

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

# EVALUATION REPORT

- ▶ ▶ Protection and assistance to the  
Congolese refugees in Burundi

CAMP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME IN BURUNDI

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**EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL  
CAMP MANAGEMENT IN BURUNDI**

*Protection and assistance to the Congolese refugees  
in Burundi*

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## Acronyms

AHA	African Humanitarian Action
ARI	Acute Respiratory Infection
COP	Country Operations Plan
CSB	Corn Soya Blend
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FBU	Franc Burundais
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KCAL	Calories per kilo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIR	Standard Indicators Report
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
HN-TPO	Health Net - Transcultural Psychosocial Organization
WFP	World Food Programme

## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **1.1. ACTION EVALUATED:**

The present evaluation covers the role of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as a Camp Management Agency with responsibility for two refugee camps in Burundi. It reviews NRC's ability to provide protection and assistance to the Congolese refugees in Burundi in a relevant, coordinated, efficient and effective manner, as well as assessing the organisational set-up of the camp management programme in Burundi as a whole.

### **1.2. DATE OF EVALUATION:**

5 March – 19 April 2008

### **1.3. CONSULTANTS:**

Anne Davies (Team Leader), Augustin Ngendakuriyo

### **1.4. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation is aimed at providing a review of strategies and activities pursued by NRC from January 2006 to December 2007 within the framework of its strategic partnership with UNHCR. Findings are designed to provide the Camp Management team with useful information, analysis and recommendations for future action, thereby enabling the organisation to engage in effective policy-making, planning, programming and implementation.

The evaluation team conducted the evaluation through a combination of strategies including documentation review, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, both in Bujumbura and in the two refugee camps of Gasorwe and Gihinga. Key informants included programme managers and staff of the NRC Camp Management programme, national and international camp partner agencies, government officials at national and local levels and refugees, either individually or in focus group discussions.

### **1.5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS**

#### **1.5.1. Level 1: Intervention Strategy**

NRC has been engaged in activities in Burundi since 1997. Its programmes serve the agency's overall objective to promote and protect the basic rights of returnees, IDPs and refugees, and to facilitate voluntary return or reintegration as a durable solution. NRC's activities in Burundi include: Shelter (construction of shelters/houses and classrooms); Education (provision of basic education to out-of-school children and providing access to basic literacy, life skills and skills training); Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) and Camp Management (the management of several refugee camps, the focus of this evaluation).

NRC's decision to intervene in the camp management sector in 2004 was both relevant and appropriate in light of the rapidly evolving situation: growing numbers of Congolese refugees in Burundi and the increasingly complex task of providing them with effective protection and assistance. Other factors leading to conclude that NRC's intervention strategy was rational, relevant and appropriate in these circumstances include:

- The pressing humanitarian needs of the refugees;
- NRC's proven expertise in camp management (hithertofore with IDPs);

- The UNHCR-NRC strategic partnership, cemented by their May 2006 Memorandum of Understanding;
- NRC's stated aim to reinforce the efforts of United Nations agencies in the field, particularly support to UNHCR to carry out its responsibilities towards refugees;
- UNHCR's request to NRC to take over the management of the camps.

The absence, or non-availability, of documentation indicating that any needs assessment took place prior to the commencement of the programme signifies a weakness in the intervention strategy. For the field, it translates to an absence of baseline information with which to measure subsequent progress. However, the evaluation noted that a joint UNHCR-NRC needs assessment had recently been undertaken with a view to opening up a fourth refugee camp in Burundi, indicating that appropriate lessons have been drawn.

The programme does not appear to have a clear or fixed time-frame and there is no formal exit strategy. The political situation in the DRC, as well as the obstacles that would need to be overcome in that country for the refugees to consider voluntary repatriation, indicate that NRC could potentially remain in its camp management role for an indeterminate future. The NRC Country Strategy Burundi 2007-2008 indicates a tentative withdrawal date from Burundi in 2010 without specifying how it would achieve such a withdrawal.

A recurring problem with regard to the intervention strategy has been a certain confusion and non-clarity with regard to the protection role of NRC vis-à-vis its main partner UNHCR. This compromises the coherence and complementarity of the Camp Management Programme. The problem appears to be rooted in a structurally unclear delineation of roles and responsibilities. The Strategic Partnership agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and NRC in May 2006 does not assist in the search for clarity: NRC roles and responsibilities in Protection, Shelter and Camp Coordination and Management appear to be limited to 'IDP situations'. There is no agreement on how to develop collaboration or undertake joint efforts to address these activities in refugee situations, thus no institutional guidance to either agency in Burundi.

Policy overlap in the all-important protection roles of UNHCR and NRC has created unfortunate tensions between them. However, despite the absence of institutional guidance provided by the MoU, the evaluation observed that both agencies are responsibly tackling areas of overlap founded on mutual respect, a will to seek solutions and the consideration that differences should not impact negatively on the camp populations. The body of this report explores examples of situations where negative impact could arise.

Coordination with partners at camp level is functioning well but there is less coordination at the Bujumbura level. This leads to inefficiencies that could be overcome through more regular coordination meetings led by UNHCR. NRC's written request to UNHCR to activate regular coordination meetings in the capital, and the UNHCR Representative's stated commitment to it, have not brought about the desired results.

Complementarity is lacking with NRC's ICLA project in Burundi and in DRC. Closer synergies need to be forged to bring to refugees in Burundi as much information as possible concerning the situation in their home areas. ICLA as an advocacy tool can help Congolese refugees to make informed decisions on the timing and areas where it may be eventually safe to return. NRC foresees that the planned extension of its presence in South Kivu in 2008 will gradually improve the information base in many of the home areas of the refugees (notably Uvira, Fizi and Bukavu). As a consequence,

NRC in both countries should be able to establish a regular information exchange mechanism for the refugees in Burundi.

Complementarity and coherence have been much better with NRC's education and shelter programmes in Burundi. The shelter component has assisted the CM programme to build infrastructure in the camps while the education programme has lent expertise and materials to refugee children in the camps.

### **1.5.2. LEVEL 2: OPERATIONAL STRATEGY**

Overall, NRC's operational strategy and implementation have resulted in an effective use of resources towards achieving the aims of the programme: to protect the rights of the refugees through timely and efficient provision of assistance and to advocate for those rights with the Burundian authorities.

The structure and staffing of NRC Burundi is appropriate to achieving these goals. NRC's recruitment and training investments have been effective in building an impressive team of committed, enthusiastic and competent professionals. Their dealings with the refugees and camp partners, including the local authorities, manifest a common set of values that emphasise clear communications, firmness, respect and patience towards all interlocutors, a willingness to listen and a 'can-do' attitude toward problem-solving.

Project inputs have contributed to the overall efficiency of camp management operations. The number of staff engaged in the programme and the functions attributed to them are appropriate. Reducing the number of staff could result in certain gaps arising in humanitarian response, compromise effective monitoring of activities and possibly result in a negative impact on the refugees' welfare. On the other hand, a reduction in the amount of fuel provided to the beneficiaries would achieve budgetary economies without compromising their cooking and heating needs. A review of the nature of the fuel provided (wood) is needed to examine the possibility of changing it to a more environmentally friendly source. The evaluation notes that NRC has planned for such a review to take place in 2008.

An operational constraint to optimum management of the camps is the difficulty in estimating more accurately the numbers of refugees in both camps under review. It is clear that there are fewer permanent camp residents than the official statistics suggest. A joint verification exercise could result in confirming this perception, which is widely shared between all partners. However, no matter how carefully planned and executed, camp surveys such as head or hut counts rarely achieve a satisfactory degree of accuracy: refugees have developed multiple ways to confound demographic surveys and can be counted on to do so in future. The cost/benefits of an exhaustive survey must also be carefully weighed. This is not to discourage a survey, rather to caution against unrealistic expectations of it resulting in major project economies.

Responses provided by the camp management programme to key issues raised have been relevant and effective for all beneficiaries, not only the refugees. Some problems, however, are recurring and difficult to resolve. NRC employs its deepening understanding of the dynamics of camp life to devise greater efficiencies and respond according to shifts in the situation.

The weekly camp management activity planning and camp coordination meetings provide the opportunity for early detection of problems or potential problems in order that

appropriate responses or preventive measures can be agreed upon between partners. This is a useful mechanism to promote flexible responses to problem-solving. The camp management programme's flexibility in responding to different problems on a case by case basis while adhering to the spirit of camp regulations is to be commended.

Despite the absence of a pre-intervention needs assessment, the programme design, as described by the 2006 and 2007 sub-agreement narratives, is consistent with the humanitarian and protection needs of the refugees. It is also coherent with the goals of the partner agencies working alongside NRC in the camps, fortified by the laudable system of camp coordination between the partners that includes weekly planning and information meetings, ad hoc informal briefings, information-sharing and problem-solving mechanisms.

Close coordination results in efficiency and effectiveness in protecting and assisting the refugees and has had a positive impact on their overall health and well-being, as attested to by the health indicators collected by UNHCR.

NRC's operational strategy is appropriately guided by two documents: the NRC Camp Management Policy and the inter-agency Camp Management Toolkit. The guidance provided by these two baseline documents is closely adhered to and fortified by periodic camp management training organized by NRC for the benefit of its own staff and that of its partners, including national and local authorities. The training has enhanced their ability to work with all aspects of camp management and familiarised them with the use of the Camp Management Toolkit.

At the same time, the Camp Management Toolkit itself benefits from the 'reality check' that is the implementation of managing camps in practice. The Camp Management team in Burundi has provided detailed feedback and sensible suggestions for updating and improving the relevance of the Toolkit, which is currently undergoing revision by the inter-agency Camp Management Project members (DRC, IOM, IRC, OCHA, NRC and UNHCR) under the coordination of NRC at the headquarters' level.

Both tools, combined with NRC's institutional experience in camp management, have helped it to achieve its objectives in Burundi. Objectives and activities are clearly defined in the sub-project narrative document and both Sphere standards and the UNHCR Standard Indicators in Reporting (SIRs) are regularly used to measure results against objectives. The refugees have benefited from the programme as measured by their overall good health and absence of outbreaks of communicable diseases.

NRC and the other partners have been conscientious in jointly organizing and providing appropriate services to different groups of refugees: women, children, the disabled, adolescents, unaccompanied minors, victims of SGBV and HIV/AIDS sufferers. This represents coherence with NRC's operational policy to respond to the needs of vulnerable individuals and groups.

The presence of the refugee camps has had both positive and negative impacts on the host population: positively, through the employment of local residents in the camps as well as increased cross-socialization and marriages, especially in Gasorwe; negatively, through having to share scarce national resources such as wood for construction and fuel, ground water and cultivable land. The latter is scarce in Burundi and the acreage of cultivable land lost to the camps is considerable. NRC is to be credited for its ongoing search to minimise the negative impact on the host population and local environment, but structural challenges – such as a shortage of viable alternative options to firewood – remain to be addressed.

NRC has worked hard to foster a good working environment with all its camp management partners built on clarity and coherence of vision, coordination built on transparency and problem-solving and a search for positive outcomes. In this, it is highly appreciated by its partners and the beneficiaries.

### **1.5.3. LEVEL 3: SECTOR ACTIVITIES**

On-site visits show that the Gasorwe and Gihinga camps are efficiently run in all sectors. Sphere standards are respected in most sectors. In general, though with a few exceptions, the camps are reasonably clean, infrastructure is moderate to well-maintained and the refugees manifest a healthy aspect.

The sectors where indicators show that services and provisions are below Sphere standards are: food and water in both camps and hygiene in Gasorwe. The shortfalls in these sectors and their implications are discussed in the body of this report. UNHCR statistics show that there has so far been no negative impact on refugee overall health due to these lower standards. Indeed, refugee health indicators surpass not only those of the local population but also of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Were living standards in the camps to be any higher, they would exceed those of the local population. It is always difficult to achieve a balance between providing minimum standards to refugees while not surpassing those experienced by the host population, but this balance has been largely achieved in the camp management programme.

The provision of firewood is becoming increasingly unsustainable for environmental reasons. The Government of Burundi has requested that UNHCR reduce its use of national forest resources to provide the refugees with fuel for cooking and heating but studies to date show that alternative options are difficult to identify. NRC plans to engage consultancy services to conduct an in-depth study of this issue with ensuing recommendations for alternative sources.

NRC has made commendable efforts to contribute to the social wellbeing of the refugees by providing additional camp inputs such as the establishment of libraries in both camps. Additional socialization and education improvements could be made by organizing the teaching of small-scale cultivation techniques to children that would be useful at a later stage of their lives and bring additional nutritional inputs to their diets.

While results from the maternal and primary schools are satisfactory, secondary education in the two camps by refugee teachers has not achieved expected results, leaving young adults uneducated, unemployed, frustrated and at risk of turning to unsound behavioural practices. NRC is currently assessing whether to implement secondary education.

NRC staff are motivated, competent and well-trained. They are recognized by their partners for their willingness to discuss problems and take appropriate steps to solve them. The impact of their work is reflected in the overall good health and well-being enjoyed by the refugees and the satisfaction of all who work with them.

### **1.6. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

The camp management programme provides a sensitive and appropriate response to the needs of the different refugee groups to the extent possible. Youth, women, elderly and disabled groups have been formed in each camp and their members are vocal

advocates for the specific needs of the groups they represent. The programme has sought to provide space for group discussions and follow up on recommendations.

Refugee participation is low in these two camps. The refugees are passive and reluctant to participate in camp management activities voluntarily. They request payment for any service rendered for their own benefit or that of their families. More robust efforts could be undertaken by NRC and its partners to encourage the refugees to undertake voluntary services.

In both camps much emphasis is placed on a holistic response to HIV/AIDS. Specific initiatives deal with community and individual awareness, promoting safe sex and condom use and confidential follow-up of those affected. HIV/AIDS awareness is particularly and repeatedly directed at adolescents through community health workers and school.

Advocacy with regard to refugee-specific needs towards the Government of Burundi hardly seemed an issue during the evaluation: the national and local authorities work closely with NRC and its partners and are part of all decision-making at camp management level. There are no discernible dissenting views between partners.

A key exception is the lack of sufficiently robust follow up on the part of the authorities concerning perpetrators of rape or other forms of SGBV, who they often release from prison prematurely. This creates an environment of impunity, the danger being that if SGBV comes to be seen as an unimportant crime, it will not deter perpetrators and more incidences could result. NRC is in constant discussions with its partner UNHCR on this problem but the protection overlap question appears to arise on each occasion and hampers more robust action.

Camp security is considered satisfactory: there are very few external threats to the refugees and nothing close to the 2004 Gatumba incident that arose mainly due to the close proximity of the camp to the border with DRC.

### **1.7. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Coordination: In the interests of improving efficiency, maintaining a free flow of information and discussion and optimising partner networking, regular coordination at the Bujumbura level should be reactivated. NRC must advocate more strongly with UNHCR on this issue which would benefit all partners and close gaps arising in camp policies, services and activities.

It would now be appropriate, and for NRC Burundi, urgent, to undertake a revision of the global UNHCR-NRC Strategic Partnership Agreement. The key focus of such a revision from the perspective of NRC Burundi would be to provide greater clarity on the respective agency roles and responsibilities in refugee situations – not only for the Burundi context but also to further enhance future partnership with UNHCR in similar circumstances.

The 'Roles and Responsibilities' table elaborated jointly by UNHCR and NRC country staff represents an important first step towards a constructive solution of the 'Protection overlap' problem but it is not sufficiently detailed. The evaluation considers that the table could be expanded, using specific protection scenarios to map out more detailed responses to be undertaken by each partner.

It is necessary to more closely align NRC's stringent (but rational) staff security rules with the operational need for NRC's presence in Gasorwe camp when new busloads of refugees arrive from Bujumbura. A parallel initiative would be for NRC to redouble its

efforts in requesting UNHCR to send the convoys earlier in the day, and with a longer notice period to NRC, to reduce the number of times it is necessary for NRC staff to be out late in the camps. A more in-depth dialogue with UNHCR on this issue is strongly recommended to find a satisfactory *modus operandi*. The issue is dealt with more fully in the body of this report.

NRC should coordinate more closely with the Administrators of the communes where the camps are located in order to better monitor relations with local communities and discuss issues of common concern.

Effectiveness and Efficiency: In planning for a house-to-house verification exercise to get a more accurate figure of camp residents, it is imperative that the exercise is conducted simultaneously in the three refugee camps and that the refugees are given only one day's notice. A longer warning period could negate the results of the exercise by alerting the refugees residing outside the camps to return in time to secure their continued benefits.

