

Real Time Evaluation

Ethiopia Drought Response

02 September – 19th September 2011

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Acknowledgements

The RTE team would like to thank all of the staff in all of the field offices and in Addis Ababa for their openness, hospitality, and support throughout the time we spent in Ethiopia; we covered a lot of ground and spoke to many people. We are fortunate to gain an insight into the great work that the teams are undertaking across the country. We would especially like to thank Hassan Mahmood for organising meetings, flights and other travel arrangements. His support enabled us to cover the ground, and interview the number of people that we did.

Introduction

This Real Time Evaluation (RTE) was commissioned by Oxfam's regional humanitarian lead as part of a regional RTE that is being undertaken to assess and help support Oxfam's drought response in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. It will be one of three country reports and will be linked to a global report analysing Oxfam's coordination internationally and in the region. Background information on the drought can be found on the United Nations emergency information site: relief web¹ for general information and on SUMUS² for sitreps and other Oxfam specific information.

Methodology

As mentioned above the RTE for Ethiopia is part of a broader RTE that has been undertaken for the HECA regional drought response. It follows the Oxfam International (OI) RTE guidelines with regard to the approach and reporting format and the recommendations will feed into a global report. That said this will also be a standalone report aimed to support the current Oxfam response in Ethiopia and provide information and learning for future planning and responses.

The evaluation focused on four geographical areas where Oxfam is currently responding to the drought; the refugee camps at Dollo Ado and the surrounding host communities, Gorobaqaqsa, Shinille, Jigiga zones of Somali region and Borena and Guji zones of Oromiya Region, as well as the country offices based in Addis Ababa. During the evaluation a team of four interviewed Oxfam staff, beneficiaries, local partners, INGOs and UN organisations, and government at local and national level. Approximately one hundred and five interviews and group discussions were held over the two weeks. The team also visited sites where Oxfam and partners are working to see firsthand some of the projects being undertaken.

Following each of the field visits the RTE team held a staff debriefing to present finding and to allow field staff the opportunity to feed into the main day of reflection held in Addis Ababa. Any recommendations coming out of the interviews that could be acted on straight away were articulated to relevant parties in order for them to have an immediate impact. The day of reflection in Addis Ababa produced an action plan that was also shared with the Country Leadership Team (CLT) for them to initiate at the next CLT meeting and before this report was finalised.

Although the team were able to achieve a substantial amount in relatively short period of time there were a number of constraints such as the evaluation coinciding with Ethiopian New Year which slightly affected team movement and interviewing. The sheer distances travelled to various kebeles (smallest government administration) meant that in many cases only one or two focus group discussions (FGD) could be undertaken on a single trip. As with all RTEs the team were not able to interview every relevant person or visit all program areas due to time constraints or coordination issues (i.e. staff on leave, completed contacts, or out of the country). As some programmatic work had not started it was difficult to fully analyse its impact in terms of quality. Through the field briefings the RTE team did try to facilitate some kind of voice for the field staff at the day of reflection but low representation of field staff (which is an issue at many RTE reflection days) was still an issue. Key senior management staff from Oxfam Canada (OCA) only intermittently attending the day of reflection also hampered the decision making process on important issues.

¹ <http://reliefweb.int/horn-africa-crisis2011>

² <https://sumus.oxfam.org/201106-horn-africa-regional-drought-humanitarian-response>

Summary of Recommendations

Benchmark 1: The speed and timeliness of the response will be good relative to other actors, with consideration of emergency preparedness measures in place

- Develop a contingency /preparedness plan that covers management structure, staff, material requirements and all logistics support for the agreed scenarios. This should be done in a way that staff feel ownership over the plan and are familiar with it. This should be done before April 2012 ('go live date') and should incorporate learning from the past RTEs. Contingency planning should also have a clear geographical strategy.
- Strengthen assessment methodology which is the basis for clear and comprehensive proposal development. Where proposals are developed between affiliates there needs to be clear timeliness and donor policies to minimise delay and protect brand reputation.
- The development/program team need to have the capacity to assess and analysis the recurring drought situation in Ethiopia and know when to scale up. This would be the basis for scenario planning and development of appropriate emergency response preparedness through emergency response training (ERT). It is important for this to be part of the long term developmental program and for the development team to have emergency response capacity in the country and owned by all affiliates. Although it is recognised that this would be a process it will enhance a timely response to an emergency happening without relying fully on external support.
- The programme scenario planning, led by OGB and planned for November should be moved forward and be done as soon as possible to ensure a preparedness plan is in place and scale up if necessary is undertaken rapidly.
- Triggers for responding to food insecurity need to be standardised across the affiliates and incorporated into the contingency plan to clarify what level requires intervention. For example, linking using the GPDJ early warning system to inform the IPC³ tool with its established cut offs for Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis / Humanitarian emergency / Famine.
- An advocacy strategy should be put together around lobbying government to recognise pending or current crisis.
- An advocacy strategy around lobbying government to scale up food aid, continue PSNP support throughout the drought, and inform the international community of shortfalls in food, and logistical or financial support needed.
- Strengthen HCT capacity to effectively identify humanitarian need (based on IPC standards), advocate with donors, be prepared to scale up quickly and inform the HCGG and Program Governance Group (PGG). This could be done through monthly reporting with increased reporting when emergencies arise. The PGG should also be engaged in tracking trends in the region and prioritise humanitarian concerns at their meetings.
- Link with OGB Humanitarian Department and regional office to ensure that there is support to scale up with appropriate staffing.

Benchmark 2 Relief provided is of a quality and scale appropriate to the context that would be expected of Oxfam's capacity, and is valued by the affected population

- It is important to have clarity on targeted beneficiary numbers. Analysis of assessment findings need to clarify the number of beneficiaries as well as kebeles / woredas targeted.
- OI coordination to ensure that WASH or EFSL coverage by affiliates or partners is complemented (geographically and programmatically) to ensure gaps are covered i.e. where there is WASH coverage, EFSL needs should also be met where possible.
- Establish regular technical meetings between affiliates and partners on EFSL and PH to ensure technical standards are met and to optimize coordination, information sharing, analysis and consistency between approaches
- Cash grants would be preferable in the current context in Borena, but the Government will not allow this, and so the CFW should be as creative as possible across affiliates and partners. For example light work, payment in advance, no more than 10 days work per month, and around 30% of the most vulnerable beneficiaries should receive a cash grant.

³ Integrated Phase Classification is an established HECA wide tool used to facilitate decisions on EFSVL and WASH programming in slow onset contexts, with cut offs to determine when indicators have reached a humanitarian emergency.

- HCT should ensure an up to date analysis of all partner's capacity to scale up in order to allow operational planning and response through partners or through direct implementation.
- Assess protection risks faced by the community in Borena and adapt program responses if needed.
- OGB markets support work to start as soon as possible to ensure that there is sufficient maize to purchase with the money earned through CfW.
- Accountability mechanisms to beneficiaries need to be standardized across the affiliates, and a complaints mechanism for individuals needs to be created.

