC is supported by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that manages the Fund on a day-to-day basis, the SHF Advisory Board (AB) and the Somalia cluster coordination structure - cluster coordinators and the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG).

188. The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) serves as the Fund's Administrative Agent (AA) and OCHA serves as the SHF Secretariat and Managing Agent (MA). The MPTFO is responsible for concluding standard administrative arrangements with donors and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with participating UN agencies. It receives, administers and manages contributions from donors, and disburses these funds in accordance with the decisions of the HC. The SHF governance structure is illustrated in the Figure above.



SHF governance (SHF Operational Guidelines, 01/03/2019)

Allocation strategy

189. The HC, in consultation with the SHF AB and upon recommendation by the ICCG, decides on the most critical needs to be funded. Cluster coordinators work with their regional counterparts and cluster partners to define the SHF cluster-specific priorities in prioritized geographical areas, which are reflected in individual allocation strategies of which there are two types:

- Standard Allocation (SA): Funds are usually allocated early in the year for projects included in the Somalia HRP, based on a strategy that identifies the greatest priority needs underpinned by vulnerability data and needs analysis. The strategy is developed by the ICCG, approved by the HC and endorsed by the AB and forms the basis for individual project submissions. Project proposals are prioritized and vetted within clusters through Strategic Review Committees (SRCs) before undergoing technical and financial reviews, then recommended to the AB for endorsement and final approval by the HC.
- SHF Reserve: Reserve funds are primarily intended for rapid and flexible allocations of funding in the event of unforeseen emergencies or to address identified gaps. These funds can be allocated through individual Reserve Allocations (RAs) or broader allocation rounds and are usually slightly faster and more geographically focused. Individual cluster coordinators must clear project proposals before they undergo a technical review, and endorsement and approval by the AB and the HC.