The evaluation cautions against raising unrealistic expectations in achieving accuracy in refugee camp numbers resulting from a verification exercise however. As mentioned earlier, experience points to the difficulties in overcoming the efficient strategies employed by refugees worldwide, and particularly the Congolese refugees in these camps<sup>1</sup>, to confuse anticipated survey results. The best that can be expected is to achieve *more* accurate statistics, but these will still only amount to best estimates. NRC and its partners anticipate that figures resulting from a verification exercise could be up to one-third lower than current official statistics. If this is confirmed from the verification results, it should help all the agencies to adjust to their budgets and result in overall project efficiency. Currently between 200 and 250 refugees are living in collective tents in Gasorwe camp because there are not enough spare shelters, constituting a misallocation of resources and inefficiency. A verification survey may be effective in finding out which shelters could be freed up for incoming refugees and reduce, if not eliminate, the need for tents.

Impact: In order to secure a better educational impact for children or young adults of secondary school level, NRC is recommended to take charge of the secondary school activity and manage it professionally. The evaluation considers that this would be a logical adjunct to its primary education activities.

Linked to the provision of secondary education is the recommendation that NRC provide vocational training to all refugees wishing to benefit from such activities. There is an important opportunity here to make a major impact on refugee livelihoods as well as contributing to their skills base for the time when they can return home.

Undertaking these additional activities will require much planning and additional budgeting, which should start as soon as possible.

Hygienic practices in the school area can be improved by involving refugee children more directly in regular cleaning of the sites, complemented by AHA's more frequent disinfecting of latrines. Here again, there is an important opportunity to make an impact on improving the cleanliness of this area and instilling healthy practices at an early age.

Parts of the school area in Gasorwe camp (near the water points) could be used to teach children crop cultivation, keeping this vital cultural activity alive in the population while they remain in exile. It should also teach the children the discipline inherent in cultivation,

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<sup>1</sup> Interviews with UNHCR staff in Burundi and Headquarters registration staff (FICSS).

give them something creative to do and instil pride in their contribution to supplementing the family food ration.

NRC could make educational use of community areas by putting up posters with key messages regarding health, hygiene and educational issues. Refugee children could be encouraged to design the posters.

A reduction in the firewood ration is recommended, concurrent with efforts to find alternative sources of cooking fuel to reduce the negative impact on the environment. Refugees are able to convert their wood packages into charcoal and sell them to buyers outside the camp, indicating surplus supply.

Sustainability: In keeping with its stated policy to phase out of camp management altogether by 2010, NRC could be more proactive in developing an exit strategy by opening discussions with UNHCR to start jointly developing plans for phased withdrawal. The optimum strategy would be to train government officials or national NGOs such as the Burundi Red Cross to take over the camp management portfolio. Extensive camp management training and mentoring would be necessary in both cases, something in which NRC excels. This could constitute a real opportunity for national capacity-building and provide a model of good practice.

NRC Oslo could consider updating its current camp management policy, requiring not only that each camp management intervention be accompanied by an exit strategy but also proposing to how this could be achieved. In most cases, it would preferably be based on building the capacity of a local partner to take over, where feasible, and in cases where camps will continue to exist after country programme phase out.

To protect and sustain the environment, which is extremely fragile in Burundi, it would be advisable to consider the full-time employment of an Environment Adviser to draw up a country environment policy for NRC and to counsel alternatives to wood for construction and cooking/heating fuel. Further, in the absence of an agency-wide policy on the environment, it is recommended that NRC Oslo take steps to draft a policy that would serve as a useful guide to camp management operations worldwide.

## *I. INTRODUCTION*

The present evaluation covers the role of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as a Camp Management Agency with responsibility for refugee camps in Burundi. It covers a two-year period: 2006 – 2007 during which NRC signed a strategic partnership agreement with UNHCR, undertook of a camp management role in a refugee situation for the first time, closed one camp (Musasa) in 2006 and re-opened it in 2007, and assessed with UNHCR the prospect of managing a new camp towards the end of the current year. The two camps under review are Gasorwe in Muyinga province, where NRC's intervention commenced in January 2006, and Gihinga in Mwaro province where NRC has been a partner of UNHCR since 2004.

NRC now finds itself at an important cross-road in its role as a refugee Camp Management Agency in Burundi. After two years of building its camp management capacities it needs to take stock of the situation, examine successes and challenges and consider how it might make structural and operational adjustments to better respond to refugee needs within the confines of limited resources. While it has well-developed ideas on the direction it could take in the future, it has decided to test these hypotheses against the views of an external and independent evaluation.

The evaluation is organized into three different levels or analysis: intervention strategy, operational strategy and sectoral activities, to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, coordination, coherence, complementarity, impact and sustainability of the camp management programme in varying degrees of detail. An in-depth examination of individual sectors reflects key findings that are sometimes cross-cutting and sometimes specific to the characteristics of each sector.

## *II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY*

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of NRC's performance in managing two refugee camps in Burundi over the period 2006-2007. It aims to analyse NRC's ability to provide assistance and protection to the Congolese refugees in Burundi in a relevant, coordinated, efficient and effective manner and assess the programme's sustainability. An additional aim is to evaluate the organisational set-up of NRC's camp management programme in Burundi and to consider its suitability as a model for the design and implementation of camp management projects or programmes in similar refugee contexts. The evaluation should inform NRC's Camp Management team on the future direction of the camp management programme in Burundi in 2008 and beyond. Based on the findings of the assessment, recommendations are made to guide NRC in respect of policy options for the continuation and/or modification of camp management activities in Burundi. Input is provided on implementation strategies and options for future empowerment of local authorities or a local NGO with a view to handing over camp management responsibilities to them at a later date.

In developing its methodology, the evaluation team took as its starting point the Terms of Reference provided by the NRC which outlines the methodology to be followed for the evaluation. In addition, the evaluation team took into account the NRC's published

evaluation policy,<sup>2</sup> other related experience of the team as well as additional NRC policy documents relevant to the evaluation.<sup>3</sup>

In all respects, the evaluation team was guided by the following principles:

- Openness and transparency – The evaluation team made clear to all interviewees the purpose of the interviews and how information received would be used.
- Publicity/public access – The evaluation team made clear to NRC management in Burundi and programme staff its preliminary findings and incorporated comments and revisions as appropriate. Interviews with beneficiaries and counterpart organisations and institutions were conducted without the presence of NRC staff in order to encourage the interviewees to speak freely.
- Broad participation – The evaluation team sought to interview as wide as possible a range of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries, in addition to NRC management and programme staff.
- Reliability and independence – The evaluation team made every effort to verify information collected and conclusions arrived at and sought to confirm its findings with a variety of sources.

### **1.1. i. Evaluation Terms and Concepts**

The evaluation team employed the following terms and concepts relevant to the evaluation, all of which are further explained in the Terms of Reference:

- a) Relevance/appropriateness
- b) Effectiveness
- c) Efficiency
- d) Coordination
- e) Impact
- f) Sustainability

Coherence and complementarity are additional indicators laid out in OECD/DAC humanitarian evaluation criteria and have been used also in this evaluation.

### **1.2. ii. Information Gathering**

The evaluation methodology was comprised of the following components:

#### **1) Desk research:**

The evaluation team studied relevant internal NRC material, including policy documents relevant to NRC in general and the camp management programme in particular, the NRC country strategy for Burundi, public materials and reports, sub-project narratives, budgets and reports, staff responsibilities, financial documentation, external funding applications and reports and camp records. In addition, the evaluation team reviewed UNHCR statistical data, humanitarian situation reports, programme documents and

<sup>2</sup> Norwegian Refugee Council. Evaluation Policy: Learning from Experience, available on the NRC website: [http://www.nrc.no/arch/\\_img/9154436.pdf](http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9154436.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> For example, NRC Policy Paper ([http://www.nrc.no/arch/\\_img/9154478.pdf](http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9154478.pdf)); NRC Country Strategy Burundi 2007-2008;

news reports. During this phase, telephone interviews were conducted at the Oslo level with the Camp Management Adviser and the Programme Coordinator.

## **2) Field mission:**

The evaluation team conducted its field review from 5 to 19 March 2008. Preliminary meetings were held with NRC management and key programme staff in the Bujumbura country office. The purpose of such meetings was to gain an understanding of the issues around achieving the objectives of the camp management programme from the perspective of the employees, to understand internal management structures in place to ensure transparency, professionalism and the timely, efficient and effective meeting of programme outputs, to assess monitoring and evaluation structures in order to analyse progress in meeting objectives and the strength, flexibility and capacity of the programme to evolve to meet new challenges. Additional interviews were conducted in Bujumbura with UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, and OCHA), a national nongovernmental organisation camp partner (TPO) and a key official from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the camp management governmental counterpart. These meetings, as well as those with counterparts at the field level, sought to gain an understanding of the level of cooperation and collaboration within the NRC camp management team and between the team and its partners. The interviews sought to assess the extent to which all actors perceived the different components of the camp management programme to be useful and to meet clear and pressing needs, and/or whether there is unnecessary duplication or other inefficiencies and if so, to identify the ways in which the same could be avoided in future. Additionally, the evaluation team drew out the views of project counterparts on questions of sustainability and durability.

The team visited the two camps under review in the provinces of Muyinga, from 9 to 12 March, and Mwaro, from 16 to 18 March. In both sites the team met with a range of NRC camp management staff, UN field staff, NGOs, local authorities, refugee committees and individual beneficiaries, and observed camp management activities including a clothing distribution in Gasorwe camp (Muyinga) and a food distribution in Gihinga (Mwaro).

## **3) Observation of Programme Activities and Interviews with beneficiaries**

Through the evaluation mission, the evaluation team sought to observe project activities and to meet with direct beneficiaries. In the observation of project outputs and discussions with direct beneficiaries, the evaluation team assessed the extent to which the activities were relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries were satisfied with the services rendered and the comportment of camp management staff. The team also sought to discern whether the camp activities were conducted in accordance with international standards and whether they contributed to positive changes for the beneficiaries in the manner envisioned by the programme objectives, and/or whether there were other strategies which could be employed to achieve the desired objectives in a more efficient or effective manner.

### ***1.3. iii. Interview and feedback sessions***

The evaluation team sought to meet with a wide range of NRC staff individually and collectively. Interview and feedback sessions were held in Muyinga and Mwaro field offices with the Camp Management Field Coordinators and in Bujumbura with the Country Director, the camp management Programme Coordinator and the Protection

and Advocacy Adviser. They provided a useful forum to exchange ideas and to discuss some of the preliminary findings of the evaluation team. A final presentation and feedback session was held in Bujumbura at the end of the field mission attended by the above staff as well as the UNHCR Senior Programme Officer. This session provided a further opportunity for the evaluation team to explain its preliminary findings and for discussion of the findings.

The evaluation team would like to thank the NRC Mission in Burundi, the Camp Management programme staff in Bujumbura and the two field offices, and others who collaborated in the evaluation for their support and patience over the course of our mission. We hope our findings will be useful in the furtherance of the aims of the programme.

### **III. BACKGROUND**

#### **4.1. Context**

Burundi, a small but densely populated country with a population of around eight million, currently hosts over 30,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>4</sup>, with whom it shares its western border. The number of refugees has steadily increased since 2004 due to recurring and violent conflict in their country. Over 10,000 refugees reside in Gasorwe camp in the Province of Muyinga and some 2,500 are hosted in Gihinga camp in Mwaro province. An unknown number are resident in other parts of Burundi<sup>5</sup>. Given the instability of the political, economic and social situation in DRC, people seeking refuge in Burundi are considered as 'prima facie' refugees, meaning they do not have to undergo an individual refugee status determination process to prove their bona fides as refugees. Due to continued unrest in DRC, the refugees are unable and unlikely to return any time soon – although there are reportedly frequent cross-border movements of some refugees between Burundi and DRC.

The two refugee camps under review house two different groups of refugees. Those housed in Gasorwe fled DRC in 1998 and were initially installed in Rugombo transit centre in Cibitoke province. They comprise an ethnic mix of Banyamulenge, Bafurera, Babembe and Barega. Those residing in Gihinga comprise mainly Banyamulenge who fled to Burundi following an attack on the towns of Uvira and Bukavu in eastern DRC (South Kivu) in June 2004. Initially they settled in Gatumba but following a massacre at that site in 2004, they were relocated to the camp at Gihinga. This camp is thus relatively ethnically homogeneous. A growing number of refugees, either new arrivals or urban refugees, are arriving at the Cibitoke transit centre, from where UNHCR periodically transports them to Gasorwe camp. They comprise the ethnic mix noted above.

NRC has been engaged in Burundi since 1997 and currently operates a number of programmes in the country. Areas of progressive intervention have been in the four sectors that represent NRC's 'core activities': shelter, education, ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance) and camp management.

A strategic partnership agreement signed in May 2006 between UNHCR and NRC opened the way for NRC's camp management role, although NRC has been a partner of UNHCR in Gihinga camp since 2004. NRC currently manages some 20,307 refugees in three camps: Gasorwe, Gihinga and Musasa (in Ngozi province). Due to the growing

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<sup>4</sup> UNHCR, Burundi Fact Sheet, 29 February 2008

<sup>5</sup> UNHCR provides protection and some assistance to just under 13,000 urban refugees and asylum-seekers of whom 99% are Congolese. Source: UNHCR, Burundi Fact Sheet, 29 February 2008

number of refugees UNHCR has asked NRC to manage a fourth camp, due to open in the province of Ruyigi, in eastern Burundi, later in 2008.

NRC's camp management activity is currently financed by UNHCR (57%) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (43%). Budget and financing<sup>6</sup> are as follows:

Sub-project symbol	Total budget US\$	HCR financed US\$ value	NMFA financed US\$ value
06/AB/BDI/CM/270 (b), (b\$	1,518,030	1,310,246	207,785 (13.7% of total)
07/AB/BDI/CM/270 (b), (b\$	1,343,184	756,714	586,470 (43.7% of total)

NB. These figures represent NRC's share of the overall project and do not include the components of other partners or UNHCR.

The per capita cost to NRC was US\$ 0.33/refugee/day in 2006 and US\$ 0.29/refugee/day in 2007, the difference reflecting the cost of camp construction works in 2006. This benchmark can be useful to compare with NRC's camp management projects elsewhere.

Sectors managed by NRC are financed by UNHCR and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows:

	Sectors financed by UNHCR	Sectors financed by NMFA
2006	Logistics and transport Non-food items and firewood Water Shelter and other infrastructure Community Services Education Agency administrative support	Seminars and training Project materials* Procurement - goods and services* Agency support, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• personnel costs*</li> <li>• premises and communications</li> </ul>
2007	Logistics and transport Non-food items Shelter and other infrastructure Community Services Education Agency administrative support	Firewood provision Didactic materials for camps libraries Project materials* Procurement - goods and services* Agency support, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• personnel costs*</li> <li>• staff training</li> <li>• premises and communications</li> <li>• project evaluation.</li> </ul>

\* Shared with UNHCR

#### 4.2. Definition of Camp Management

Camp Management is defined in NRC's Camp Management Toolkit as "the coordination of all activities and services within a camp. Through the coordination of activities and the motivation of service providers, NRC aims to ensure timely delivery of services in a comprehensive manner, according to international standards". The overall goal of the NRC Camp Management Programme in Burundi is to "promote and protect the basic

<sup>6</sup> Extrapolated from NRC Burundi project documents.

rights of Congolese refugees and to facilitate voluntary return or reintegration as a durable solution”<sup>7</sup>. Within this overall objective, specific programme outputs of the Camp Management Programme in Burundi are: to increase the physical and social protection of refugees through the management of two camps, Gasorwe and Gihinga; to provide specific services and to train, capacitate and empower other actors involved in the camps. NRC aims to provide assistance in accordance with international minimum standards, such as Sphere, at all levels of planning, practice and participation, as well as upholding a ‘Do No Harm’ policy. NRC’s Camp Management Toolkit is employed an essential guide to ensuring that well-tested policies and strategies are pursued in all areas of camp management. Camp management in Burundi is, at the same time, an excellent testing ground for the Toolkit and can provide valuable feedback to NRC for improving and updating it.

### **4.3. Beneficiaries (Refugees) - Main characteristics**

#### **Ethnicity, Culture and Way of Life in the Camps**

The beneficiaries of the camp management programme are all refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They number a little over 10,000 in Gasorwe camp (Muyinga) and some 2,500 in Gihinga camp (Mwaro). Gasorwe camp is marked by ethnic diversity, comprised of Babembe, Bafurero, Barega and Banyamulenge) while in Gihinga camp, people are mainly Banyamulenge (Kinyarwanda-speaking). This ethnic composition is the origin of different characteristics of the two camps : many of the Banyamulenge are cattle raisers and were able to flee their land with their livestock, which they can keep in Cibitoke province bordering the DRC. They organize themselves with a system of relays so there are always some members of some families away from the camp guarding the whole community’s cattle stock. This livestock rearing allows the refugees to earn an income (mainly from milk production) and enjoy a higher standard of living in the camps. Thus, the general aspect of cleanliness, health and clothing of the refugees in Gihinga camp is better than in Gasorwe. People are better nourished on the whole, able to supplement their diet with milk, and there are less kinds of vulnerability. As the refugees in this camp do not traditionally engage in cultivation, it is noticeable how few of the green spaces available in the camp are being exploited for growing garden produce. Also noticeable is the higher level of hygiene in this camp, the notion of personal and communal hygiene apparently better developed in this ethnic group. Finally the Banyamulenge have strong religious beliefs which cement their remarkable cohesiveness and solidarity and reinforce their organizational capacities, witnessed by the religious committee meetings, choral meetings and visits and support to the sick, that are regular events in the camp.