Benchmark 3 An effective management structure is in place, that provides clarity and well-communicated decision-making and direction (including partners) and is appropriately accountable to affected populations

- Provide necessary support to managers so that they will have enough time to undertake field visits and program support including representation. Program manager should be able to feel comfortable delegating support roles to appropriate people.
- Coordination and Team management of specific technical teams should be strengthened by undertaking frequent team meetings and planning together.
- HCT and CLT to undertake timely decision making in relation to humanitarian program needs that is clearly communicated to the field level.
- Accountability, communication and coordination lines need to be revised and clearly outlined in relation to the OI strategy.
- HCT to revise the Oromia IO strategy.
- OGB managers to address bottlenecks in HR, logistics, finance and security (also related to below benchmark)
- Review the finance and logistics procedures in terms of SOP's, financial accountability, and WOW.

Benchmark 4: Key support functions are sufficiently resourced and being effectively run. Risks that are being taken are being calculated and documented

- Oxfam in Ethiopia should initiate the SMS procedures around security and have one security plan for all the affiliates, this will have to be in place once Ethiopia 'goes live' with SMS next year but it would be useful to be undertaken now.
- Visibility materials need to be purchased for vehicles.
- Identifying reputable vehicle hire companies as part of preparedness planning that can be utilised during an emergency
- Rectify management support issues by providing the necessary HR, and Financial support to programmes (e.g Shinile).
- Devise joint affiliate advocacy strategy around the recruitment issues with of local skilled technical staff for the implementation of activities in Dollo Addo and Shinile.
- Scenario planning should include a clear plan of action for logistics, HR, and finance scale up, and be supported by a broader HCGG discussion on standardised scale up needs..
- Support functions learning from the current response needs to be fed into contingency planning. For example, discussions with banks around the transfer of cash will assist preparedness for the next crisis and will require ongoing finance team time to facilitate current CFW activities.
- Harmonised employee benefits need to be finalised quickly and clearly articulated to staff, as it is affecting moral in the field.
- All of the affiliates need to look at standardising their inductions within their own affiliates and sharing information for areas where more than one affiliate is working.
- For future response the OGB Operations Director should be an OI focal point on Government Relations, with their time prioritised to support initial set-up of field relations with the government.
- All affiliates should consider the need for an interim financial audit especially in field sites where there has been insufficient logistics and finance support e.g. Dolo Ado. OGB should consider a rolling financial audit

Benchmark 5: Our internal Oxfam relationships are productive and well coordinated, under the leadership of the lead agency, and we are having a positive influence on other actors

- Strengthen regular communication between affiliates and develop modalities in which information is shared periodically (Health risk information, regional weather information etc..)
- Communication with responsible Regional/Zonal/Woreda authorities need to be continuously undertaken so that authorities do not have the opportunity to complain 'we do not know what Oxfam is doing' and hinder programme implementation (e.g. Shinlle and Ayisha Woreda authorities).
- CLT and HCT need to be empowered and current mandates and TORs need to be clearly understood by all implementing affiliates and by all parties involved in decision making to avoid confusion, overlap of responsibilities and ensure accountability.
- It is suggested that a technical OI working group is set up with clear terms of reference to regularly share information from different affiliates EWS, make joint analysis of the humanitarian situation, develop joint assessments, decide on joint triggers for response and inform with technical evidence the HCT decision making processes.
- CLT to unblock situation around the structure and set-up of the OI support office in Borena.
- For CAT 1 & 2 emergencies senior humanitarian programme managers should have access to Emergency Management Network support from the Region and HD, and OI Secretariat coaching.
- Integral to the drought scenario planning exercise recommended, there needs to be a particular focus on affiliate / partner's capacity, coordination and roles and responsibilities.
- Ensure in future responses (i.e. to be included in the Contingency Plan) that OGB as the Humanitarian Lead coordinates by default until there is an OI structure in place (if appropriate), with support from HCT and CLT.
- Affiliates/partners need to share and coordinate information on what activities they are doing, where, and until when to ensure coherent delivery of the OI Oromia programme strategy.
- OI technical working groups for WASH and EFSL need to be established to enable technical standards to be uniformly applied and where appropriate to leverage influence with the government e.g. current Gov strategy limits CFW to 350 birr, whereas affiliates analysis suggests 700 birr meets immediate needs.
- The set up of the Dolo Addo office and the positive working relationships between affiliates needs to be captured for future learning to assist OI responses.
- OGB ensures stronger, continuous leadership of the HCT.
- OGB reviews its Catfund underwriting process for other affiliates in order to ensure faster decision-making in the future. Integral to this, other affiliates should also review their partner contracting processes in order to ensure that OGB underwriting, once in place, can enable partners to rapidly scale up.

Benchmark 6: The program has considered the longer term implications and has taken connectedness into consideration

- WASH response for drought affected communities need to be appropriately analysed and linked to long term development programmes and Disaster Risk Management initiatives.
- Long term implication of interventions need to be analysed appropriately (Water trucking operation vis-à-vis coping mechanism of the beneficiary community, capacity and responsibility of Regional/Zonal/Woreda Water bureaus)
- Scenario planning to build in a phased transition phase that heavily involves the development team from the beginning of the recovery phase.
- Create an OI Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) post to strengthen food security analysis, advocacy, policy and linkages with the development pastoral programme. This person would be part of the humanitarian team, provide timely advice to the HCT, be strongly linked to the development pastoral program reflected in the JCAS and play a key role in contingency planning, proposal development, and technical support to partners.
- A system needs to be set up to ensure appropriate handover is undertaken by out going staff.
- Work on a strategy to support partners in the recovery phase and following periods.

- Staff sensitisation for all Ethiopia OI staff on the dual OI mandate, the humanitarian dossier and expectations of all staff during a scale up. As mentioned earlier this would be effective if done through ERT.

Note: It is also worth noting that the October 2008 drought RTE made a number of key recommendations, and the following recommendations are still valid in October 2011:

- Review current activity plans in relation to the external environment and internal logistical constraints to ensure that activities will be implemented at the right time to have impact.
- Focus on improving livelihoods analysis in-country via the EHT.
- Develop plans for recovery interventions and/or exit for the current drought response programs.
- Review community feedback mechanisms (OGB and IO)
- Set up a mechanism to share technical resources among affiliates and their partners (esp. WASH and livelihoods).
- Ensure that the recently revised Contingency Plan is sufficiently action-oriented.
- Develop a strategy for longer-term multi-year preparedness and response

Findings against benchmarks

Speed and Timeliness

Benchmark 1: The speed and timeliness of the response will be good relative to other actors, with consideration of emergency preparedness measures in place

The majority of those interviewed felt that Oxfam affiliates in Ethiopia were late to respond to the current drought. That said once the decision to respond was made the affiliates in some areas mobilised quickly and were able to reach affected communities in a short space of time. Relative to other actors Oxfam was on a par, or later than, many agencies, that were also late to respond, and late to recognise the severity of the drought. The delay by the government in recognising the crisis also impeded the international community's reaction to the drought. Many of those interviewed felt that defining response timeliness in a slow onset emergency is extremely difficult and that the concept itself should be revisited. The perception of many interviewed is that Oxfam International (OI) in Ethiopia could have responded earlier as the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) had collected information from various Early Warning Systems (EWS) in April-May that revealed the gravity of the drought.