On the other hand, the mixed ethnic groups of refugees in Gasorwe make it difficult for any one of them to impose their living standards on other groups : those who may have better hygiene practices are discouraged by those who do not make the effort to keep camp areas clean – especially communal latrines.

The Gasorwe refugee community is comprised mainly of artisans, traders and casual labourers. They are less attached to livestock rearing and, while some might wish to engage in small-scale agricultural cultivation, there is a lack of land space. In this more populated camp there are a higher number of vulnerable people – non-accompanied minors, disabled and elderly. Despite only a few refugees engaging in garden cultivation

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<sup>7</sup> Evaluation Terms of Reference, 10 December 2007.

and the lower degree of milk consumption in Gasorwe camp, the malnutrition rate is no higher than in Gihinga. However, the refugees certainly have a more unkempt bearing (less well-dressed, less fleeces or jackets) than those in Gihinga, which indicates that any additional income would go towards supplementing the diet than on clothing or hygienic items.

The wide ethnic mix in Gasorwe camp has resulted in a closer interaction of communities which would not normally deal with each other to such a great extent in their home country. For instance, even under normal conditions in DRC, interaction and trust between the Banyamulenge and other ethnic groups is rare. The greater socialisation of these groups in exile may be considered a plus factor for the chances of their future reintegration upon repatriation. By contrast, the social composition of Gihinga camp, marked by the predominance of the Banyamulenge group, lacks the social advantages manifested in the more ethnically diverse Gasorwe camp.

Marriages are officially celebrated in Gihinga camp, facilitated by the Camp Administrator who brings in a civil agent from the commune de Kayokwe (Mwaro). Conversely, marriage is not authorized in Gasorwe camp, to avoid bigamy. The Camp Administrator states that it is not possible to know who may already have been officially married in DRC, so he cannot perform the ceremony. Consequently there are higher cases of illegal and early marriages in Gasorwe camp than in Gihinga, despite these being discouraged by the council of elders.

### **Organisation**

The refugees are organized into different committees representing their specific circumstances and/or interests, or according to camp demarcation ('Chefs de Quartier'). Each camp committee has a president and vice-president elected by the refugees. There are parents' committees, a primary and secondary school education body (one for each), parents' committees, hygiene committees, distribution committees, security and community policing committees, as well as women's groups, elderly people's, handicapped and youth groups. NRC has been instrumental in assisting these bodies to hold peaceful elections and to encourage respect for the results. In an earlier case, unrest broke out in one of the camps because the Camp President was found to be representing his own interests over those of his camp constituents. Camp Administration organized new elections with a prior sensitization campaign, which were held peacefully and a more representative president appointed. Questioned about these societal organizations, the refugees expressed high appreciation of NRC's facilitating role.

### **Mobility & Communication**

Refugees may leave both camps officially by obtaining from the Camp Administrators exit coupons (billets de sortie). Many also leave the camps unofficially because there is no physical barrier to prevent them. While none of the refugees admit to it, they are able to pursue employment opportunities and studies outside the camp but are always present on the monthly distribution day. This mobility is at the root of the 'recycling' phenomenon observed by all camp partners and is suspected to be the cause of inflated camp population statistics. Information circulates freely between the camps thanks to the high ownership of mobile telephones which allows refugees to compare benefits in each camp and to warn those living outside the camps of any changes relating to distribution.

## *V. KEY FINDINGS BY SECTOR*

The following analysis does not examine each and every aspect of the activities carried out in each sector but aims to focus on areas of concern or to highlight areas that have been particularly successful. Inevitably, because NRC is responsible for camp management as a whole, observations have necessitated involving sectors and activities implemented by other partners and which have an impact on camp management.

### **5.1. Food**

NRC's role in the food sector is limited to food distribution, an activity that it carries out efficiently and mostly without incident. The team followed a refugee family waiting in line from the beginning to the end of the distribution process and witnessed the seamlessness and efficiency with which the system is implemented. There is little wastage in the distribution activity: camp livestock such as goats and chickens are efficient end-of-day cleaners of any remaining scraps and refugee complaints – mostly regarding the quality of the food<sup>8</sup> – are handled promptly. The warehouses were observed to be clean and well-maintained.

In January 2007 WFP informed there would be a temporary reduction of 25% in the food ration and the minimum standard of 2,100 kcal/person/day dropped to 1,465 kcal/person/day. Two months after, WFP increased the food ration to 1,946 Kcal and this amount has remained constant since then, representing 154 kcal/person/day under the norm.

It would be reasonable to assume that long-term exposure to inadequate food would lead to a generalised state of malnutrition among the refugee population yet health statistics show that malnutrition is very low in the camps. There may be several reasons for this:

- Firstly, WFP explained that, since the food ration is the same for all ages, families with small children - who do not consume a full ration - are able to satisfy their daily nutritional needs.
- Secondly, there appears to be a surplus of food in circulation: many refugees do not actually live in the camps but they remain registered as camp residents. They return on distribution day to collect their ration and, rather than return to wherever they are living with sacks of food, with all the risks this would entail, they are able to convert it into currency by selling it to those in the camps who can afford to pay. Others leave the camps without informing the Camp Administrator and sell their ration card to other camp residents (the going rate is FBU 10,000/card). Some leave the camps and go to Bujumbura where they present themselves at UNHCR convoy sites, register with another name, go to another camp and pick up a new ration card there. Still others borrow a child from a Burundian family in order to get additional rations, then split the proceeds with the child's family.
- Thirdly, many refugees have income-generating possibilities, particularly the Banyamulenge in Gihinga who raise cattle in areas away from the camp. The proceeds from selling milk enables them to supplement the family food basket.

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<sup>8</sup> NRC has noticed that some sacks of wheat flour contain mould and duly notified WFP. The current distribution system includes delivery of 5% additional sacks of flour to the camp warehouses to replace any defective flour as well as to compensate for underweight sacks.

Common spaces in the camps have allowed some refugees to engage in small-scale cultivation of garden produce that also supplements the ration.

The family food ration system benefits some families but not childless couples nor families with adult children (who, as one refugee pointed out, can eat enough for two), nor those who do not have income-generating possibilities such as the elderly and the infirm. It is recommended that NRC advocate with UNHCR and WFP for a nutritional survey. Furthermore, a nutritional survey is due according to UNHCR SIRs, which advocate for a yearly survey in stable refugee situations. If the results show that malnutrition rates are indeed low, the evaluation recommends that a paragraph be inserted in the tri-partite agreement between UNHCR, WFP and NRC indicating why the food ration is below the minimum recommended standard and how UNHCR will be able to detect any resulting malnutrition through regular monitoring of health indicators. The lack of a correlation between sub-standard ration and malnutrition needs explaining, otherwise it undercuts the Sphere rationale for promoting a minimum nutritional standard. This is an important advocacy point to be raised with UNHCR and WFP.

## **5.2. Non-food items including fuel**

NRC's implementation role in this sector is also limited to distribution, except for the fuel which it purchases, rather than actual provision of domestic items (the responsibility of UNHCR). Here too, distribution is carried out efficiently, according to observations of the evaluation team in Gasorwe. The refugees in Gasorwe camp appear to be inadequately clothed, which could be due to the non-provision of replacement clothing in over a year. However, it is recognized that if refugees receive additional clothing or blankets, they tend to sell them. Women refugees have just received a new distribution of 'pagnes' which should help combat the cold. In Gihinga camps refugees appear to be better dressed and wealthier – perhaps linked to their livestock rearing activities that provide them with an income to supplement their clothing needs.

The evaluation noted the willingness of UNICEF to provide additional clothing for children – and possibly women - upon request from UNHCR. Certain budgetary economies could be used by obtaining camp items from other agencies, and NRC could do much to lay the groundwork through informal networking to assess which agency might be able to provide inputs and increase programme efficiency.

The provision of firewood is becoming increasingly unsustainable for environmental reasons. The Government of Burundi has requested that UNHCR reduce its use of national forest resources to provide the refugees with fuel for cooking and heating but studies to date show that alternative options are difficult to identify. NRC staff are fully conscious of the need to identify cost-effective options and frustrated at the apparent lack of options. The wood ration is being reduced progressively and over time, but there is a limit to ration reductions and at some point, alternatives – or supplements – must be found. NRC plans to engage consultancy services to conduct an in-depth study of this issue with ensuing recommendations for alternative sources of energy, an initiative that the evaluation fully endorses. .

It may be timely to remind camp partners of certain basic regulations, most notably the need to ensure that their staff are not involved in purchasing assets from the refugees or transporting them in their project vehicles. It should be made clear that staff engaged in such activities are liable to dismissal. There is a healthy traffic of refugee firewood between Gihinga and Bujumbura in which it was observed certain NGO partners to be involved, and it is only a short step to finding themselves inadvertently transporting more dangerous and illegal items.



### 5.3. Water and sanitation

#### 1. Gasorwe (Muyinga) et Gihinga (Mwaro)

No	Indicators	Standard	Actual : Gasorwe	Actual : Gihinga
<b>Water and Sanitation</b>				
<b>WS1</b>	Minimum quantity of water per person per day	<b>20L</b>	17,0	16
<b>WS2a</b>	Number of people per functioning water point	<b>≤ 80</b>	76,3	72
<b>WS2b</b>	Number of people per functioning well/hand pump	<b>≤ 200</b>	0	0
<b>WS3a</b>	Percentage of families with access to individual (family) latrines	<b>100%</b>	0%	100%
<b>WS 3b</b>	Number of persons per drop-hole in communal latrine	<b>≤ 20</b>	24	0
<b>WS4b</b>	Percentage of people living within 200 m of a water point	<b>100%</b>	100%	97%

Source : UNHCR Annual Report and Standard Indicator Reports (SIRs) 2007.

#### Field observations

##### a. Water :

NRC was responsible for management of both the water sector and latrines maintenance in 2006 and 2007 but handed over management of the water sector to AHA as of 2008 (retaining responsibility for latrines maintenance). The evaluation questions the wisdom of this decision, taken in line with NRC Oslo recommendations. The reasoning behind it is that water is not part of the core activities of NRC and that globally, NRC would search for other existing partners with more expertise in this area to carry out water-related activities. UNHCR staff interviewed expressed disappointment at NRC's decision to withdraw and would have preferred to retain the continuity of NRC's management of this sector, being fully satisfied with its performance. Notwithstanding NRC's valid reasoning to hand over water sector responsibilities to another agency, there are greater considerations that could have outweighed the decision to withdraw. The main one is the logic of having less partners for a camp management programme, thereby securing greater overall project efficiencies with economies of scale. The evaluation can fully understand NRC's concern of incurring ever greater expenditure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the recruitment, training and retention of appropriate staff but considers that the greater interests of efficient management might have taken precedence.

##### Gihinga Camp

The above table shows that each person received 16 l/day in 2007. However, the evaluation raises some questions regarding these statistics for the following reasons:

- During the months of May, June, July and November, water amounts in litres, per person, per day provided were 12.11, 14.6, 14.6 and 14.35 respectively.
- To achieve an average of 16 l/person/day over a twelve-month period would signify that in other months the amounts provided would have reached or superseded the prescribed minimum of 20 l/person/day, which has never been the case in this camp, according to other documentation.
- Although the number of people per functioning water point and accessibility to water points are either within or very close to the norm, the evaluation observed a number of non-functioning water points, signifying reduced accessibility.
- Since November 2007 the sole existing water pump has not been working correctly and all camp water has to be brought in by water tanker. This has reduced the amount of water per person to just under 13 L/person/day – well below the prescribed standard.

The situation today remains extremely fragile: the water tanker in use can carry 11,000 litres and makes three trips daily to the camps over rough terrain (33,000L) daily, but this is compromised further by leakages from the cistern. Should the tanker break down the water provision would drop to zero – and because of the terrain and the condition of the tanker, this cannot be ruled out. It is therefore imperative that the water pump be replaced at the earliest opportunity to prevent a potentially catastrophic deterioration in the health of the refugee population should the tanker break down. UNHCR is able to make emergency arrangements to replace the tanker should it break down, but the situation remains tenuous and needs redress.

Despite the significantly sub-norm provision of potable water from November 2007 to the present, there is no indication of health deterioration so far: the refugees can obtain clean water from a source some way out of the camp and appear to be using this option according to their needs. It is fortunate that Burundi is well-endowed with water and there is no reason, other than the distribution difficulties mentioned above, for the refugees not to receive the Sphere-prescribed minimum amount.

#### Gasorwe Camp

Here too, water provision is sub-standard at 17 L/person/day. The amounts available are even less due to a number of non-functioning taps and to the new arrivals adding to the number of users. NRC reports that refugees in this camp have a tendency to steal taps for sale outside the camp. NRC has tried several measures to discourage this illegal activity by stepping up sensitization campaigns and community vigilance and fixing the taps in such a way that stealing them means breaking them, rendering them unfit for sale. Although it has reduced somewhat, the problem has by no means been solved. Community security watch groups cannot patrol everywhere at once and ultimately the refugees should understand that they are undermining their own health by stealing the taps – but this apparently holds little sway with the perpetrators. The replacement of broken or missing taps is expensive and cannot be undertaken each time a tap is broken or stolen. An uneasy balance exists whereby taps are replaced periodically and are again stolen, but not replaced at once – signifying the less than optimum situation prevailing. In fact, this is a common occurrence in refugee camps throughout the world and is an ongoing and unsolved dilemma. The evaluation has no better solution to offer than that already implemented by NRC. A better system would be to use hand pumps for water

provision instead of taps, but changing over the system would entail a high investment that does not seem justified at this stage, given that current health indicators do not correlate to insufficient clean water.

## **b. Sanitation**

### **Gihinga Camp**

International standards are respected and the latrines and surrounding areas are clean in this camp. Nevertheless a point will soon arrive when the latrines will have to be moved because they almost full. As the sanitation sector is under the responsibility of AHA, NRC can only advocate for appropriate action with its partners. The latrines in the school area are markedly cleaner than those in Gasorwe. The camp aspect is admirably clean and free of unsanitary odours or practices.

### **Gasorwe Camp**

Here, the latrines are 100% community, as opposed to family usage, which might account for the less than optimum sanitary aspect of the camp. As mentioned earlier, the mixed ethnic groups may also account for lower standards, those with cleaner habits being unable to prevail over those who do not make any effort. Indicators suggest that the number of persons per community latrine are 24 instead of the minimum standard of 20. Latrines and showers are over-populated because of the tendency in this camp to steal the wooden doors, which are useful for domestic use, rendering the affected facilities unusable. It is difficult for camp security to prevent theft and sensitization campaigns led by the hygiene committees do not reduce it either. A possible solution might be to replace all wooden doors with corrugated iron, using metal cross-beams to hold them together. The evaluation has noticed this system in use in refugee camps elsewhere, the main drawback being eventual rust and deterioration of the doors. On balance it is cheaper to replace corrugated iron doors and the slow rate of their deterioration offsets the cost of replacement. However, there is no guarantee that theft of corrugated iron doors would not take place were they to replace the wooden ones, so again it is an uneasy balance of trying to maintain Sphere standards while preventing spiralling costs in replacing stolen materials.

Observing the lack of cleanliness in and around the school latrines, the evaluation would further recommend a more structured system of promoting hygienic practices at an early age by having both primary and secondary school pupils clean the latrines every day. Currently only the primary school students do this regularly but the secondary school pupils should play their part too. AHA could support these efforts by providing cleaning materials and by having the hygiene committees disinfect the latrines on a regular basis. To maximise the green area around school water points, and to improve their general standard of cleanliness, it could be used to involve children in small-scale cultivation practices. This would have the added benefit of teaching them an income-generating activity for when they return home and as a contribution to the family food basket while they remain in the camps. Prolonged stays in the camps mean that children are currently growing up without knowledge of this key survival technique.

Several informants said they were unclear about the role of the AHA hygienists in cleaning the school area and the evaluation could not obtain precisions either. It is recommended that the hygienists monitor student hygienic practices and give

periodic lessons on proper latrine cleaning techniques by working alongside them on certain days. Sensitization should also include the importance of proper hygiene, the whole body/waste cycle and other aspects that need constant repetition to instil good habits. NRC is encouraged to put up more posters in classrooms and common school areas on hygiene to boost these efforts and eventually include appropriate videos for the library.

#### **5.4. Shelter**

In both camps, shelter space is consistent with Sphere standards. The maximum number of inhabitants to one shelter is 6, meaning that many families have two or more shelters. NRC has performed commendably in camp layout: refugee shelters are sufficiently well-spaced and well-constructed. Efficient mechanisms are in place to monitor and replace deficient materials.

##### Gihinga Camp

Individual shelters are made out of wooden sticks and plastic sheeting with corrugated iron roofing. The system is a sound one, though needing periodic inputs of new materials. While the refugees claim they have had no new materials for four consecutive years, the evaluation could detect only a few shelters that needed urgent repairs or reconstruction. Rather than providing new rolls of plastic sheeting across-the-board, it is recommended that shelter assessments be carried out periodically, eg. every six months, and individual sheets (not rolls) provided where necessary. Unfortunately, experience shows that plastic sheeting rolls are often sold on the market rather than used for necessary repairs, and plastic squares are perfectly adequate. Furthermore it is easier to replace individual squares that may become damaged. In some cases it is necessary to replace all the materials because the wooden sticks are becoming rotten and threaten to collapse the whole structure. The refugees would like brick structures but this is not considered advisable: while making every effort to provide safe and habitable shelter for refugees, changing over the system to brick structures would give an air of permanency that is not recommended.

##### Gasorwe Camp

The adobe-made shelters have a more solid aspect than those in Gihinga. The problem here is less one of upkeep than in preventing the refugees from building annexes onto their houses to enlarge them. Whole housing blocks are gradually becoming enclosed, blocking off passage to the road in between the houses in case of an emergency. The situation presents itself as an example of apparent irrational behaviour among the refugees that nevertheless turns out to be one of a fine series of calculations for short-term gain over longer-term risk, in this and other sectors. With respect to shelter, for example, short-term gain in space is privileged over long-term safety. In other cases, by selling their food, clothing, fuel and other domestic items that their families actually need, the refugees are calculating that the short-term infusion of cash is preferable for the purchase of more gratifying items, such as tobacco, alcohol or perhaps meat. Another example is foregoing use of communal cooking space to cook inside the houses: the short-term preference for cooking and eating individually can lead to longer-term respiratory problems from the smoke inhaled in the poorly ventilated

shelters. NRC and its partners take pains to repeatedly sensitize the refugees to the risks such behaviour can elicit, but are rarely successful in changing it.

## 5.5. Health

This sector covers public health including basic medical services, nutrition and supplementary feeding, implemented by TPO in 2006 and 2007 and by AHA starting in 2008, as well as an HIV/AIDS component implemented by Stop Sida in Gasorwe. The indicators provided by UNHCR illustrate the general health situation of the refugees, which is good insofar as the indicators go, but they are incomplete. Health indicators represent an essential monitoring mechanism for camp management: deficiencies or gaps in the provision of food, domestic items, water, sanitation, shelter and protection would impact negatively on refugee health, which would show up in the indicators. Those indicators available are positive in relation to international standards meaning that, whatever the deficiencies noted in the delivery of goods and services in different sectors, they are not serious enough to have a negative impact on refugee health. Crude mortality rates of 0.27 are well below the Sub-Saharan target of 1.32. Under-five, infant, neonatal and maternal mortality rates are likewise well below the norm. The highest cause of illness is acute respiratory infection (ARI), although most of the patients waiting at Gasorwe clinic interviewed by the team claimed they had malaria.

Unfortunately health statistics are incomplete. UNHCR's October 2007 SIRs cannot be used to draw any conclusions because so much data is missing. UNHCR's Bujumbura-based doctor has more complete data but these give malnutrition rates in numbers, not as a percentage of the population, and there are no corresponding figures for the local population to assess whether malnutrition is greater or lower than the norm. In 2007 there were 68 cases of crude malnutrition in Gasorwe, or 0.68% of the total refugee population in that camp. The 2007-2008 Human Development Report Burundi Fact Sheet<sup>9</sup> shows that 45% of children below the age of five are underweight, which gives an indication of crude country malnutrition rates. This leads to conclude that malnutrition in Gasorwe is extremely low by comparison and, according to UNHCR, the fact that it exists at all is attributed to the new arrivals from Bujumbura who tend to have overall lower health condition. In Gihinga malnutrition is reported as zero. Additional feeding is given to vulnerable refugees under health centre supervision: lactating women, certain sick people, HIV/AIDS victims and vegetables are provided to diabetics. These represent sound measures to prevent malnutrition and help refugees to overcome or manage their illnesses.

It was understood from interviews with NRC, UNHCR and WFP that no nutritional survey has been conducted during the previous two years. UNHCR health standards require that a nutrition survey is undertaken once a year in a stable situation<sup>10</sup>. In the absence of malnutrition statistics it is strongly recommended that a nutrition survey be carried out during the course of 2008 in compliance with the standard requirement.

In 2007, with the changeover of health implementation from TPO to AHA, doctors have been reduced in the camps to the extent that medical services are mainly administered through qualified nurses, only one doctor is available for both the Gasorwe and Musasa camps, and none for Gihinga. This is a topic of some concern to camp partners, protection staff and refugees alike, but the UNHCR medical supervisor states that

<sup>9</sup> UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008 – Country Fact Sheet, [http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_BDI.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BDI.html)

<sup>10</sup> Annual Report: Programme Overview, UNHCR, 2007

services are in accordance with international standards of one doctor per 30,000 people. Close monitoring of health standards in the camps will need to be maintained to ensure that changed medical coverage does not impact negatively on refugee health.

## **5.6. Infrastructure**

NRC has constructed, modified and/or equipped both camps with the necessary infrastructure to enable the efficient conduct of camp activities, such as offices for the various camp partners, a health centre, enclosed school area, water network, distribution sheds, warehouses to stock food and non-food items, community centre, showers, latrines and related equipment in each camp. Necessary repairs are carried out promptly. The site layout is appropriate, with sufficient space between buildings and the buildings themselves of workable quality, adapted to the various needs of the users. To store water in the camps, IRC and NRC installed water reservoirs in 2004. These are being currently used to store the water trucked in by AHA. NRC has provided Gasorwe camp with a sports field that is often used for basket ball matches with the local population. This encourages good relations and interaction with the host community.

## **5.7. Education**

There are serious challenges in this sector. NRC administers the schools at all levels, as well as literacy classes for adults (discontinued in September 2007), which involves identifying qualified teachers and monitoring their performance, organizing monthly teacher-parent meetings, providing educational materials, supplies and equipment, uniforms and teacher 'incentives' (pay). Employing its expertise in primary education, NRC recruits, trains and evaluates maternity and primary level teachers, but not those at the secondary school level. The Ecole Congolaise is responsible for the content of the school curricula, for hiring and training secondary school teachers, nominating Directors and other officials.

Primary school students have obtained good results and the level of teachers – 89% of whom are refugees - is considered by the Congolese authorities to be average to good<sup>11</sup>. The number of students per teacher is 40, which is in line with minimum standards. The number of boys and girls attending maternal and primary school is about equal, whereas the attendance of girls in secondary school is notably lower (26% in Gasorwe and 40% in Gihinga). This is attributed mainly to the cultural prevalence which privileges the education of boys at secondary level, but not girls, according to NRC reports. Exam results of primary school children during the 2006-2007 school year was a high 80%, considering that only 77% of the teachers are qualified according to Congolese standards, below the minimum standard of 80%. In contrast, secondary school pupils show an exam success rate between 48 and 70% during the 2006-2007 school year. In Gasorwe only 59% of the teachers are qualified according to Congolese standards. The number of secondary school students passing the Congolese state school exams is extremely low in both camps (around 2%).

The low standard of teaching at the secondary level, due mainly to the under-qualification of refugee teachers, and the lack of motivation, low achievement and absenteeism of the students means that young adults are missing out on their rights to adequate education. Insufficiently equipped to lead productive and responsible lives, a generation of camp children risks exposure to a future cycle of poverty, low life

<sup>11</sup> 2006 and 2007 sub-project narrative reports, NRC

expectancy and possibly, continued violence – or at least, acceptance of violence as the norm.

In order to secure a better educational impact for children or young adults of secondary school level, the evaluation recommends that NRC take charge of the secondary school activity and implement it professionally. Internal discussion is taking place in NRC as to whether its education policy would allow the organization to take on activities at the secondary level. The recommendation from NRC Oslo so far has been that other partners, if existing, with expertise in this area should take on the responsibility. The evaluation finds that it would be a logical activity for NRC to pursue for several reasons:

- The need for such an activity, conducted professionally;
- respect for refugee children's rights to adequate education, including at the secondary level;
- the lamentable lack of quality teaching that is available currently;
- the fact that NRC has proven expertise and experience in the education sector, albeit not at the secondary level;
- coherence with the maternity and primary school activities that NRC is already implementing, and with camp management as a whole;
- NRC's mandate is to "... promote and protect the rights of all people who have been forced to flee their countries, or their homes within their countries, regardless of their race, religion, nationality or political convictions... by strengthening the capacity of the UN organizations to offer and coordinate international aid and protection". Furthermore, the UNHCR-NRC Strategic Partnership agreement states: "In operations where NRC and UNHCR are present, both organizations will, as appropriate, explore opportunities for joint planning and aim for complementary implementation of operational activities"<sup>12</sup>.

The evaluation considers that, on the strength of NRC's proven ability to successfully implement primary school activities, it is better placed than any other in-country partner to implement secondary school activities successfully. A pre-condition for any future activities must be a formal invitation /request from UNHCR to do so<sup>13</sup>. In addition, several important hurdles will have to be overcome, notably the resistance of the existing secondary school teachers and parents to bringing in professionally qualified Burundian teachers, who they doubt have the ability to teach the Congolese curriculum. This issue is not as important as it seems: mathematics, geography and the sciences have common content, irrespective of the nationality of the teachers.

Linked to the provision of secondary education is the recommendation that NRC provide vocational training to all refugees wishing to benefit from such activities. There is an important opportunity here to make a major impact on young refugees' livelihoods: providing additional learning pursuits in the camps where there is otherwise little to occupy young people's minds, and contributing to their skills base for the time when they can return home. It would be also useful to examine the possibilities of organizing special classes for refugee children who cannot attend school because they themselves have parental duties, and for youths who have missed years of schooling due to the conflict in their country of origin.

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<sup>12</sup> Strategic Partnership document, paragraph 6.

<sup>13</sup> In interviews with UNHCR the evaluation team was given to believe that this request had already been formulated, but NRC maintains that it has not.

Undertaking these additional activities will require much planning and additional budgeting. It is therefore important for UNHCR to make a formal request, for NRC Oslo to take an early decision on accepting it, and for NRC Burundi to subsequently undertake a needs assessment jointly with UNHCR to gauge the extent of necessary inputs.

### **5.8. Activities organized for beneficiaries**

NRC has had notable success in providing a library in Gihinga camp which is also open to the local population. Books and magazines have been financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (640 books provided in 2007). A new library is about to be opened in Gasorwe camp. NRC is anxious to cultivate an interest in learning in girls and is preparing for the library a magazine for girls to encourage them. Also envisaged is a set of educational videos and magazines that will benefit all ages. UNHCR is preparing computer literacy courses for the Gasorwe camp. These activities and materials show creativity and a concern for finding innovative ways to 'hook' refugees into expanding their learning horizons.

Refugee participation in and contribution to camp activities is extremely low. The refugees display apathetic tendencies and lack of interest in taking part in the many camp learning and civic activities that are available to them. Furthermore, they expect to be paid for every service they perform, even though activities such as hygiene maintenance, waste recycling, repairing individual shelters, offloading food and non-food trucks and teaching are for the benefit of themselves, their families and the community. The problem is apparently that incentives have always been paid and it would be extremely difficult to withdraw these payments which are relied on as monthly salaries for many families. The degree to which incentives are paid to refugees in other refugee situations varies widely and is generally a function of budgetary latitude, but UNHCR's policy is usually to discourage it. One way to reduce and ultimately eliminate the system would be to involve the refugees in discussions that ask them to choose, for budgetary reasons, between cutting down on certain food, non-food items or other goods and services that they value, and not getting paid. With long-term planning, sensitization and involving the refugees in preliminary discussions, the incentives could be gradually phased out. The evaluation considers that this is an area that could achieve greater financial efficiency but is sidelined because of the difficulties entailed in organizing it. A lesson to be learned for future camp management activities is never to start up camp management with incentives to beneficiaries. NRC has commented that it needs to work with UNHCR in defining policy for voluntary and paid positions in refugee camps, both for residents and host populations, a position that the evaluation endorses. The discussions should eventually involve wider stakeholders but preliminary discussions should be held between NRC and UNHCR to assess its feasibility and modalities.

TPO psychosocial activities in the camps have had an enormous impact on refugee behaviour: encouraging condom use in the Banyamulenge who were highly resistant to it previously (attested to by the rise in demand for condoms in Gihinga over the past two years when previously these refugees refused to use them); counselling for traumatized and otherwise mentally fragile refugees, instilling safe sex practices in youths; discouraging child marriages, teaching women about their rights not to submit to domestic or sexual abuse and teaching men the same, malaria net use and resolving family disputes are some of the discussion group themes that TPO has organized. It is difficult to tell if these activities have been instrumental in reducing camp violence, SGBV

and other protection problems but camp partners find that the thematic discussions and individual counselling are useful in instilling a sense of values, improving behaviour and reducing tensions among the refugees. TPO also manages a team of hygiene workers who are instrumental in promoting improved hygienic practices among the refugee community through individual household visits and community discussions.

The NGO Stop Sida provides counselling on all aspects covering HIV/AIDS in Gasorwe camp and according to the refugees, their services and modes of delivery are effective and relevant. Future NRC support to this activity could be to create a space for young people in the camps where they can socialise and where HIV/AIDS testing can be carried out confidentially, a suggestion made by Stop Sida that the evaluation endorses.

### **5.9. Operational Support**

This sector aims to reinforce the capacity of NRC's staff through periodic camp management training, as well as payment of staff salaries and other emoluments. Copies of the Camp Management Toolkit have been disseminated widely to NRC's camp partners, who consider it a useful and relevant guide to their activities, and fully compatible with UNHCR's policies and standards as detailed in the Standard Indicators Reports (SIRs). In 2006 a total of 18 NRC staff worked in Gihinga and 27 in Gasorwe. In 2007 the figures were 18 and 32 respectively, the higher number justified to assist with the opening of Musasa camp. Camp staff are motivated and dynamic, competent and well-trained in dealing with the various challenges they face on a day-to-day basis, guided by appropriate ToRs for each function. The fact that there is low turnover of national staff attests to their satisfaction with their work, which benefits the camp management operation by retaining a body of expertise and experience. The evaluation notes that the good working conditions provided by NRC are a key reason for it being able to retain a high quality of staff, who bear testimony to the uniqueness of the 'NRC way'. The number of staff appears high, but when examined closely, represents the minimum necessary to conduct camp management activities efficiently.

The employment of international Camp Coordinators in each camp, in addition to an international Programme Manager might be considered an unnecessary expense, especially since NRC has an institutional culture that promotes building the capacity of national staff. These might now be expected to take over camp coordination roles. The evaluation considers that international coordinators have been an enormous advantage in building up the well-run camps that are in evidence today. It considers further that they continue to be relevant to the programme for the following reasons:

- Over the past two years the camps have been in a phase of build-up and expansion requiring many difficult decisions that needed to be taken rapidly and on an ad hoc basis. International camp coordinators have greater experience and decision-making capacity to handle such matters. While greatly stabilized, the camps are still fragile environments where conflict and violence can easily arise. This requires experienced oversight, early recognition of flash points and rapid preventive intervention. If handled by inexperienced staff, potentially delicate situations could spiral out of control resulting in loss of or damage to refugee and camp partners' lives and property.
- National staff have been observed elsewhere in similar contexts to come under pressure from national or local authorities, refugees, camp suppliers and others,

to allow programme irregularities or turn a blind eye to protection or other abuses perpetrated in the camps;

- National staff, however senior and well-trained, might have difficulties in gaining access to UNHCR to discuss important and urgent matters, especially with regard to sensitive protection issues;
- International staff, for no other reason than perception and possible bias, have greater credibility with other camp partners, including the refugees. They are able to provide an authoritative leadership role with sensitivity and integrity. This is important for a camp management function and is particularly appreciated by partners and refugees alike.

NRC camp coordinators were noted to put a high premium on training and mentoring local staff, some of whom show good aptitudes for future camp coordination and leadership. However, they are not yet fully in possession of the necessary skills or nuanced decision-making capacities to assume authority of a camp coordination position. These will be particularly necessary elements to evaluate when NRC and UNHCR begin to focus on phase-down and exit strategies.

## **VI. EVALUATION ACCORDING TO KEY INDICATORS**

### **1.1. Level 1: Intervention Strategy**

#### Relevance

NRC's stated camp management intervention logic is "to increase the physical and social protection through the management of Gasorwe and Gihinga camps, the provision of basic services and the training, capacity building and empowerment of actors involved in the camps"<sup>14</sup>.