Activities launched in early 2011 by some affiliates (see timetable appendix 1) were deemed to be sufficient and were standard activities that Oxfam undertakes in chronically food insecure countries. The categorisation of the emergency was done late (July 7th 2011) and followed the mass media alert about the huge crisis in the whole Horn of Africa region. Oxfam's slow response to the drought was questioned by some stakeholders given that in May 2011 the HCT had already assessed the situation to be a potential Cat 2 emergency and that some Humanitarian Consortium Governance Group (HCGG) members were, informally, made aware of it. Some of those interviewed felt that the official communication channels were not being properly used as the information was not scaled up from HCT to HCGG. Issues around this lie with both the HCT and the HCGG. Many of the interviewees believe that, if Oxfam had reacted earlier in the first quarter of the year the drought impact in the affected communities could have been lessened.

If the categorisation of the emergency in July activated the Oxfam rapid response mechanisms the necessary adaptation and/or development of the OI response governance outline, country strategies and ways of working discussions definitely slowed down the response.

There were number of assessments carried out by different affiliates – and there was combined inter affiliate assessment in Guji / Borena. The assessments were mostly based on secondary data with little primary data or triangulation of findings. This resulted in a poor level of analysis and understanding upon which to design programmes and link humanitarian to development programme and policy. It was felt that the development/program team need to have the capacity to assess and analysis the recurring drought situation in Ethiopia and know when to scale up. This would be the basis for scenario planning and development of appropriate emergency response preparedness.

Program Specific

Dollo Addo: Somali refugee influx

The response to the Somali refugees influx in Hiloween Camp at Dollo Addo started after the decision to undertake a quick assessment was made and the assessment findings indicated the need to respond. The decision made was quick and the response was swift and highly appreciated by beneficiaries, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA). The response to Hiloween refugee camp can be considered as quick and timely. However some of the team felt they could have been deployed earlier – as they spent some time in Addis Ababa; their earlier engagement could have helped to influence the decision to set up a camp at Hiloween by UNHCR and ARRA.

Following a quick assessment and the decision to get involved in supporting the refugee community at Hiloween camp, an aeroplane loaded with WASH equipment was sent immediately to Addis Ababa from UK which was then transported to Dollo Addo by trucks. This was a very important factor for Oxfam Great Britain's (OGB's) swift response to provide drinking water and sanitation facilities for the refugees in the camp. This was greatly appreciated by staff on the ground. Coordination and support received from UNHCR on the release of the WASH equipment from customs was excellent.

Dollo Addo: Response for drought affected community: there is mixed feeling about the timeliness of the response and the severity/intensity of the drought itself. The drought has been ongoing for three consecutive years starting in 2009 and by some these years of drought is perceived as a continuation of the same with more severity. The view of the staff on ground, is that the response to the drought affected communities in Dollo Addo area needs long term programming to strengthen the coping mechanism of the affected communities. That said the water trucking operation is appreciated by the communities and the local authorities have been providing the list of villages that they want water to be trucked to. The coordinated approach of OGB and Oxfam Intermon (OES) to address the water shortage problem of the area by planning to undertake immediate water trucking followed by more long term water sources rehabilitation is highly appreciated and well planned.

Gorobaqaqsa

There were mixed responses from the team with regard to the timeliness of the response, some felt that as the drought was known about in June/July this would be the most appropriate time to respond. That said, most felt that as OES did not have a humanitarian program in the country they moved very quickly to respond once confirmation was given, considering time for assessments, program set-up, recruitment, formulating the strategy and proposals, the project was up and running very quickly. It was noted that the project started very quickly after the exploration report. Beneficiaries interviewed also felt that the intervention was timely as has stopped them from relocating to other water sources. There was concern that the intervention moved a little too quickly and overtook logistical needs around setting up the office. There was also concern by some interviewed that the intervention was based on a verbal agreement with the government and not on a written agreement which is causing problems now with regard to the government adhering to what they agreed on.

Borena:

The general belief (from beneficiaries, regional government officials and affiliates) is that the response should have started between January and April 2011 before the failed long rains of March-April 2011. Some partners in Borena Region; Gayo Pastoralist Development Initiative (GPDI) and Action For Development AFD) felt that the response should have ideally started after the failed rains of September 2010, informed by the EWS from GPDI. In addition, the government announced the state of emergency (Humanitarian Requirements) in April 2011.

SOS Sahel, an Oxfam Canada (OCA) partner in Borena started an initial response in November 2010 using their own funds. Oxfam America (OUS) and OCA through GPDI and AFD respectively, started livestock support and cash for work in March. However these were perceived at the time to be a scale up of DRR activities; for example more Cash For Work (CFW) rather than destocking which would have been better suited to the humanitarian needs. Generally partners stated that they received funds late and they felt that this has resulted in a majority of programs starting late (see timetable appendix 1: water trucking mid August and CFW early Sept 2011)⁴.

People interviewed felt that there was a cascade of delays starting with the decision to scale up then with program design, office set up and implementation start-up. Substantive scale up started in late July 2011 with water trucking and cash for work (CfW) after the Cat 1 categorisation (on July 7th) and following several months of HCT discussions regarding response. A number of people identified that there wasn't a sense of emergency, but that it felt like 'business as usual'.

Shinille Region

OGB as part of its ongoing pastoralist programme developed the Shinille emergency response proposal in early 2011 which did not get funding until April 2011. Because the proposal was not funded the water trucking needed earlier was not possible, on the other hand when water trucking to water stressed areas of Jijiga and Harshin was undertaken.

Preparedness

A recurring issue with many response not only in Ethiopia, was that the contingency plan was not widely used with many of those interviewed not knowing of its existence. Those who did know of it felt it was out of date and not relevant. There had been a revision of the 2008 contingency plan in 2010. Some senior management people acknowledged that long term planning has never been a high

⁴ Some OUS funded CFW started in March 2011, and some OC water trucking started in Nov 2010 and more in Feb 2011.

priority of the CLT agenda. There was however a scenario plan developed in January and February 2011 and further updated in May and July but this did not take into consideration program support functions, management structures, security guidelines and Oxfam International ways of working.