This logic, and the agency's decision to intervene in the camp management sector in 2006, was both relevant and appropriate given the rapidly evolving context: growing numbers of Congolese refugees in Burundi and the increasingly complex task of providing them with effective protection and assistance. Other factors leading to conclude that NRC's intervention strategy was rational, relevant and appropriate in these circumstances include:

- The pressing humanitarian needs of the refugees;
- NRC's proven expertise in camp management (hithertofore with IDPs);
- The UNHCR-NRC strategic partnership, cemented by their May 2006 Memorandum of Understanding;
- NRC's stated aim to reinforce the efforts of United Nations agencies in the field, particularly support to UNHCR to carry out its responsibilities towards refugees;
- UNHCR's request to NRC to take over the management of the camps. It must be added that the prospect of financial support to camp management by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have represented an added bonus to UNHCR in selecting the NRC for this role. This is not to relegate to second place the primary consideration of NRC's established track record as a professional and effective camp management agency;

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<sup>14</sup> NRC Logical Framework, Annex 2 to project BIFM0703 + BIFC0704 (undated)

According to information provided by the previous Country Director and Camp Management Adviser through NRC Oslo, no overall needs assessment for camp management was undertaken prior to the start-up of the programme. For Gihinga (managed by NRC since 2005), this is probably due to the fact that camp management was not a NRC core activity at the time the Gihinga camp was taken over. For Gasorwe (managed by NRC since 2006), the NRC archives in Oslo have documentation on visits and discussions from the preparation period indicating that separate assessments were done in specific sectors. However, these were not shared with the evaluators. The absence of a pre-intervention needs assessment – or the lack of use of existing assessments – weakens the intervention rationale and results in a lack of baseline information with which to measure subsequent progress. The evaluation noted, however, that a joint UNHCR-NRC needs assessment had recently been undertaken with a view to opening up a fourth refugee camp in Burundi, indicating that appropriate lessons have been drawn.

While NRC's camp management programme remains highly relevant to the refugees and to its partners in view of the continuing need for the camps, it has less relevance for other inhabitants of the local community. From the viewpoint of the Administrator of Gasorwe commune, there was insufficient consultation with local community representatives when the refugee camp was planned, and there remains insufficient collaboration today. Even if NRC was unable to provide consultation and coordination in the planning stages of the camp because it was not involved in those stages, it could now redress the coordination deficit by engaging on a regular basis with the Administrator. This is a delicate issue for NRC, because it feels that UNHCR is the appropriate coordinating body with the local authorities.

The relevance and appropriateness of NRC's advocacy strategy is less evident with regard to the camp management programme. NRC informed the evaluation that its advocacy strategy had not yet been finalised therefore it was difficult to judge how it is performing. The main challenges for advocacy are twofold: within the camp, the main challenge seems to be how to persuade the refugees to participate in camp maintenance activities without demanding incentives; the other is a question of how to successfully engage UNHCR in following up appropriately on incidences of SGBV and other kinds of violence in the camp. So far, repeated advocacy has failed to bring about results that are satisfactory to NRC.

#### Complementarity, coherence and coordination

All parties involved in camp management – UNHCR, NRC, the Burundian Government and NGOs, working towards the same common goals and share the same understanding of these goals in the broad sense. Coherence and complementarity are particularly strong with respect to the partners' understanding and implementation of camp services. Each actor plays a clear role and the weekly planning meetings ensure that any existing or potential overlap or gap is addressed satisfactorily. These meetings are in themselves an excellent coordination mechanism to foster coherence and complementarity between partners.

Unfortunately coherence and complementarity with respect to protection issues are weaker. There is a broad understanding as to what protection means and how it should be promoted, the main problem lying in the unclear delineation of protection activities between UNHCR and NRC.

While the mandates and stated goals of UNHCR and NRC are theoretically complementary and coherent, NRC's camp management intervention to date has been marked by confusion and lack of clarity with regard to its protection role in the camps vis-à-vis that of UNHCR. The problem appears to be rooted in a structurally unclear delineation of roles and responsibilities. On the one hand, UNHCR is internationally mandated to protect refugees. On the other, it is clear that protection is an in-built component of managing a refugee camp: refugee health and safety are enhanced by the timely provision of goods and services. This is reflected in the 2007 sub-project description in which '*Objectifs généraux du sous projet*' are stated as being: "to ensure the protection and rights of the refugees through the provision of services as well as by the management of activities, in coordination with other partners working in the camps"<sup>15</sup>. Although it is recognized by UNHCR itself that all camp partners have an inherent protection role, the division of duties for implementing protection on the ground is not yet clearly marked out.

The Strategic Partnership agreement signed by UNHCR and NRC in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in May 2006 does not assist in the search for clarity. Point C of the MoU governing roles and responsibilities in Protection, Shelter and Camp Coordination and Management only refers to 'IDP situations'. There is no agreement on how to develop collaboration or undertake joint efforts to address these activities in refugee situations, thus no institutional guidance to either agency in Burundi. In order to clarify this situation NRC Burundi is working with NRC Oslo to revise the MoU with a view to providing greater clarity vis-à-vis the respective roles and responsibilities in refugee situations.

Policy overlap in the all-important protection roles of UNHCR and NRC has created unfortunate tensions between them. However, despite the absence of institutional guidance provided by the MoU, the evaluation considers that both agencies are responsibly tackling areas of overlap founded on mutual respect, a will to seek solutions and the consideration that differences should not impact negatively on the camp populations. Negative impact has, however been noted with regard to delays in following up on important protection incidents occurring in the camps due to disagreements as to whom this should be done by; this has allowed perpetrators of crimes of SGBV and other types of violence to escape appropriate correction. The evaluation considers that clarification and actionable responsibilities can be achieved through discussions leading to a more detailed set of standard operating procedures that would be triggered in specific circumstances. NRC is encouraged to think these through internally and to present them to UNHCR for discussion and agreement.

Coordination with partners at camp level is functioning well but there is less coordination at the Bujumbura level. This leads to inefficiencies. For example, UNICEF would be well-placed to provide additional school materials and additional warm clothing for refugee children, reducing UNHCR's and NRC's expenditure on such items. However, the infrequency of coordination meetings means that such possibilities can get overlooked. NRC's written request to UNHCR to activate regular coordination meetings in the capital, and the UNHCR Representative's stated commitment to it, have not brought about the desired results.

Complementarity and coherence are lacking with NRC's ICLA project in Burundi and in DRC. The evaluators noted that, while cooperation is foreseen in project documents, there is in fact little contact between the two teams. It will be interesting to see if a

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<sup>15</sup> UNHCR project 07/AB/BDI/CM/270, Annex A, p.2

general survey done by ICLA in 2007 in all the camps reached similar conclusions. Closer synergies need to be forged with these programmes to bring the Congolese refugees in Burundi as much information as possible concerning the situation in their home areas. ICLA as an advocacy tool can help the refugees to make informed decisions on the timing and areas where it may be eventually safe to return. The team notes that NRC in the DRC plans to strengthen its South Kivu presence, a plan that it fully endorses for its potential to provide more information to the refugees in their home areas.

Complementarity and coherence have been much better with NRC's education and shelter programmes in Burundi. The shelter component has assisted the CM programme to build infrastructure in the camps while the education programme has lent expertise and materials to refugee children in the camps.

The programme is only sustainable if its partners continue funding it in future years. A weakness noted in the intervention strategy is that it has no fixed time-frame and no formal exit strategy has been envisaged. Of course, the time-frame could potentially cover many years, depending on external factors such as the length of time it takes to secure peace in the areas in DRC from which the refugees originate, which will determine the refugees' ability to repatriate, as well as whether Burundi would consider local settlement for the refugees. The humanitarian community's current assessment of the political situation in the DRC, as well as the obstacles that would need to be overcome in that country for the refugees to consider voluntary repatriation, indicate a long-term perspective for camp management. Yet the NRC Country Strategy Burundi 2007-2008 indicates a tentative withdrawal date from Burundi in 2010 without specifying how it would achieve such a withdrawal.

NRC could be more proactive in developing an exit strategy by opening discussions with UNHCR to start jointly developing plans for phased withdrawal. The optimum strategy favoured by the evaluation would be to train government officials or national NGOs such as the Burundi Red Cross to take over the camp management portfolio. Extensive camp management training and mentoring would be necessary in both cases, something in which NRC excels. This could constitute a real opportunity for national capacity-building and provide a model of good practice.

The evaluation recommends that NRC Oslo consider developing an additional element to its current camp management policy, requiring not only that each camp management intervention be accompanied by an exit strategy but also proposing how this could be achieved. This should preferably be based on building the capacity of a local partner to take over, where feasible, and in cases where camps will continue to exist after the country programmes phases out.

In addition, and given growing global concern on environmental issues, NRC Oslo is further recommended to consider adding an Environmental Advisor to its permanent team of experts. Refugee camp interventions inevitably have an impact on the local environment and the Burundi camps are no exception. Technical advice is urgently needed for the NRC Burundi Camp Management programme to make necessary adjustments to camp activities and modus operandi. If UNHCR could perform the same service, this would be preferable from the point of view of providing overall policy guidance and monitoring to all partners, including its own team.

## **6.2. Level 2: Operations – Strategy and Outcomes**

Overall, NRC's operational strategy and implementation have resulted in an effective use of resources towards achieving the aims of the programme: to protect the rights of the refugees through timely and efficient provision of services.

The structure and staffing of NRC Burundi is appropriate to achieving these goals. NRC's recruitment and training investments have been effective in building an impressive team of committed, enthusiastic and competent professionals. Their dealings with the refugees and camp partners, including the local authorities, manifest a common set of values that emphasise clear communications, firmness, respect and patience towards all interlocutors, a willingness to listen and a 'can-do' attitude toward problem-solving.

Despite the absence of an overall Camp Management pre-intervention needs assessment undertaken by NRC, the programme design, as described by the 2006 and 2007 sub-agreement narratives, is consistent with the humanitarian and protection needs of the refugees. It is also coherent with the goals of the partner agencies working alongside NRC in the camps, fortified by a commendable system of camp coordination between the partners that includes weekly planning and information meetings, ad hoc informal briefings, information-sharing and problem-solving mechanisms. The close degree of coordination results in efficiency and effectiveness in protecting and assisting the refugees and has had a positive impact on their overall health and well-being, as attested to by the health indicators collected by UNHCR.

The evaluation finds that the camp management responses to key issues raised by the refugees and camp partners have been timely and effective. For instance, when the refugees discovered that part of their food ration (wheat flour) was affected by mould, NRC lost no time in replacing it and in devising a mechanism with WFP to compensate for periodic qualitative and quantitative food deficiencies. Sometimes, however, timely responses are not possible due to budgetary constraints: NRC lobbied UNHCR for over a year to undertake a clothing distribution but a partial distribution ('pagnes' for women) only took place in March 2008; urgent repairs needed to the Gihinga water pump have also been delayed for reasons of budgetary shortfalls. Both camps have coordinated effectively with partners in drawing up contingency plans to respond to sector-specific emergencies.

Over the two year implementation period the refugees' needs have not changed markedly. However, NRC employs its deepening understanding of the dynamics of camp life to devise greater efficiencies and respond according to shifts in the situation. The current ongoing assessment of problems in the secondary education is an illustration of NRC's commitment to improving the quality of camp services. The transfer of NRC's water and sanitation activities to AHA, beginning in 2008, has been implemented smoothly and the agencies' relations are cordial and respectful. UNHCR's decision to transfer physical health activities from TPO to AHA has likewise been implemented smoothly with no discernible negative impact on the refugees.

NRC's operational strategy is guided by two documents: the Camp Management Policy and the Camp Management Toolkit. The guidance provided by these two baseline tools is closely adhered to, fortified by periodic Toolkit training sessions and camp management workshops organized by NRC for the benefit of its own staff and that of its partners, including national and local authorities. Those interviewed attested to the usefulness, relevance and clarity of the Toolkit. The goals and activities pursued by the programme are fully consistent with the NRC Camp Management Policy.

At the same time, the Toolkit itself benefits from the 'reality check' that is the implementation of a camp management operation in practice. The Camp Management team in Burundi has provided detailed feedback with suggestions for updating and improving the relevance of the Toolkit, which is currently undergoing a revision at headquarters level (with concurrent translation into French and Arabic).

Both these tools, combined with other international policy guidance and NRC's institutional experience in camp management, have helped it to achieve its objectives in Burundi. Objectives and activities are clearly defined in the sub-project narrative document and both Sphere standards and the UNHCR Standard Indicators in Reporting (SIRs) are regularly used to measure results against objectives. The refugees have benefited from the programme as measured by their overall good health, absence of outbreaks of communicable diseases. Camp structure and layout, distribution mechanisms and the way that day to day activities are organized all contribute to minimising protection hazards, both from outside and within the camp.

Primary beneficiaries of the camp management operation are the refugees. Secondary beneficiaries include camp management partners, who participate in and enjoy well-coordinated and orderly camp activities; UNHCR, which benefits from having a professional and competent partner to run the camps, permitting it to report positively on the qualitative and quantitative impact on the refugees; and the Government of Burundi, which benefits from a well-run overall programme that allows it to continue to generously provide asylum to neighbouring populations in distress. NRC and its partners have been conscientious in jointly organizing and providing appropriate services to different groups of refugees: women, children, the elderly, the disabled, adolescents, unaccompanied minors, victims of SGBV and HIV/AIDS sufferers. This represents coherence with NRC's operational policy to respond to the needs of vulnerable individuals and groups.

While there is little evidence to suggest that the refugees were involved in setting up the camps – in their design, infrastructure, choice of materials, layout or services – they are involved in day-to-day camp activities, consistent with both NRC and UNHCR camp management principles. When NRC took over the camp management role in Gasorwe in 2006 the camps were already established, thus it had a limited opportunity to enact structural or design changes. NRC constructed Gihinga camp in 2004 and the camp layout four years later remains relevant to optimum living conditions of the refugees, given the space limitations of the site. A key role in the early stages of operations was to improve and expand Gasorwe camp infrastructure, which NRC successfully accomplished in 2006. Administrative offices were constructed, refugee housing upgraded and camp fixtures and fittings replaced where necessary. In 2007 the main focus has been on running both camps to provide a maximum level of physical and psychological protection to the refugees through the efficient provision of goods and services.

The refugees are involved in discussions and decision-making regarding their well-being through a closely connected network of associations and interest groups. NRC has been instrumental in providing the conditions necessary for the election of refugee leaders in different functional groupings: sector heads (according to the geographical layout of the shelters), education committees, women's groups, disabled groups etc. The refugees appreciate NRC's commitment to ensuring their well-being and listening to their problems, although they hold out for some unrealistic expectations relating to 'more of everything' (food, clothing, incentives etc).

The presence of the refugee camps has had both positive and negative impacts on the host population: positively, through the employment of local residents in the camps, both by the agencies and the refugees themselves. Local residents are also able to use the sports ground built near the perimeter of Gasorwe camp, for basket ball matches with the refugees. However the host population is negatively affected by the refugee presence through having to share scarce national resources such as wood for construction and fuel, ground water and cultivable land. The latter is scarce in Burundi and the acreage of cultivable land lost to the camps is considerable. NRC is to be credited for its ongoing search to minimise the negative impact on the host population and local environment, but structural challenges – such as a shortage of viable alternative options to firewood – remain to be addressed.

An operational constraint to optimum management of the camps is the difficulty in estimating more accurately the numbers of refugees in both camps under review. It is clear that there are fewer permanent camp residents than the official statistics suggest. A joint verification exercise could result in confirming this perception, which is widely shared between all partners. However, no matter how carefully planned and executed, camp surveys such as head or hut counts rarely achieve a satisfactory degree of accuracy: refugees have developed multiple ways to confound demographic surveys and can be counted on to do so in future. The cost/benefits of an exhaustive survey must also be carefully weighed. This is not to discourage a survey, rather to caution against unrealistic expectations of it resulting in major project economies.

Another constraint is the refugees' reluctance to participate in camp management maintenance and distribution activities voluntarily. The refugees could undertake many activities on a voluntary basis. That they are unwilling to do so results in the payment of incentives, which obviously have to come out of project funds. It also makes it difficult for NRC and its partners to improve cleanliness and hygiene in the camps and to instill a sense of responsibility in the refugees for their own welfare – a 'quid pro quo' of voluntary participation in exchange for the free goods and services provided. Recommendations for redress are suggested in points 5.8 above and 6.4 below.

NRC has worked hard to foster a good working environment with all its camp management partners built on clarity and coherence of vision, coordination built on transparency and problem-solving and a search for positive outcomes. In this, it is highly appreciated by its partners and the beneficiaries.

### **6.3. Level 3: Sector activities**

Sector activities are relevant to UNHCR's standard refugee camp programme template and cover the basic needs of the refugees. Currently, NRC implements the sectors that are most relevant to its expertise: distribution services, shelter and infrastructure, maternity and primary education. During the period of this review it also undertook implementation in the Water sector, which is not a core NRC activity and which it withdrew from at the end of 2007 for this reason, but in which UNHCR would have preferred it to remain.