Greater connectedness between the humanitarian and development teams may have allowed Oxfam to advocate for funding for preparedness activities such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) proposed grain price stabilisation in Oct- Dec 2010, which could have acted to reduce the sharp price rises in the southern zones in early 2011.

Recommendations:

- Develop a contingency /preparedness plan that covers management structure, staff, material requirements and all logistics support for the agreed scenarios. This should be done in a way that staff feel ownership over the plan and are familiar with it. This should be done before April 2012 ('go live date') and should incorporate learning from the past RTEs. Contingency planning should also have a clear geographical strategy.
- Strengthen assessment methodology which is the basis for clear and comprehensive proposal development. Where proposals are developed between affiliates there needs to be clear timeliness and donor policies to minimise delay and protect brand reputation.
- The development/program team need to have the capacity to assess and analysis the recurring drought situation in Ethiopia and know when to scale up. This would be the basis for scenario planning and development of appropriate emergency response preparedness through emergency response training (ERT). It is important for this to be part of the long term developmental program and for the development team to have emergency response capacity in the country and owned by all affiliates. Although it is recognised that this would be a process it will enhance a timely response to an emergency happening without relying fully on external support.
- The programme scenario planning, led by OGB and planned for November should be moved forward and be done as soon as possible to ensure a preparedness plan is in place and scale up if necessary is undertaken rapidly.
- Triggers for responding to food insecurity need to be standardised across the affiliates and incorporated into the contingency plan to clarify what level requires intervention. For example, linking using the GPD⁵ early warning system to inform the IPC⁵ tool with its established cut offs for Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis / Humanitarian emergency / Famine.
- Oxfam should continue its advocacy efforts in lobbying government on scaling up food aid.
- Strengthen HCT capacity to effectively identify humanitarian need (based on IPC standards), advocate with donors, be prepared to scale up quickly and inform the HCGG and Program Governance Group (PGG). This could be done through monthly reporting with increased reporting when emergencies arise. The PGG should also be engaged in tracking trends in the region and prioritise humanitarian concerns at their meetings.
- Link with OGB Humanitarian Department and regional office to ensure that there is support to scale up with appropriate staffing.

Appropriateness and Scale

Benchmark 2 Relief provided is of a quality and scale appropriate to the context that would be expected of Oxfam's capacity, and is valued by the affected population

Overall there were mixed feelings regarding the scale of the response with many feeling that considering Oxfam's global capacity the response could have been bigger and with others feeling that the scale was appropriate depending on certain programs and the current capacity to support the scale of the response. It was noted that in comparison to other agencies Oxfam's scale up from their regular program was very good.

For example the scale of the response in addressing the need of the Somali Refugees in Hiloween Camp was seen as very good as far as the refugee program is concerned. The WASH work in Hiloween camp is highly appreciated by the refugee community and other stake holders in the camp

⁵ Integrated Phase Classification is an established HECA wide tool used to facilitate decisions on EFSVL and WASH programming in slow onset contexts, with cut offs to determine when indicators have reached a humanitarian emergency.

such as ARRA, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc. In Gorobaqaqas it was generally felt that the scale of the response to the crisis was very good and also very appropriate, all the activities address the immediate needs of the community, and it was also felt that targeting has been appropriate.

Overall the WASH and Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods (EFS-VL) programming is seen as appropriate by staff and valued by beneficiaries although there are some specific issues with these approaches.

WASH

In general the WASH response for drought affected communities by all of the affiliates consists of the provision of water for human drinking and for livestock; through water trucking and the rehabilitation of existing water sources. Also by addressing the sanitation needs of the communities through appropriate hygiene promotion work and the provision and promotion of sanitation facilities specific to the areas of intervention.

Borena and Guji : Three affiliates; OGB, OCA, and OUS are currently responding in five of the ten waradas identified by the government as the most drought affected, in the Borena zone of Oromiya Region. They are Dire, Das delo Moyale and Miyo waradas. WASH activities in Borena and Guji include Water trucking, rehabilitation and construction of water points, and water quality analysis. The PHP component of the intervention includes distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs), community training and mobilisation for the targeted population.

Despite the logistic constraints (a vast geographical area with very spread out woredas) and the initial difficulties in finding sufficient cistern trucks, the water and sanitation interventions (mainly water rationing) in Borena are appropriate. Some initial overlaps were identified mainly due to inconsistent information sharing and irregular coordination between partners and OGB, but water rationing gaps are currently been covered by OGB in Oxfam areas. Some activities, such as rehabilitation of motorised schemes (by OGB) have not yet started which is a matter of concern with regard to the late September rains as it will be difficult to access to some woredas/works and potentially the work may not be finalised in time). According to the Borena Zonal Water Head the water needs of the communities are satisfied in the five most affected woredas. That said if the October rains fail the demand will highly increase and Oxfam, as the team said, is not prepared for an additional scale up in the region. In general people receive around 2.5 to 5.5 l/p/day for human consumption. GPDI (OUS Partner) interventions have integrated WASH and Cash for Work activities that have contributed to a higher impact on beneficiary needs. However a site visit to an AFD programme (OCA partner) revealed the limited impact of water trucking activities on the beneficiaries since they were not, and there was no plan for them to receive livelihood support. Associated hygiene activities, water committees are of a high quality and perform well. Some early issues with water truckers have been rectified by strengthening systems and record management.

There have been reported outbreaks of measles and a small number of cases of Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD), which will require close monitoring.

Dollo Addo and Hiloween Camp

OGB is responding in Hiloween camp. The WASH response for the Somali Refugees in the camp consists of the provision water supply and sanitation facilities and hygiene promotion activities. Host communities in the area surrounding Hiloween camp are also covered by the WASH intervention This has been appreciated by the host communities who have been in consultation with Oxfam.

WATER: Currently there are four refugee camps in Dollo Addo (Bokol Mayo, Melkadida, Kobe and Hiloween) OGB is responding only in Hiloween camp where the refugee population is about 18,000 refugees. UNHCR have a plan to bring more refugees to the camp to raise it to 40,000. Water to the camp is supplied from water treatment plant at Genale River 2.5 kms from the camp. The treatment plant set up comprises of three T45 Tanks and two 15m³ bladders that are filled from five jet wells drilled by MSF Holland on the edge of the river. Chlorinated water from the storage tanks is transported to the camp by water trucks, unloaded into T70 water storage tanks from which it is distributed at the tap stands. The refugees are receiving up to 16 l/p/d (information from UNHCR). The OGB team are currently working to lay pipe line from the water treatment plant to the camp to bring water into the camp by pumping in order to overcome the expensive process of trucking water to the

camp. (The Team are also considering the possibility of drilling one major borehole and install submersible pump) The set up implemented in such a short time is highly appreciated.

Sanitation & Hygiene Promotion (HP): Oxfam is constructing communal and family trench latrines on the basis of 50 persons per latrine (eventually this will be raised to SPHERE standard of 20 persons per latrine) The work is still in progress. The team have prepared stand frames and jerry cans with taps to provide hand washing facilities at all family and communal latrines.

HP activities currently being undertaken in Hiloween camp consist of:

- Organising WASH committees
- Training of WASH committees
- Promotional activities with children in the camp
- Hygiene promotion sensitisation sessions in Transit camps

The air freighted WASH equipment includes basic hygiene kits. UNHCR and ARRA who are the responsible agencies for the distribution of NFIs for the refugees have asked OGB not to undertake a similar distribution. The PH team will have to find out how and where they will be able to make use of the NFIs in the ware-house. The possibility of using the NFIs for activities with the drought affected communities in the area should be considered. As mentioned above the equipment flown in was very useful and timely.

Hiloween camp is in an area where the soil formation is very rocky. Digging trenches for latrines or the laying of pipes is proving very difficult. It is impossible to dig more than 30cm into the ground. Family latrines are constructed as raised latrines using sand bags, while communal latrines are being constructed in trenches dug using a UNHCR provided trench excavator. The trench excavator has a very wide bucket and while solving the excavation problem, the size of the trench is creating complications in using the standard Oxfam plastic slab. This has required timber planks, wooden poles, wire mesh, and concrete work in order to support the slab. This has also slowed down construction of the communal trench latrines and thus making it difficult to complete the number of latrines required for the refugees in time. The UNHCR excavator has a current mechanical problem, and UNICEF is in the process of bringing another excavator, it is hoped that this will have the right size bucket which will ease and facilitate the communal latrine construction.

Buramino (5th Refugee camp): UNHCR and ARRA are currently planning to open a 5th refugee camp at Buramino, which will accommodate up to 40,000 refugees, OGB is preparing to provide WASH support in this new camp.

Health Risks

Main health problems in the refugee camps were (i) outbreak of measles in Kobi camp (ii) high malnutrition level. UNICEF lead measles vaccination campaign was carried out successfully in the camps and the surrounding communities. The PHP team are closely following the situation and developing preventive mechanisms for any outbreak of AWD.

The PH team working in the camp will have to start working on solid waste disposal and drainage issues, before it becomes a major problem. Sensitising the refugee community about solid waste and providing solid waste disposal pits is immediately needed. The soil formation where the camp is sited is silty and rocky. The silt has poor permeability capacity, making drainage a big problem and the rocky formation is proving difficult for the construction of latrines.

Dollo Addo drought affected community:

Those interviewed felt that Oxfam's work with the host communities was appropriate, especially as Oxfam was taking a lot of care in identifying communities whose coping mechanisms were at a higher level of deterioration than other communities and that Oxfam was not blanket targeting. As mentioned above a coordinated plan by OGB and OES to address the need of the drought affected population in 9 Kebeles of Dollo Addo area (Liben zone) is currently being started. OGB will initially help in undertaking water trucking operation with hygiene promotion activities as required and OES will respond on the long term public health and food security needs of those kebeles such as livestock activities with their partner, Pastoralist Concern (PCA). Currently both OES and OGB are undertaking detailed assessment and planning for the response, and the first water trucking operation for Adad one of the kebeles started on 9th of September 2011.

Shinille Zone

In Shinille zone OGB is responding to the WASH needs of communities in six Woredas (Shinille, Ayisha, Dembel, Meisso, Error and Afdem). Detailed assessments in each Woereda have been carried out and the analysis of the assessment is in progress. While undertaking the assessment the team has been undertaking rehabilitation of existing water sources, monitoring of AWD situation in the area and planning to undertake water trucking operations.

The PHP team in consultation with the PHE and EFSL team are planning to address the sanitation situation of the pastoralist community through appropriate Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST) and Community Lead Total Sanitation (CLTS) approach by looking at a sanitation ladder and are in the process of designing Nutrition tailored hygiene promotion activities.

Drought and AWD related emergencies in Shinille zone has been a recurring issue in the past, as drought is a cyclical chronic problem in the area.

- It would be advisable that the team address the sustainability issue in the design of the WASH response, and not only propose the rehabilitation of previously OGB implemented water sources and undertaking water trucking activities.
- A response which helps increase the coping mechanism of the pastoralist community that includes environmental resource management should be considered in close collaboration with the long term pastoralist program team.

Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods (EFS-VL)

Background: The productive safety net programme (PSNP) has provided food aid and sporadic CFW to vulnerable households (approximately 10-12% of the community) for 7 out of 9 months this year. They receive 15 kg / p / month which provide 1316 kcal⁶, however it is normal practice for households to share this with 2-3 other households reducing the intake to 438 kcal / p / day⁷. The CFW provides 350 birr/HH/Month and supports government works programs. This is insufficient to meet immediate nutritional and energy needs. In addition to PSNP, the government delivers food aid (between 12-15 kg of wheat and 0.5 L oil), to a further proportion of the community (around 52%). However these distributions are irregular and beneficiary numbers are difficult to ascertain.

For an average household of five people in Borena, it costs around 525 birr to purchase enough cereal for one month, as one tin (approx one kg) of maize costs 7 -8 birr. Food prices have risen sharply in the last year. In Sept 2010 1 kg of maize was 2.5 birr and it is now 7-8 birr, a rise of 300% and sugar has risen by 75%. High food prices in the markets have reduced demand and traders are no longer bringing so much stock to the more remote woredas. This reduced supply has acted to further increase the food prices.

In addition, geographical access is poor for more remote kebeles, with some households walking up to 150 km, or two days to market. Following the loss of 70% of the livestock due to lack of grazing and water supplies, households can no longer rely on a supply of milk in the diet, and currently households are existing on maize, wheat and sugar in tea. The very poorest households are eating no more than once per day. People are coping by selling charcoal, or wood, daily labour in nearby towns and the men are migrating to local towns, Addis Ababa or Kenya for work.

In such a context, the optimal response would be a combination of food assistance, cash grants and trader support. However, inadequate knowledge of this zone, and requirement for a government licence to distribute food and a belief from the government that cash grants increase 'dependency' led to a proposal for CFW, with grants to less able bodied members of the community in Borena and Shinille. The OI markets assessment in August, and other technical support in Shinille have strongly recommended support to traders from the highlands to facilitate food availability at woreda level as well as support to small cooperatives and womens saving groups are woreda and kebele level.

CFW is not an ideal response when households have reached this level of acute food and livelihood insecurity / humanitarian emergency as there is a risk that we are further increasing their workload

⁶ 63% energy, 72% protein and 38% fat requirements

⁷ 21% energy, 24% protein, 13% fat requirements

and coping mechanisms, In this context it is important that CFW is interpreted creatively to minimize the burden on households and maximize income.