On-site visits show that the Gasorwe and Gihinga camps are efficiently run in all sectors and that camp services are both relevant and effective for refugee welfare. Minimum international standards are respected in most sectors, as well as the standards elaborated in the NRC Camp Management Toolkit. In general, though with a few exceptions, the camps are healthy environments, infrastructure is appropriate to needs

and the positive impact of camp inputs on the refugees is manifested by their generally satisfactory state of health.

Were living standards in the camps to be any higher, they would exceed those of the local population. It is always difficult to achieve a balance between providing minimum standards to refugees while not surpassing those experienced by the host population, but the absence of tensions between the refugee and local communities would seem to indicate that this balance has been achieved.

The sectors where indicators show that services and provisions are below Sphere and agency standards are: food and water in both camps and hygiene in Gasorwe. Yet UNHCR statistics show that there has so far been no negative impact on refugee overall health due to these lower standards. Indeed, refugee health indicators surpass not only those of the local population but also of Sub-Saharan Africa. Sector-specific deficiencies and camp management responses have been discussed in the chapter 4, Key Findings on Sectors.

Programme deliverables – goods and services in the camps – are effective in ensuring refugee security and wellbeing. Services are available for refugees to develop their educational and intellectual abilities, such as library facilities, literacy classes for adults and the possibility to join various groups. Shelters and camp infrastructure are correctly sited, sized and maintained with the exception of some refugee shelters in Gihinga that cannot be repaired due to UNHCR funding shortfalls that have not permitted deliveries of plastic rolls in 2007.

There are discernible negative impacts of the refugee camps on the local population. The provision of firewood is becoming increasingly unsustainable for environmental reasons. The Government of Burundi has requested that UNHCR reduce its use of national forest resources to provide the refugees with fuel for cooking and heating. However, studies to date show that alternative options are difficult to identify. NRC plans to engage consultancy services to conduct an in-depth study of this issue with ensuing recommendations for alternative sources. The evaluation found that NRC staff are fully conscious of the need to identify cost-effective options and anxious that this is proving so difficult.

The evaluation concurs with plans to decrease the firewood ration in 2008, partly for the above reasons and partly because much of the wood ration is being re-cycled. Camp partners observe that many refugees convert part of their wood ration to charcoal to sell on the market, even if the resulting shortfall for domestic use has a direct impact on their lives and those of their families. On the other hand, it is recommended that the reduction of this essential commodity be accompanied by close monitoring to detect any cases of women refugees exchanging sex for fuel.

The local authorities in Gasorwe raised concerns regarding the current practice of emptying latrines and waste water from the camps. Apparently the polluted waste affects a high number of cultivable swampland (1000 swamps) with a negative impact on local farmers who have been forced to discontinue crop cultivation on the affected land. This is an unfortunate spillover effect from hosting the refugees in this area that has not been adequately discussed between the Administrative Office and NRC. The evaluation encourages NRC to engage more closely with this office with a view to jointly identifying problem areas and appropriate solutions.

NRC staff are motivated, competent and well-trained. They are recognized by their partners for their willingness to discuss problems and take appropriate steps to solve

them. The impact of their work is reflected in the overall good health and well-being enjoyed by the refugees and the satisfaction of all who work with them. Refugees in Gihinga complain that the NRC staff no longer listen to them and suggest they should be rotated (like the police in the camps who rotate every three months). The evaluation considers that complaints are unfounded and more likely due to the fact that the NRC staff have such an in-depth understanding of the issues raised by the refugees that they have become resistant to many unreasonable demands. When the refugees were asked if would prefer to have NRC withdraw, there was unanimous expression that they would not.

The evaluation was not able to discern any negative impact on NRC's operations arising from occasional delays in funding transfers from UNHCR. The complementary funding received from the Norwegian MFA has cushioned any eventual cash flow problems and ensured continuity in the programme.

#### **6.4. Crosscutting issues**

Cross-cutting issues examined in this evaluation include: children, women, gender, the elderly, disabled, HIV/AIDS sufferers, refugee participation, protection, advocacy and security. Environment was initially included as a cross-cutting issue but as it pertains chiefly to the topic of firewood, it is dealt with under Sector activities.

The camp management programme provides a sensitive and appropriate response to the needs of the above groups of refugees where possible. Youth, women, elderly and disabled groups have been formed in each camp and their members are vocal advocates for the specific needs of the groups they represent. To the extent possible, and without privileging the needs of one group over another, NRC has sought to provide space for group discussions and follow up on recommendations. The only danger detected by the evaluation was that, in the absence of the desired response to some of the repeatedly expressed wishes, the refugees are becoming discouraged and could organize unrest in the camps. For example, nearly all refugees interviewed wanted more food, better housing materials, better health care (more consultations with doctors and more pills) and higher incentives for teachers. The most salient request was for the restoration of 'la bouillie', the corn-soya blend (CSB) that used to be part of the food ration until WFP was obliged to suspend it over a year ago. Group leaders are frustrated that they have no power to advocate successfully for the things that their constituents most want, which are out of NRC's mandate or budget to provide. Some of these wishes are unrealistic, however, and are noticeable for their recurrence in other refugee situations outside Burundi. The group leaders seemed resigned to advocating for their perceived needs at every opportunity and to lowering their expectations for achieving the desired results.

Refugee participation is low in these two camps. The refugees are passive and request payment for any service rendered for their own benefit or that of their families. NRC Gasorwe attempted to initiate the Burundian national Community Service duties held every Saturday morning by law, by all Burundian citizens, but not a single refugee turned up, despite intense promotional efforts, on two consecutive Saturdays. Refugee teachers are requesting higher incentives, justifying this by pointing out that uneducated community workers receive the same 'pay'. Unfortunately, providing incentives to refugees for services rendered has been a tradition in these camps and it would be extremely difficult to change the situation now. NRC has discussed the subject fully

internally and with its partners and can see no way to increase participation and decrease incentives concurrently. The evaluation considers that NRC could help the distribution committee to organize, on a rotational basis, refugees to offload food trucks and bring food to the warehouse, and from the warehouse to the distribution centre on distribution day, with no incentive. This would need significant prior warning and discussion with the refugees to prevent unrest, but could work – as it does in other camp situations – when people realise that if they do not perform labour duties themselves they will not receive their rations. In Gihinga camp the refugees pay local Burundians to carry their food to their homes, which is acceptable as it represents an individual cost/benefit calculation.

One area where the refugees seem particularly pleased with camp services is the attention given to HIV/AIDS sufferers. The camps have specific programmes that deal with community and individual awareness, promoting safe sex and condom use and in confidential follow-up of those affected. The evaluation considers that more posters could be put up in community areas with key messages regarding this and other health and hygiene issues.

Protection is an issue that cuts across all sectors. The ultimate measure of successful camp management is the low incidence of protection problems and here, NRC has worked hard to fulfill its mission statement *“to promote and protect the rights of people who have been forced to flee their countries, or their homes within their countries”*<sup>16</sup>, and its Camp Management Policy to *“work with camp residents, humanitarian actors, authorities and host populations to secure the overall protection of all groups with a focus on the most vulnerable.”*<sup>17</sup>

Inherent in securing refugee protection is delivering a set of commonly agreed minimum standards of food, water, clothing and shelter, ensuring their physical safety and allowing their psychosocial development. From the smooth running of the camps witnessed by the evaluation, project reports that programme objectives are being achieved, the satisfactory state of health of the refugees and the statements of partner agencies of NRC as an effective, diligent and responsive camp manager, it can be concluded that refugees are sufficiently well assisted and protected. Violence and SGBV has reportedly decreased since NRC banned alcohol in the camps. However, there are aspects of refugee protection that could be improved and where NRC can play an important advocacy, if not implementation role.

In 2007, 14 cases of rape were reported in Gasorwe camp<sup>18</sup>, yet none of the perpetrators were brought to justice. Some were never identified or caught, others were helped by friends to escape the camps – and justice, some were caught and escaped from the camp detention cell and others were brought to justice but released. One case of physical assault to a NRC staff member was dropped, apparently at the instigation of UNHCR Muyinga which is reported to have told the police to desist from investigating the case. This creates a climate of impunity in the camps: if 26 rape cases have occurred and not one person has been brought to justice, the message that goes out among the refugee community is “It’s OK to rape”. No matter how much sensitization is

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<sup>16</sup> <http://www.nrc.no> ;

<sup>17</sup> NRC Camp Management Policy.

<sup>18</sup> Statistics show zero SGBV incidents in Gihinga camp. Yet the evaluation questions the veracity of this and concludes that incidents may be unreported. While TPO reports success in instilling better respect for women among the Banyamulenge male refugees, it does not seem credible that improvements can have taken place so rapidly.

done to give a contrary message, the empirical message is that sexual violence will go unpunished.

UNHCR has very high internal standards when it comes to SGBV and protection of women refugees, and this poor record must be taken up in the strongest possible terms with the agency.

TPO has a rare window on refugee women, receiving information through community workers about incidences of rape, domestic violence and sexual exploitation, a function that guides UNHCR and its camp partners on refugee protection challenges that may otherwise go unnoticed. No evaluation of short-term duration such as this can come close to gathering primary information on violence against women, but the team was able to learn, through talking to the refugee women's committees in both camps, that women are satisfied with the level of protection they are afforded and acknowledge that incidents of violence towards women in the camps are fewer than what they have experienced in their home country.

*A 2002 study on refugee women found that "although food distribution techniques have improved in some places, food is a protection concern. In every site visited, women described others who exchanged sex for otherwise unavailable food and non-food items. Women also described children forced to work for the same items. Among the non-food items, the assessment found serious inadequacies in clothing, blankets, and sanitary materials among camp-based refugees that impeded their ability to participate in education, employment, and other activities".<sup>19</sup>*

While the evaluation could find no direct evidence of such occurrences in the camps, it would be unsurprising to learn that they take place, especially since women expressed particular suffering from the cold and insufficient food. There may be a correlation of perceived insufficient food and non-food items and the high number of teenage pregnancies in Gasorwe (reported through anecdotal evidence, but notably absent in UNHCR health reports). While acknowledging the difficulties involved, NRC is encouraged to double its vigilance and that of its partners to a) encourage women and girls to report incidents such as those described above, and b) take appropriate measures to reduce it.

The evaluation considers that refugee children are at risk from the Gihinga camp's close proximity to a main road which is well-maintained for traffic to move very fast on it. The recommendation has been made in past NRC reports to arrange for speed bumps to be installed on this road at the point where it runs alongside the camp to avoid accidents, but so far no action has been taken. NRC has tried for over a year to obtain administrative permission for speed bumps but the green light has not been given. As the dangers remain very real, it is recommended that NRC renew its advocacy efforts in conjunction with UNHCR to obtain authority.

The case where an NRC staff member was attacked with a machete by a refugee, who was detained but subsequently released, must be properly investigated. If indeed UNHCR is found to be at fault through intervening with the police for the refugee's release, the issue must be taken up in writing by the NRC Country Director with the UNHCR Representative. This is a serious matter and requires an investigation and response from UNHCR. If no such response is forthcoming, the issue – and subsequent issues where staff safety is at risk – must be forwarded to NRC Oslo for further attention.

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<sup>19</sup> *UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women and Guidelines on Their Protection: An Assessment of Ten Years of Implementation.* An independent assessment by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children May 2002

All such documentation should be retained on file and periodically a letter should be sent with copies of preceding correspondence to remind UNHCR of its pending status. Advocacy must sometimes be used at the highest levels to ensure appropriate follow-up action.

The evaluation noted that efficient mechanisms are in place to care for unaccompanied minors, the majority of whom are placed in foster families while attempts are made to trace the parents. The team was approached by a man who had helped an unaccompanied adolescent girl in transit to the camps and who was concerned for her safety. The information was passed on to both NRC and UNHCR, who noted down details for immediate follow-up.

The evaluation wishes to highlight a possible situation whereby teenage pregnancies may be correlated with the size of refugee shelters. The minimum standard of shelter space is 6 to an individual shelter and the minimum space of 3.5 m/person is respected. However, if a family has adolescent boys and girls, it is difficult to maintain needed separations. Parents anxious to separate the siblings may try to find space for them in a different (empty) shelter. If a medium to large family uses several shelters, it would be difficult for the parents to ensure proper supervision and early pregnancies could be the result of such lack of supervision. This issue was raised during a conversation with a group of refugee parents in Gihinga who were concerned about the possibilities for promiscuous behaviour between adolescents in the camps because of the lack of proper supervision, which they traced to the small size of the shelters. It is raised in this report not to promote bigger shelters for large-sized families, but rather to point out a possible cause and effect phenomenon which may occur in other refugee situations and to encourage further study.

Advocacy with regard to refugee-specific needs towards the Government of Burundi hardly seemed an issue during the evaluation: the national and local authorities work closely with NRC and its partners and are part of all decision-making at camp management level. There are no discernible dissenting views between partners. The one outstanding exception is the lack of sufficiently robust follow up on the part of the authorities concerning perpetrators of rape or other forms of SGBV, who they often release from prison prematurely. This creates an environment of impunity, the danger being that if SGBV comes to be seen as an unimportant crime, it will not deter perpetrators and more incidences could result. NRC is in constant discussions with its partner UNHCR on this problem but the protection overlap question appears to arise on each occasion and hampers more robust action.

Camp security was examined and found to be satisfactory: there are very few external threats to the refugees and nothing close to the 2004 Gatumba incident that arose mainly because the camp was situated too close to the border with DRC. On the other hand, there is clearly a need to more closely align the operational necessity of NRC's presence in Gasorwe camp when new busloads of refugees are transferred from Bujumbura. The buses often arrive after hours when NRC security rules dictate that staff should have vacated the camps. The refugees arrive hungry and in need of shelter, so someone must be there to receive them. It is incumbent on NRC camp management staff to handle this task. Yet, it is also potentially dangerous for camp management staff to travel home from the camp in the evening. The safest way to handle the situation would be to provide basic lodgings in the camp for NRC camp management staff, allowing them to overnight in the camp on transfer days. A roster system for staff could be envisaged and a compensatory day off the following day could be awarded to ensure

they get enough rest. The evaluation considers that this would be safer even than arranging a convoy after the day's work is completed, because a convoy remains just as vulnerable to attack as a single vehicle.

A parallel initiative would be for NRC to redouble its efforts in requesting UNHCR to send the convoys earlier in the day, and with a longer notice period to NRC, to reduce the number of times it is necessary for NRC staff to be out late in the camps. A more in-depth dialogue with UNHCR on this issue is strongly recommended to find a satisfactory *modus operandi*, mentioning also that late convoys will result in budgetary increases due to the need to provide for NRC overtime/overnight stays. It should be one of the first agenda items to address in future UNHCR-NRC coordination meetings at the Bujumbura level.

## *VII. CONCLUSIONS*

NRC's camp management programme satisfies all the requirements for a successful operation according to OECD/DAC criteria, running an effective and efficient programme with mostly positive impact on its beneficiaries while making efforts to mitigate negative impacts on the environment. The programme is well-coordinated with other partners, has internal coherence with its own policies and external coherence and complementarity with partner objectives and implementation strategies, with the notable exception of unclear roles and responsibilities for protection. It has clearly-stated goals which it strives to fulfil with a complement of well-trained, professional international and national staff.

The programme to date has been undertaken in compliance with international standards and with commendable efforts to ensure smooth day-to-day functioning and problem-solving. The model has undoubtedly benefited from other NRC camp management operations with relevant adjustments for the specific context, and can be endorsed as a model for future refugee camp management situations.

The evaluation could not determine any better methodology for managing refugee camps than the one in operation. NRC is highly professional and an expert in the field of camp management. It is perhaps overly sensitive about its ability to undertake difficult assignments: challenges will always arise in refugee contexts and any other implementing agency would be faced with similar difficulties. With its impressive background support, body of expertise and wealth of training resources, NRC is probably one of the best materially, technically and professionally equipped camp management agencies that UNHCR could hope to benefit from as a partner, especially if it is accompanied by the generous support of the Norwegian Government. It could deepen its expertise by progressively taking on more camp management activities, but has reasoned that while other agencies with the required expertise are available in-country, it should limit implementation to areas of its own expertise. The evaluation concurs with this approach, recommendations for becoming more involved in secondary level education excepted.

Given the resources available and the constraints imposed by external factors beyond its control, the Burundi camp management programme has had a positive impact on refugee wellbeing and partner development. Further improvements on refugee wellbeing and institutional good practice can be taken by simultaneously opening secondary education and vocational training activities and devising an exit strategy from the programme as a whole through targeted capacity-building.

## VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a consolidation of the various findings and recommendations analysed throughout this report. Actionable points are proposed for NRC in line with specific questions in the ToR. They are organized according to the prescribed evaluation criteria and, because some of them cut across criteria, there may be some different recommendations on the same theme, viewed from the perspective of the particular indicator.

### Relevance:

1. The refugees already participate fully in defining how the camp management programme can better respond to their needs. Their expectations are often too high and cannot be met for reasons of cost, or because meeting them would give them benefits that the local population does not enjoy. The evaluation considers that NRC does its best to accommodate refugee proposals and there is little further to recommend by way of improvement. However, there are some measures that NRC could take to improve the refugees' participation in camp maintenance, which is extremely low. For instance, NRC could promote civic responsibility through the education and sensitization of children of all ages, including practical activities, with the participation of the teachers:

- Organize, with the participation of teachers and a focused campaign, the participation of children in cleaning the school area on a regular basis complemented by AHA's more frequent disinfecting of latrines;
- Linked with this, teach children cultivation techniques and make available appropriate material to initiate small garden production in certain of the school areas; link the activity to increasing the family food basket to give the children a sense of pride;
- Redouble efforts, through getting the children to design posters promoting hygienic and other useful practices, civic responsibility and codes of ethics that will help them in their development, and putting the posters up around the camps;
- Initiate the children to Saturday morning cleanups, in line with the practice of every local Burundian, and devise ways of perhaps making this a game. This should be a compulsory activity with, for example, a prize for the most rubbish gathered around the camp at the end of the morning (prize suggestions: a set of crayons, pair of shoes or clothing that can be donated by UNICEF, or another item that the children would appreciate without this adding to project costs).

These suggestions are not exhaustive and there may be better variations on them that the camp staff, partners or the refugee teachers could propose. Aside from the relevance of initiating children to sound behavioural practices and the importance of community, the impact on camp cleanliness could be significant.

2. In reducing the system of incentives another tactic is needed, but one of a more 'carrot and stick' nature: NRC could help the distribution committee to organize, on a rotational basis, refugees to offload food trucks and bring food to the warehouse, and from the warehouse to the distribution centre on distribution day,

- without paying incentives. This would need significant prior warning and discussion with the refugees to prevent unrest, but could work – as it does in other camp situations – when people realise that if they do not perform labour duties themselves they will not receive their rations. In Gihinga camp the refugees pay local Burundians to carry their food to their homes, which is acceptable as it represents an individual cost/benefit calculation.
3. With respect to the low relevance of the camp management programme to the host population, the evaluation recommends that NRC Gasorwe raise with the UNHCR counterpart the possibility of initiating joint coordination meetings with the Administrator. UNHCR could delegate this responsibility to NRC if it so wishes, but it is clear that regular meetings with this important local official would do much to pre-empt certain problems, lead to joint initiatives to address ongoing problems raised by either side, and increase good relations. In Gihinga camp there is somewhat more contact because a local official often visits the camp, at the invitation of the camp Administrator, to officiate in refugee marriages. However it is recommended in this camp also that more regular coordination meetings take place with the Administrator of the commune, NRC and UNHCR.
  4. The team also recommends that NRC conduct from time to time ‘walkabouts’ in the local community, to stop and talk with ordinary people and ask them to what extent they may be affected by the refugees’ presence. Problems may not be solved immediately, but it would give the villagers an opportunity to share their views, alert NRC to emerging tensions and allow NRC to make, if possible, goodwill gestures of solidarity.
  5. Due to the ongoing problems of protection overlap with UNHCR, the NRC’s Protection Advocacy role appears to have become somewhat sidelined and less relevant to the harmonious solution of protection problems. The early release of NRC’s advocacy strategy might help to make this role more transparent and facilitate the task of the incumbent to explain it to partners. The evaluation believes that protection advocacy vis-à-vis UNHCR needs to be channelled through the Camp Coordinators, who have the closest working relationships with their partners in the camps and can choose the right time and place to address them, or directly with UNHCR protection staff in Bujumbura.

#### Effectiveness and Efficiency:

6. In an attempt to improve budgetary efficiency and service delivery effectiveness, NRC should try to persuade UNHCR that a house-to-house verification survey be conducted at the earliest opportunity, and at least in time to make budgetary adjustments for 2009. When planning this exercise partners should ensure that it is conducted in all three camps on a given day and that the camp residents are given only one day’s notice. If they know in advance of its taking place, they will be sure to alert those living outside the camps and even those living back in the DRC, who will make every effort to return on time to secure their continued benefits. It is not guaranteed that the resulting figure will be a truly accurate one, given the challenges inherent in such surveys. However, whatever figure emerges, it should help all the agencies to make adjustments to their budgets and eventually free up shelters occupied by ‘ghost’ refugees for the newcomers, improving efficiency and achieving economies in camp service delivery.

7. With respect to the sub-standard food ration, NRC should write to WFP and UNHCR to express its concern and request feedback as to if, and when, the ration might be raised to comply with international norms or how the situation is likely to evolve. Depending on the reply, NRC should suggest inserting a paragraph in its sub-agreement with UNHCR indicating how UNHCR will be able to detect any resulting malnutrition through regular monitoring of health indicators. The lack of a correlation between sub-standard ration and malnutrition needs an explanation, otherwise it undercuts the Sphere rationale for promoting a minimum nutritional standard. This is an important advocacy point to be raised with UNHCR and WFP.
8. In addressing the lack of voluntary refugee participation in camp maintenance activities, which creates budgetary inefficiencies due to the need to pay them incentives, NRC should work with UNHCR to define a policy for voluntary and paid positions in refugee camps, both for residents and host populations. Discussions should eventually involve other partners but preliminary discussions need to be held between NRC and UNHCR to assess feasibility and modalities. One way to reduce and ultimately eliminate the incentives would be to involve the refugees in discussions that ask them to choose, for budgetary reasons, between cutting down on certain food, non-food items or other goods and services that they value, and not getting paid. With long-term planning, sensitization and involving the refugees in preliminary discussions, the incentives could be gradually phased out. The evaluation considers that this is an area that could achieve greater financial efficiency but is sidelined because of the difficulties entailed in organizing it. A lesson to be learned for future camp management activities is never to start up camp management without a clear policy on incentives to beneficiaries.
9. The level and configuration of NRC's staffing component does not need changing for the time being. While fully respecting the high quality and commitment of the national staff to uphold NRC norms, the time is not yet ripe to replace international Camp Coordinators with national ones. NRC should nevertheless continue to train appropriate national staff with a view to their taking over the role and evaluate on a yearly basis if the change can take place. Indicators for judging this should include the questions:
  - Are the staff now equipped and trained sufficiently to respond to nuances in programme shifts and emerging problems?
  - Is there a likelihood that they would come under pressure from beneficiaries, partners or local authorities to overlook or tolerate practices that NRC would not condone?
  - Would they be able to resist such pressure and what dangers might confront them or their families if they did?
  - Would they be likely to have less access to UNHCR staff to discuss urgent or emerging problems?
  - Can they take decisions rapidly and authoritatively on difficult aspects of the programme or a rapid-onset crisis, eg. conflict in the camp or between camp residents and outsiders?

10. In preparing the national staff for camp coordination roles, intensive training exercises should take place with emphasis on role-play in different likely scenarios. This would help the staff themselves to judge their own abilities in a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis and contribute to a participatory approach in decision-making.
11. Concurrently with such training and in consultation with UNHCR, NRC could consider inviting local NGOs such as the Burundi Red Cross to participate in camp coordination capacitation with a view to phasing down and handing over its activities to one such partner.

Coordination:

12. In the interests of improving efficiency, maintaining a free flow of information and optimising partner networking it would be advisable for agencies to coordinate more closely through holding regular (monthly) meetings at the Bujumbura level. NRC can advocate more strongly with UNHCR to re-institute regular coordination meetings between camp partners. For instance, such meetings could be a useful forum to map out a monthly operational plan on the reception in Gasorwe of refugees transferred from Bujumbura.
13. NRC could be more proactive in coordinating with other agencies of its own accord, for example UNICEF, whose staff could help design ways in which to educate children to hygienic practices and camp participation – as proposed in ‘relevance’ above.
14. At Headquarters level, it would be appropriate, and for NRC Burundi, urgent, to undertake a revision of the UNHCR-NRC Memorandum of Understanding. The key focus of such a revision from the perspective of NRC Burundi would be to provide greater clarity on the respective agency roles and responsibilities in refugee situations – not only for the Burundi context but also to further enhance future partnership with UNHCR in similar circumstances. Indeed, prior to entering into any future partnership with UNHCR in a refugee camp management situation, NRC should make it a *sine qua non* to identify joint solutions with UNHCR regarding the protection overlap issue.
15. At Field level, the ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ table elaborated jointly by UNHCR and NRC country staff represents an important first step towards a constructive solution of the ‘Protection overlap’ problem but it is not sufficiently detailed. The evaluation considers that the table could be expanded, using specific protection scenarios to map out more detailed responses to be undertaken by each partner. For instance, in a rape scenario, NRC or another partner would first learn about the incident and report it to both the local authorities and UNHCR, upon which the perpetrators would be detained while an investigation is carried out by the authorities. If guilty, perpetrators would be jailed for a specified period, during which it would be the responsibility of UNHCR to support the authorities with explicitly detailed action. Should the perpetrator be released prematurely, NRC would again report the event to both the authorities and UNHCR and explicit action pursued. While these steps are currently more or less taken for granted, they would have more weight if detailed in writing and serve as a clear guide to each intervening party.
16. It is recommended that for every serious protection incident reported, UNHCR be advised in writing from NRC Burundi top management with suggestions for

follow-up. The letter should request UNHCR to inform NRC of all action being undertaken to address the issue and all outcomes of such action. It is UNHCR's role to take up such incidents with the police to encourage prompt and robust action. However, rather than second-guess those more closely involved in this issue, the evaluation recommends that UNHCR and NRC meet at field level to draw up a detailed Protection Action Plan that looks at specific scenarios and delegates action to the appropriate body for that occasion. This Plan should be endorsed by Bujumbura level officials and used as a guide for all camp management partners. The Plan could also serve as a model for future camp management programmes.

17. The use of the word 'Protection' can be counter-productive for NRC in the eyes of its partners and must be used judiciously. While NRC undoubtedly plays an important protection role through its presence in the camps, refugee protection is mainly the responsibility of UNHCR. Using the word 'protection' in an NRC job title is perhaps somewhat provocative to UNHCR, which fails to see how its own core function can be attributed to another agency. The evaluation recommends that the function and title of the current Protection and Advocacy Adviser post should be changed to Advocacy Adviser, also to give advocacy a wider impact. From the partner perspective, and while not wishing to devalue the work of the incumbent, the Camp Coordinators have a much more credible protection advocacy role.

#### Impact:

18. Close monitoring of refugee health must be regularly undertaken by NRC and its partners to detect any signs of malnutrition arising from the lower food ration and from water-related illnesses that could result from the significantly sub-standard water provision in Gihinga camp.
19. In the water sector, NRC should insist upon early repair of the broken water pump in Gihinga camp to avoid a catastrophic situation should the water tanker break down. Impact on the refugees' well-being could be severe if this should occur without additional backup systems.
20. The evaluation recommends continuation of NRC's excellent training activities for its staff and partners, as well as the weekly camp meetings. These represent sound mechanisms to monitor whether the programme has adapted to changes in context and needs and to take redress should the need arise.
21. In order to secure a better educational impact for children or young adults of secondary school level, NRC is recommended, upon a formal request from UNHCR, to take charge of the secondary school activity and implement it professionally. Linked to this is the recommendation that NRC provide vocational training to all refugees wishing to benefit from such activities. There is an important opportunity here to make a major impact on refugee livelihoods: providing additional learning pursuits in the camps where there is otherwise little to occupy young people's minds, and contributing to their skills base for the time when they can return home.
22. Undertaking these additional activities will require much planning and additional budgeting, which should start as soon as possible.

23. To offset the negative impact of refugee camps on the environment, a reduction in the firewood ration is recommended, concurrent with efforts to find alternative sources of cooking fuel.
24. Further, in the absence of an agency-wide policy on the environment and in the likelihood of this becoming a progressively important feature of future camp management programmes, it is recommended that NRC Oslo take steps to draft a policy that would serve as a useful guide to camp management operations worldwide.
25. NRC's advocacy approaches on specific issues, notably appropriate follow-up to protection concerns, appear to be having little or no impact on its main partner which, in turn, could result in negative impact on the security of refugees and camp staff. Advocacy is often a question of not only setting out a policy but of constant and repetitive follow-up with the partner to address the issue until the goal is accomplished. This is not always easy and goals may not have the same priority weighting for each partner. NRC should not become discouraged in its efforts to promote its goals, which are complementary to its partners but not always given the desired attention. Advocacy is usually a step by step process of engagement at different levels, culminating, if the issues are considered to be of great importance, in requesting intervention from agency headquarters. The evaluation recommends that, to advocate effectively with its partners, NRC could place progressive pressure on them to investigate protection cases more fully, ensure perpetrators remain in jail while also advocating more strongly with the authorities that it is also their responsibility to do this. Formal letters must be written at Country Office level to ensure that its most pressing concerns are heeded and acted on – outlining clearly the possible consequences if they are not. It is advisable to make such demarches in writing because if, due to lack of action, negative consequences do materialise, NRC will have a written record of the number of times it raised the concern. Furthermore, after camp activity or coordination meetings certain items have been discussed and action agreed, it would help the partner to understand which of them need priority action by either phoning, or e-mailing or – if extremely important, writing a letter.
26. NRC in Gasorwe is urged to solve the problem of pigs being kept within the camp, the source of potential health problems and other nuisances. According to the weekly coordination meeting PVs, this issue was first raised by the refugees in January 2008 and needs to be solved promptly.

Sustainability:

27. NRC's intervention in the camps is not sustainable in the long-term. In keeping with its stated policy to phase out of camp management altogether by 2010, NRC could be more proactive in developing an exit strategy by opening discussions with UNHCR to start jointly developing plans for phased withdrawal. This would be consistent with UNHCR's own requirement to specify in its yearly Country Operations Plan (COP) how it plans an exit strategy.
28. There are some interesting possibilities for phase-out, specifically in handing over camp management operations to the host authorities or to national NGOs such as the Burundi Red Cross. Extensive camp management training and mentoring would be necessary in both cases, something in which NRC excels. This could constitute a real opportunity for national capacity-building and provide

- a model of good practice. Of course, the situation in Burundi or in DRC, or both, may change between now and 2010 in any number of different ways, but it would still constitute sound policy to start developing a concrete exit strategy.
29. NRC Oslo might consider developing a policy which requires that each camp management intervention draw up plans for a detailed exit strategy, preferably based on building the capacity of a local partner to take over where this is feasible.
  30. To protect and sustain the environment, which is extremely fragile in Burundi, it would be advisable to consider the full-time employment of an Environment Advisor to draw up a country environment policy for NRC and to advise on alternatives to wood for construction and cooking/heating fuel.

## **Annexe A: List of persons interviewed**

### **Interviews in Oslo (by phone)**

Ms. Heidi Solheim Nordbeck, Programme Coordinator, Burundi & DR Congo

Ms. Laila Badawy, Camp Management Adviser

### **Interviews in Burundi**

Ms Sophie KAZADE, Country Director, NRC Bujumbura

M. Philippe ALLARD, Camp Management Project Manager, NRC Bujumbura

M. Edouardo Garcia Rolland, Protection Advocacy Advisor, NRC Bujumbura

M. Eric BATONE, Camp Management Project Coordinator, NRC Muyinga

M. Ali SAWADOGO, Camp Management Project Coordinator, NRC Mwaro

M. Etienne BIGIRIMANA, Assistant Coordinator, NRC Gihinga (Mwaro)

M. Lazarre KAREKEZI, Camp Administrator, Gasorwe (Muyinga)

M. Samuel NDAYISENGA, Camp Administrator, Gihinga (Mwaro)

M. Valentin Tapsoba, Deputy Representative, UNHCR Bujumbura

M. Cheik Tidiane Pouye, Senior Programme Officer, UNHCR Bujumbura

Ms. Lydie Navigué, Protection Officer, UNHCR Bujumbura

Dr. Colette Houéto, Health Coordinator, UNHCR Bujumbura

Ms. Gogo Ablewa Hukportie, Head of UNHCR Sub-Office Muyinga

M. John H. Mackissick, Protection Officer, UNHCR Sub-Office Muyinga

M. Ephrem KABURA, Assistant Protection Officer, UNHCR Mwaro

Colonel Didace NZIKURURIHO, Ministry of Interior, Government of Burundi

M. Sylvestre BWATEMBA, Administrator, AHA Muyinga

M. Léonidas NTIBAYAZI, Administrator, AHA Mwaro

Dr. Jean-Claude NAYASHAKI, Medical Officer, AHA Gasorwe

Nurse Thérèse, AHA Gasorwe

Mr. Noé Sébisaba, Project Coordinator, STOP SIDA

Ms. Angélique Mandy IRIBAGIZA, Head of Project, TPO Bujumbura

Mme Justine NKURUNZIZA, Psychosocial Assistant, TPO Mwaro

Ms. Aude RIGOT, Emergency Project Officer, UNICEF Bujumbura

M. Laurent DUFOUR, Head of Office, OCHA Burundi

M. Sylvestre NDAYIRUKIYE, Field Analyst, OCHA Bujumbura

M. Imed Khansir, Head of Field Office Ngozi, WFP Ngozi

M. Emmanuel Twagirumukiza, Programme Assistant, WFP

M. Symphorien BASHAKA, Social and Administrative Counsellor, Commune Gasorwe

Refugees : Camp Chiefs, Women's Committee, Primary Education Committee of Teachers, Secondary Education Committee of Teachers, Council of Elders, Handicapped Persons Committee, Distribution Committee and individual refugees, Gasorwe and Gihinga

## Annexe B: Bibliography

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*Congo: Bringing the Peace to North Kivu*, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No 133,  
31 October 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5134&l=1>

### Annexe C: Map of area covered



Mwaro  
Gihinga Refugee Camp: 2,500 +

Muyinga  
Gasorwe Refugee Camp, 10,000+

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/popup.cfm?i=/library/images/africa/burundi\\_detail.jpg](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/popup.cfm?i=/library/images/africa/burundi_detail.jpg)

### Annexe E: Evaluation Terms of Reference



**NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL**

## TERMS OF REFERENCE

### Evaluation

<b>Project/Program:</b>	<b>Camp Management</b>
<b>Country:</b>	<b>Burundi</b>
<b>Period:</b>	<b>January 2006 to December 2007</b>
<b>Date final version ToR:</b>	<b>10 December 2007</b>

#### **A. Project background**

##### **Project context and rationale:**

The recent history of the Great Lakes Region is one of conflict. Since 1993 conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have resulted in more than five million deaths, and hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. The situation in Burundi reflects the impacts of these conflicts, with approximately 350,000 Burundian refugees living in Tanzania, 117,000 people internally displaced within the country, two refugee camps and a transit centre housing 19,000 Congolese refugees.