There was an assumption that the pastoralist team would manage to provide analysis and data for the scale up. However, they are not thought to have the technical capacity in immediate needs analysis and they report being minimally involved in the scale up process.

Although there was an OGB EFSL person in country from April, it took until the last week of June to move them from the pastoralist team to the humanitarian team to support analysis, assessment, and proposal development. This was too late for some of these activities which had already started and quality of technical input was compromised. However, since this time this post has played a significant role in contributing to the program response, but has been hampered from developing ongoing needs analysis by a need to gap fill EFSVL posts.

Assessment and program design

The OI scenario planning that took place in April 2011 did not include the development staff from the pastoralist team which has had implications for connectedness of the program and reduced the sense of development team ownership within the humanitarian and development mandate of Oxfam.

The Borena OI needs assessment (July 2011) was a good example of inter-affiliate and integrated team (EFSVL and WASH) assessment. However, as a basis for program design it was insufficiently robust and some felt that this resulted in gaps in the initial program design.

Our federal level input into the Agriculture task force has been limited across the affiliates, impacting on our reputation for EFSVL work, understanding of the context and limiting our opportunities to influence the government approach to scaling up (eg CFW rates and terms and conditions).

The CFW initiatives varies massively between affiliates; from 22 birr / cubic meter dug / day to 700 birr / household / month. Mostly the interventions are similar to the government development CFW with a strong emphasis on the public work, and little or no grant provision. OUS (through GPDI) and OGB are trying to change this by negotiating with warada level government to increase rates to 700 birr / HH, reduce the workload, increase the grant provision to 30% of beneficiaries, increase the number of female headed households, target based on vulnerability rather than government directive, and pay households in advance. A cash working group will help to facilitate this in Borena and Shinile.

As food prices are so high, cash provision is not enough to ensure immediate needs are met. Following the markets assessment in Borena there is a plan to provide grants to traders from the highlands to increase the flow of food to the warada level. However, this intervention is only planned by OGB, and the late support for this activity may mean that it does not occur in conjunction with the first round of the CFW, risking further market inflation. It was felt by technical people interviewed to be a significant gap in program planning and implementation.

Targeted Beneficiary population:

Targeting is an area of concern to a number of interviewees, as there is no systematic approach between affiliates. OGB believes that that 35-38% of the beneficiaries are receiving PSNP or Gov food aid +/- government CFW and that there is a gap of 10-12% of the community who fall into the poor and very poor (Household Economy Analysis baseline for Ethiopia). This is the group that are being targeted by OGB, which is justifiable, but care needs to be taken not to disregard PSNP / Gov beneficiaries as sharing means that their needs are not fully met.

Action for Development is targeting non- PSNP beneficiaries as dictated by the Government, and upon meeting some of their CFW beneficiaries it was clear that they were not the most vulnerable members of the community. They planned to spend the money on school fees and debt rather than food as was the case with all of the communities met with GPDI and OGB. An OI technical working group at Addis Ababa level and cash technical working groups in the field would help to streamline approaches and understanding of vulnerability, as well as considerably strengthening our leverage with the Government.

The intervention is targeting the communities that are highly affected by the drought, and where the water sources have dried up, and the community have to leave their villages for search of water for

themselves and their livestock. There is a need for clarity as to the number of targeted beneficiaries. While the overall plan is to meet the needs of 1.5 million drought affected beneficiaries, the actual number of beneficiaries that OI is currently meeting their needs is not yet clear.

During the day of reflection not everybody seemed to be aware of the number of beneficiaries Oxfam is targeting in Ethiopia. Some people were mentioning 800,000 and others 1.3 million or 1.5 million. Two months after the categorisation of the emergency Oxfam has reached approximately 151,000 beneficiaries, which many considered low. Reasons for this are related to context volatility (Liben and Afder), a high degree of population movement, lack of coordination and sharing of information from different actors, including within Oxfam, logistic challenges (very spread communities), and unreliable information from the rapid assessments.

Accountability and monitoring

Oxfam in Ethiopia have an agreed OI MEAL strategy in place that was developed in August 2011. Most staff interviewed was clear about this and also had a good understanding of appropriate feedback mechanisms for beneficiaries providing examples of how this was being undertaken. Focus Group Discussions with communities on several occasions have however revealed that there was some confusion about how beneficiaries could feedback to Oxfam. Feedback it was reliant on beneficiaries communicating through the various committees set up in the communities which lack confidentiality. In Borena and Dolo Ado it is felt that the lack of sufficient vehicles represent a real challenge for proper field activities monitoring and follow-up.

Impact

As programs are at an early stage of their implementation it is very difficult to measure impact in the mid and long term. However, information gathered from the FGDs confirm that the water trucking activities has contributed to saving lives and that the CFW activities are helping beneficiary communities to access basic needs in the markets. Destocking programming in February and March would have resulted in a significant reduction in the loss of productive assets, and a particular effort to reduce further losses if the rains are late will be needed in all program areas.

Gender

Overall the affiliates recognised the importance of gender in their programs and were making efforts to, as one interviewee put it, 'have women at the centre of their program.' All of the affiliates were trying to have an equal gender balance with regard to employment of staff across the program although this was proving difficult in relation to the labour laws and the acceptability of women from the lowlands or pastoral communities working away from home. It was felt that there may need to be an adapted HR policy to ensure women of lower educational attainment can apply for jobs in Oxfam. Although there was recognition that this would bring other program quality challenges. Many affiliates had women interpreters which was great to see considering the difficulties of finding female English speakers in the community.

Oxfam was also showing some innovative gender programming; especially with what was being planned in regard to supporting women's committees, selling subsidized food in the Shinile region. Oxfam was still grappling with the issues of gender based violence (GBV) in regard to refugees in Dollo Ado but had linked up with the International Medical Corp (IMC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) who both have dedicated GBV leads. The arrival of an OI Gender Advisor (OCA) was seen as a very positive step by the affiliates to link the gender work across the OI program. There was a feeling that a more robust gender and protection analysis was needed to ensure risks are minimised for women and girls.

Recommendations:

- It is important to have clarity on targeted beneficiary numbers. Analysis of assessment findings need to clarify the number of beneficiaries as well as kebeles / woredas targeted.
- OI coordination to ensure that WASH or EFSVL coverage by affiliates or partners is complemented (geographically and programmatically) to ensure gaps are covered i.e. where there is WASH coverage, EFSVL needs should also be met where possible.
- Establish regular technical meetings between affiliates and partners on EFSL and PH to ensure technical standards are met eg water trucking and CFW in order to optimize coordination, information sharing, analysis and consistency between approaches.