Rwandan Asylum Seekers arrived in Burundi after the setting up of the Rwandan genocide courts (Gacaca) in March 2005, claiming fear of persecution. Initially, in coordination with Rwanda, these asylum seekers were sent back to Rwanda, but some remained and others returned apparently in fear for their security. After the elections in mid-2005, the Government of Burundi agreed to open a new camp at Musasa, Muyinga province for the asylum seekers and, with the assistance of UNHCR, undertook an individual case status determination process. This process was completed at the end of November 2006, with a total of 206 persons being granted refugee status. The camp was closed in December 2006.

There are currently three separate groups of Congolese refugees in Burundi. The first group housed in Gasorwe camp in Muyinga province, fled DRC in 1998. They currently number 9,603. The second group, which numbers 2,513 fled to Burundi following an attack on the town of Bukavu in eastern DRC in June 2004. Initially they settled in Gatumba, but following a massacre on that site in August 2004, they were relocated to Gihinga camp in Mwaro province. The last group lives in Musasa transit centre and is made up of Congolese refugees who arrived the last few months from DRC and from Bujumbura town. The number of refugees increases every week.

##### **Program outcome:**

The overall goal of the NRC Camp Management Program in Burundi is to promote and protect the basic rights of Congolese refugees and to facilitate voluntary return or reintegration as a durable solution.

The specific program outputs of the Camp Management Program is to increase the physical and social protection of refugees through the management of Gasorwe and Gihinga camps, the provision of specific services and the training, capacity building and empowerment of actors involved in the camps.

To fulfil this objective NRC provides assistance in accordance with international minimum standards (e.g. SPHERE) at all levels of planning, practice and participation and upholds a “Do no Harm” approach, as well as promoting the use of its Camp Management Toolkit. The Camp Management Program works in close collaboration with NRC’s Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) Program to ensure the respect of refugees rights and provide them with up to date information on the situation in their country of origin.

Through the Camp management Program, NRC aims to ensure that the basic rights of refugees are secured and to advocate for refugee rights with Burundian authorities and internationally. In addition, NRC seeks to promote improved mutual understanding between refugees and host communities.

**Target groups:**

*Refugees:* the refugee community in the three camps currently numbers approximately 19,000 (2,500 in Gihinga, 9,500 in Gasorwe and 7,000 in Musasa). The number of Congolese refugees in Burundi increased during 2007 due to the security and political situation in DRC.

*Host communities:* In order to promote cooperation, integration and sustainable relationship between camp residents and host population and to reduce risk of conflict, NRC provides facilities for use both by the refugees and by those living around the camps.

**Activities:**

The Camp Management Program in Burundi started in November 2004 and is in the implementation phase, co-financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and UNHCR.

In order to meet the aim of camp management ( to respond to the needs to coordinate humanitarian assistance and to improve the physical and social protection of refugees), NRC seek to enhance relationships with all stakeholders and partners (e.g. UNHCR, NGOs and Burundian authorities) through the establishment of solid coordination mechanisms in training in camp coordination and camp management.

1Camp management; camp management is the coordination of all activities and services within a camp. Through the coordination of activities and the motivation of service providers, NRC aims to ensure timely delivery of all services in a comprehensive manner, according to international standards.

2Logistics and transport

3Firewood provision

4Water

5Shelters and other infrastructure

6Community services (e.g. library)

7Education; refugee children of school age are taught by teachers with the support of the UNHCR through the participation of the Congolese School and NRC. The majority of the teachers are refugees who passed a test with the Congolese School of Bujumbura. NRC manages the schools, supervises the primary education with “education advisors”, provides teaching and classroom materials and pays an incentive to the teachers and to the directors of the schools (literacy, nursery school, primary and secondary schools).

8Musasa camp maintenance and rehabilitation; this camp was closed in December 2006. It was maintained by NRC the first quarter of 2007. It was decided by the Government of Burundi in March 2007 that the site would be used partly as a centre for potential asylum seekers, and in the following that it would become a transit centre for refugees until their transfer to a refugee camp. To date, NRC has rehabilitated the camp to accommodate 7,500 persons. Currently the transit centre/camp hosts 7,000 refugees.

**B.Purpose og the evaluation and intended use**

The main purpose of the evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of NRC’s role as the camp management agency, in a refugee situation with a strong presence of UNHCR, in order to facilitate the elaboration of an enhanced program lay-out. Emphasis will be placed on evaluating NRC’s ability to provide assistance and protection to the refugees in a relevant, coordinated, efficient and effective manner, as well as on the organisational set-up of the camp management program in Burundi as a whole. The evaluation team should provide the Camp management program manager with useful information, analysis and recommendations, thereby enabling the organisation to engage in effective policymaking, planning, programming and implementation.

The intended use of the results of the evaluation is two-fold:

1the results of the evaluation will be used by the camp management program manager to re-direct, if necessary, the program design and implementation of the camp management program in 2008.

2to consider lessons learned from Burundi in design and implementation of camp management projects/programs of similar refugee context.

### **C.Scope of work and methods**

The evaluation should cover the overall assistance provided through the Camp Management program in Burundi in the period of January 2006 to December 2007.

The main perspective of the evaluation is to provide a mid term review of the camp management approach in Burundi, its results so far and to what extent the current methodology will need to be adjusted/ improved to ensure higher effectiveness and impact in the coming years, before phasing out. It should also provide inputs to the decision process at NRC head office for the development of partnerships with UNHCR in other similar contexts. The evaluation should refer to the NRC - UNHCR partnership in particular.

The methodology will include:

**1Desk studies.** As a general background, the evaluation team should study relevant material in NRC, such as country information, the NRC country strategy for Burundi, the NRC camp management policy, NRC camp management toolkit, action plans, project applications, agreements, reports and correspondence.

**2Field visits** to Muyinga and Mwaro. These visits should include interviews with target groups, i.e. camp residents and members of host communities, international and national camp management personnel, other non camp management NRC staff, and representatives of national and local government, NGOs, UNHCR and other partner organisations. In this respect, it is important to assess whether the key issues raised and the responses provided by the camp management program in Burundi has been the most relevant ones for the beneficiaries, whether there have been changes in their needs and whether the camp management program has been able to adapt to such changes.

**3Interviews with stakeholders.** Consultations in the field will be held with all relevant stakeholders: camp management staff, local authorities, and national authorities, beneficiaries including host communities, UNHCR and the humanitarian community as a whole.

#### **Evaluation principles:**

The evaluation will be guided by the following ethical rules/considerations:

- 1Openness – of information given, to the highest possible degree to all parties, when there are not special considerations against this
- 2Publicity/public access – to the results when there are not special considerations against this
- 3Broad participation – the interested parties should be involved when relevant / possible
- 4Reliability and independence – the evaluation should be conducted so that findings and conclusions are correct and trustworthy

## **D.Issues to be covered**

The evaluation team will assess the performance of the Camp Management Program in Burundi by applying the following criteria. These criteria are defined in NRC's Evaluation Policy. The questions under each criterion are meant to guide the evaluation team in focusing on key issues of interest for NRC:

### **Relevance/ appropriateness:**

As mentioned above, there are three separate groups of Congolese refugees in Burundi, and the number of Congolese refugees increased every week.

In those circumstances:

- 1 Was a thorough assessment undertaken prior to the camp management program design focusing on the relevance of a camp management program in such a context?
- 2 If so, to what extent was the current program design consistent with the humanitarian and protection needs and the local environment identified by the assessment?
- 3 Did potential beneficiaries, including host communities, participate in any way in defining how a camp management program could respond to their needs?
- 4 To what extent does the camp management program provide the right response to the needs of NRC's population of concern, refugees? Are the objectives of the program in line with NRC's camp management policy?
- 5 Has NRC the required capacity in terms of staffing, local knowledge and expertise in the country to conduct relevant and appropriate response?
- 6 What are the alternatives to the current design of the camp management program? Is the camp management program the best alternative in the current refugee context, and why?
- 7 Are there mechanisms in place to monitor whether the program has adapted to changes in the context and needs?

### **Efficiency:**

- 1 To what extent has the camp management program utilised its resources and time efficiently? Could the results have been achieved with fewer inputs? (link to possible reduction of activities)
- 2 Were appropriate and adequate resources (material, human, financial) available, in the right place and at the right time?

### **Effectiveness:**

The envisaged outcome of the camp management program in Burundi is to protect the rights of the population of concern (Congolese refugees in Burundi) through provisions of assistance and advocate for refugee rights with Burundian authorities and internationally. It works towards the goal through concrete objectives (see pages one and two of this ToR).

- 1 Are objectives and activities sufficiently and clearly defined? Are they relevant to the context and to the envisaged outcome of the program?
- 2 Has the program defined criteria for selecting beneficiaries in accordance with its objectives? If these exist, have they been applied consistently?
- 3 Is there an internal monitoring mechanism and objectively verifiable indicators in place to assess whether or not objectives are achieved? What standards and indicators are being used (i.e. UNHCR standards, SPHERE standards?)
- 4 To what extent has the camp management program achieved its objectives? To what extent did the beneficiaries actually benefit from the NRC camp management program?
- 5 How do the beneficiaries and others view the value, quality and quantity of the camp management program?
- 6 What knowledge, about the program objectives, the NRC camp management policy and the camp management toolkit, does the national NRC camp management staff have?

### **Coordination (management of a camp):**

- 1 To what extent has there been coordination with other relevant agencies?
- 2 Which parties were included in camp management and in what manner? Why?
- 3 Did NRC camp management appear useful for the other organisations working in the camp?
- 4 What are the complementarities and the overlap between the mandates of NRC and UNHCR for the management of refugee camps in Burundi?
- 5 Were plans for management and coordination in place (i.e. meetings, reporting, and information exchange)? Where they relevant? Did the actors adhere to these plans?

- 6 What were the main constraints and supports to camp management?
- 7 How has camp management been undertaken and what has been achieved? Is it replicable in other situations of similar context?
- 8 Where the actors (NRC, UNHCR, Burundian Government, NGOs) coherent in their understanding of and implementation of protection and assistance provided to the refugees? To what extent did the different actors in the camps work towards the same goal? Did they manage to fill gaps and avoid duplication in service provision?
- 9 What can be done to improve coordination and general management for both camps?

**Impact:**

- 1 Has the camp management program identified quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure the impacts of its activities? Are monitoring and analysis mechanisms in place?
- 2 What intended and unintended, positive and negative effects are produced by the camp management program, both on the population of concern and others who are affected?
- 3 Does the camp management program produce the most appropriate impact, given the situation and resources available?
- 4 What can be done to avoid any negative impact or to enhance any positive impact?

**Coherence:**

- 1 To what extent were the policies of the actors involved (UNHCR, Burundian Government, NGOs) complementary/contradictory?

**Protection:**

- 2 What are the complementarities and the overlap between the mandates of NRC and UNHCR for protection in refugee camps?
- 3 What are the main challenges of NRC as camp manager in relation to protection?
- 4 Have the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between UNHCR and NRC, and NRC's camp management policy provided the appropriate tools to meet the refugees' protection needs?
- 5 What can be done to improve protection in the camps?

**Specific issues for consideration: Advocacy**

- 1 Does the MoU signed between UNHCR and NRC, and the NRC camp management policy, enables NRC to conduct advocacy initiatives in the context of refugee camps? Are they relevant tools for advocacy in this context?
- 2 What are the main challenges for advocacy with the camp management program?
- 3 Is there an advocacy strategy? What have been the successes and failures of the advocacy efforts?
- 4 What can be done to improve advocacy and its results?

**E. Evaluation team**

The evaluation team will be composed of two persons. The team leader will lead the work of the team and be responsible for completing the report. The team leader should have skills and proven background in evaluations of humanitarian assistance and experience with situations of forced displacement. The regional/national team member should have knowledge and expertise in humanitarian assistance related to forced displacement and the work of UNHCR and good knowledge of the conflict and culture in the region. Both consultants should be francophone and have writing skills in English. The team members should be gender aware. Difference in opinion between team members regarding conclusions/ recommendations should be reflected in the report.

A Steering Committee will be established with the following members: NRC Advisor in Camp Management (NRC Headquarter (HQ)), NRC Advisor for Quality Assurance and Evaluations (HQ), NRC Program Coordinator Burundi and DRC (HQ), NRC Camp Management Program Manager, NRC Burundi and NRC Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC Burundi. The evaluation manager is NRC Program Coordinator Burundi and DRC (HQ).

The main function of the Steering Committee will be to select the external evaluators, review preliminary findings and recommendations and establishing a dissemination and utilization strategy. The main function of the Evaluation Manager will be preparing the Terms of Reference (ToR), in close collaboration with members of the Steering Committee, administration and overall coordination, including monitoring progress.

## **F. Timeframe and budget considerations**

The whole process of evaluation will have a time frame of seven weeks starting in February 2008 and ending in March 2008

The evaluation team is scheduled to start its work in mid February, conducting field visits to Myyinga and Mwaro in the period of February/March. The team leader should alter the evaluation manager at NRC immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval form any significant changes to the evaluation timetable will be refereed to the Steering Committee.

Total budget frame: USD 50.000

<b>Budget : NRC Burundi</b>					
<b>Monnaie : US\$</b>					
					<b>Total</b>
			<b>Collecte</b>		
<b>Honoraires</b>					
Chef d'équipe Anne Davies	870	17	16	33	28710
Augustin Ngendakuriyo	340	8	16	24	8160
<b>Sous-Total</b>					<b>36870</b>
<b>Per diem</b>					
Anne Davies	150		14		2100
Augustin Ngendakuriyo	150		14		2100
<b>Sous-Total</b>					<b>4200</b>
<b>Remboursables</b>					
Transport Internationaux					2500
<b>Total</b>					
National Transport					1500
Communication					500
Visa					60
Insurance					1000
<b>Sous-Total</b>					<b>5560</b>
Réserve					3000
<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>49630</b>

This budget includes all taxes and insurances.

## **G.Reporting**

A draft report should be submitted not later than March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2008. The completion date for the Final Evaluation report will be April 5<sup>th</sup> 2008, the consultants having addresses NRC's comments as appropriate.

The size of the report should be approximately 40 pages, clearly written in English, using Arial 11 point. The report will also have to be handed in a French version.

The evaluation report should consist of:

- 1 Executive summary and recommendations not more than six pages
- 2 Main text, to include index, emergency context, NRC mandate, evaluation methodology, commentary and analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs to include a section dedicated to the issue of particular lessons-learning focus, conclusions (not more than 35 pages)
- 3 Appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework and bibliography
- 4 All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the evaluation manager prior to the termination of the contract.

## H.Follow up

For the follow up of the evaluation the Program Coordinator for Burundi and DRC, NRC HQ, is the main responsible, with the Camp Management Program Manager, NRC Burundi as the focal point in the field. A management response, responding to recommendations, including an action plan should be prepared by the Camp Management Program Manager, NRC Burundi, with the support of the Camp Management Advisor, NRC HQ, not later than two months after receiving the final report. It is the responsibility of the NRC Country Director, NRC Burundi, to ensure that the realisations of these plans are monitored and documented.

Oslo, January 25<sup>th</sup> 2008

Ohain, ..... 2008

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Patrick Ekløf  
Head of Africa Section  
International Programme Department  
Norwegian Refugee Council

Cécile Collin  
Project Manager  
Channel Research