- Food aid and Cash grants would be preferable in the current context in Borena, but the Government will not allow this, and so the CFW should be as creative as possible across affiliates and partners. For example light work or training close to home, payment in advance, no more than 10 days work per month, around 30% of the most vulnerable beneficiaries should receive a cash grant and approximately 50% of the beneficiaries should be women.
- HCT should ensure an up to date analysis of all partner's capacity to scale up in order to allow operational planning and response through partners or through direct implementation.
- Assess protection risks faced by the community in Borena and adapt program responses if needed.
- OGB (and where possible other affiliates) markets support work to traders and petty traders should start as soon as possible to ensure that there is sufficient maize to purchase with the money earned through CfW.
- Accountability mechanisms to beneficiaries need to be standardized across the affiliates, and a complaints mechanism for individuals needs to be created.
- Agree on the pastoralist and development teams role in humanitarian scale up to ensure a one program approach, where they are integral to contingency planning, and have the capacity to analyze and input into the humanitarian scale up and play a key role in the transition to development programming.

Management Structure

Benchmark 3 An effective management structure is in place that provides clarity and well-communicated decision-making and direction (including partners) and is appropriately accountable to affected populations

Management

Overall across the affiliates most felt that their current management structures were working and had settled into effective operating systems; most felt that project managers and team leaders were supportive although under resourced. It was felt by everyone that the OGB Country Director (CD) and Associate Programme Director (APD) were supportive and accessible to all team members.

For the Shinile program, OGB deployed an external person who put together a management structure that linked the existing pastoralist team with the new drought response team. Although this has been of mixed success, nearly all of the program staff in Shinile we interviewed were very pleased with the way they had been working in the response, they felt very connected to what was going on, enjoyed working with the international staff, and felt that they were well informed. That said some of the humanitarian staff felt the structure delayed decision making and hampered program quality.

Although successful in Shinile, in other parts of the country it was mentioned several times in interviews that there is tension between the humanitarian and development teams. Both national and international staff identified that there is a feeling of 'them and us'. This includes lack of cooperation, poor information sharing, blocking financial sign off of agreements, high transaction costs, and the loss of key documents where there are disagreements in Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). It was generally felt that SOPs were not being interpreted to facilitate the emergency ways of working and this was having a significant impact on the speed of the response.

This is a recurring issue with regard to scaling up a humanitarian response and the addition of large numbers of international staff to the country. There needs to be very clear communication to Country office staff as to why there is a scale up of staff during an emergency. Are these people here to fill a gap, capacity build, or to replace staff in existing roles? The very nature of the scale up from development to an emergency response seemed to be unclear for many existing staff (this is also a recurring issue in responses internationally). Institutionalised emergency response training (ERT) annually would not only build the capacity of program staff to respond but also give staff an understanding of how things 'switch gear' during a response and why there is a need for surge capacity. The secondment of program staff to emergency roles is also an excellent idea that OGB has undertaken with some Addis Ababa based roles being deployed to Dollo Ado. The OGB CD took great care to ensure that development staff did not feel sidelined during the scale up, but it was felt that perhaps not enough attention was given to the need to adapt the development ways of working to support the humanitarian staff in their roles.

It was also mentioned that at the start of the response it was very unclear as to what the role or function of the regional lead was. This was clarified by the HCGG and it was felt that both the HCGG and the Oxfam International Secretariat played a valuable role in giving the CLT a steer and in sorting out some of the confusion. The contribution of the SMS change manager was also seen as very positive. The region put a high level of demands on the country teams and some felt that they were supporting the regional office at a time when team country teams were overwhelmed instead of the regional office supporting the country team.

With regard to the OI office in Borena the management structure organogram was relatively clear early on but a delay in defining the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the managers' positions and roles and responsibilities in the office has caused some confusion amongst the affiliates. The organogram had not been signed off by the time of this evaluation and positions are either unfilled or unclear despite repeated discussion at HCT. In addition, at the time of this RTE, the structure and set-up of the OI office in Borena was not yet signed off; after nearly two months since the decision of creating it was taken, leading to frustrations and a continuous lack of clarity on ways of working and coordination among affiliates and partners.

Across the affiliates some field offices had regular team and general staff meetings; these were appreciated by the staff, who felt they had a clear idea of what was going on. Unfortunately this has not been institutionalised and there are some gaps at field office level. While everyone can't and should not be expected to know everything, there should be consistent communication for staff members to know the program and what each other are doing. Weekly meetings such as in Shinile work well as does a large organogram with positions names and photos of staff in a staff meeting area.

There was also a request across the affiliates that the management (on all levels i.e. Senior and field office) travel to the field and see the programs and context in which the staff are working. The OGB CD's visit to Dollo Ado during the evaluation was seen as very positive. It not only boosts moral but also allows staff to have face to face discussions with management and helps them gain a contextual knowledge of where Oxfam is operating.

Decision making

Many of those interviewed felt that within their own affiliates there is a bit of top down reporting with staff at a field level being informed (not consulted) about decisions being made at an Addis Ababa level. This was not symptomatic of one affiliate but more across the board and has led to many in the field feeling that the country offices did not take into account information and issues sent from the field offices.

There is shared feeling that decision making is slow. For example the decision to withdraw from Guji was taken the second week of September, after a team was assigned there since early August to prepare for a potential response. This consequently absorbed resources that could have been used in areas of urgent need such as Borena.

The CLT and HCT terms of reference were agreed in July, but there is still some practical confusion on which specific decisions are the responsibility of each of the two bodies. This is perceived to be an issue related to the implementation of the humanitarian roles and responsibilities under SMS. This issue has now been referred to the regional office and HCGG for support.

During critical periods leading up to the response (July/August) leading members of the CLT were simultaneously on leave, which affected the decision making process of the CLT. Affiliates in country should aim to coordinate leave and absences in country in order for there to be a body of decision makers, clear delegation of responsibilities should also be made before leaving the country.

Recommendations:

- Provide necessary support to managers and technical team leaders so that they will have enough time to undertake field visits and program support including representation. Program manager should be able to feel comfortable delegating support roles to appropriate people.
- Coordination and Team management of specific technical teams should be strengthened by undertaking frequent team meetings and planning together, between affiliates.

- HCT and CLT to undertake timely decision making in relation to humanitarian program needs that is clearly communicated to the field level.
- CLT representatives need to be committed to ensuring the mandate is respected and that they take no longer than 1 week to resolve an issue before it is sent up to HCGG, or HCT are empowered to resolve it. OGB in its leadership role should ensure this.
- Accountability, communication and coordination lines need to be revised and clearly outlined in relation to the OI strategy.
- HCT to revise the Oromia IO strategy and come to a final agreement on the way forward by the end of September.
- OGB managers to address bottlenecks in HR, logistics, finance and security (also related to below benchmark)
- Review the finance and logistics procedures in terms of SOP's, financial accountability, and WOW, to include a rolling financial audit.
- Affiliate leads should coordinate leave to ensure minimum disruption to programme scale up and timely decision making.
- Institutionalise emergency response training (ERT) annually to build the capacity of development program staff to respond, but which also gives staff an understanding of how things 'switch gear' during a response and why there is a need for surge capacity.

Support functions

Benchmark 4: Key support functions are sufficiently resourced and being effectively run. Risks that are being taken are being calculated and documented

Support functions were generally felt to be under resourced, or hampered by over bureaucratic systems and procedures that lacked the flexibility needed in a Category 1 emergency response. There were also some cases identified where purposeful blocking from support functions teams, was slowing down the program response. Many of those interviewed also felt that there were issues around coordination between different support functions and programme teams.

Logistics

Many felt that systems and procedures in country are too centralised with everything coming from Addis Ababa. In the current emergency context this has caused procurement delays due to internal red tape and many of those interviewed in the field were frustrated by the lack of materials being sent from the capital. At field level it was felt that decision making capacity to respond was slow and did not reflect the urgency of requests. For example watsan hoses available in Addis took 6 weeks to reach Borena, and requests for cars were not fulfilled. The logistics team stated that they were not involved in the planning process which they believe hampered their ability to plan, but equally they did not have an effective procurement plan in place.

The OGB logistics team felt that the management structure lacked clarity, and effectiveness to address blocks. The support function organogram includes humanitarian and development staff together, and although there is commitment to this approach, it was felt that it was not functioning and delaying the procurement and vehicle management processes, therefore impacting on the programme quality, scale and timeliness.

It was mentioned on several occasions that they were significant issues with regard slow payment to suppliers (up to 6 months) which has heavily impacted mainly on OGB's ability to purchase goods (many suppliers now want 100% up-front payment from OGB). There are also internal blocks with the finance SOP which has delayed orders by 1.5 weeks due to internal requirements for additional documents resulting in particular orders needing to be escalated to a senior management level.

That said field logistics is working very well in difficult conditions with excellent working relationships, and offers of support between program and logistics staff across the affiliates.

Human Resources

Placing human resource (HR) personal in key positions has taken some time and many people felt that HR was under resourced in the early stages of the scale up, which has added extra work to other roles such as program managers. Contracts for new field staff have taken up to three weeks to arrive in program offices, affecting the programme capacity to respond. The idea of having a roving HR

deployment was well founded, and this position has been greatly appreciated but the role could not cover all of the field offices at once which was needed in the early phase of the response. There was a perception from the staff in the Borena office that it was not prioritised compared to Dolo Addo and Shinile. The delay in filling key roles such as EFSVL staff has slowed program implementation.

Across the affiliates many staff both national and international was unclear about their entitlements, pay packages, and leave. There seems to be some efforts to harmonise employee benefits but this process has taken time and frustrated many of the staff. This needs to be resolved quickly and clearly articulated to staff, as it is affecting moral in the field.

Staff with all of the affiliates had very different experiences with regard to inductions, orientation and clarity around what their roles and responsibilities would be. Some were very pleased with the support they received and others were the opposite. All of the affiliates need to look at standardising their inductions within their own affiliates and sharing information for areas where more than one affiliate is working.

As mentioned below government regulation with regard to employment of local staff has hampered Oxfam's efforts to fill key positions. All of the affiliates have been working very hard to resolve this issue with the government and following the day of reflection there are plans for affiliates to share experiences and work together on this. Ethiopia's short term visa's requirements for international staff has also had an effect on the program with a high turnaround of international staff having to come in and out of the country renewing visa's, or finding replacement staff.

The effectiveness of new humanitarian staff was hampered by the lack of readily available key programme documents including organogram's, country analysis, strategies, etc. It was felt that clear induction plans could help to ensure that resources, knowledge and skills available in the team could be openly shared. In addition it was felt that some HSP's did not handover properly resulting in delays in meeting programme needs.

Finance

Finance is generally perceived to be operating well, however there was concern raised about the length of time it took to get contracts signed off and the fact that the systems in place were overly bureaucratic therefore slowing down procurement and purchase of materials. The arrival of finance staff to the field offices has reduced to work load of project managers and some systems are progressively improving. As with HR, identifying and placing finance staff in field roles, early in the response will be an important step for future responses. A number of people felt that it was a risk not to replace the humanitarian finance manager in early October when his visa expires, and that that should be a case made for replacing him with a person of similar experience.

Funding

Funding mechanisms are working well across the affiliates with good communication between the country and region. The affiliates in Ethiopia also have a weekly funding meeting in Addis Ababa where each affiliates funding opportunities are put on the table and discussed amongst the group. The funding teams in Ethiopia have taken on a very mature approach. That said all affiliates identified that there was confusion in the underwriting using the CATFUND and that the 'goalposts' for access to the CATFUND underwrite, for all affiliates changed several times, and the decision making process was unclear. This undermined the trust between affiliates and caused time delays. Much of the funding Oxfam was seeking from other sources came in before the OGB underwrite was approved.

Security and Safety

Nearly everyone interviewed from all of the affiliates stated that security and safety was one of their highest areas of concern with the key risks being communications, vehicle safety, road traffic accidents and medical evacuation. The difficulties around vehicle purchasing has meant that Oxfam has had to rely on rented vehicles, the sheer number of vehicles needed and the demand from other NGOs has meant that vehicle quality is inconsistent. There seemed to be confusion around whether it was the hire car or Oxfam's responsibility to provided safety items in the vehicles such as seat belts spades, water and medical kits. Oxfam has made a great deal of effort to try and hire reliable vehicles and induct the drivers to Oxfam procedures and the vehicles are now getting the necessary items in them. For future planning it would be recommended to establish contracts with vehicle hire companies to ensure quality vehicles with equipment to be accessed when a scale up is needed. Visibility

materials were also inconsistent across the affiliates this was also cited as a security issue. Magnetic signs for the vehicles would be recommended.

At the beginning of the response an agreed OI security plan was not yet in place to reflect the current context. However a recent security risk analysis was carried out and the plan is to have this applied the end of September, when the security HSP returns. Staff in Dollo Ado and Gorobaqaqas felt that the security assessment was too short and did not encompass all of the risks, and there has not yet been an analysis for Shinile or Jigiga.

That said the OGB country director has now identified evacuation services, and working with the other affiliates is putting together a linked security plan. Medical kits have been purchased and were being rolled out to the field offices during the evaluation and some staff had noted that the OGB CD had 'taken ownership' of the security issue and was working very hard to ensure appropriate security standards. Now would be an excellent time for the affiliates to work on a joint security plan following the SMS guidelines, which will need to be implemented anyway when the country 'goes live' next year.

Recommendations

- Oxfam in Ethiopia should initiate the SMS procedures around security and have one security plan for all the affiliates, this will have to be in place once Ethiopia 'goes live' with SMS next year but it would be useful to be undertaken now.
- Visibility materials need to be purchased for vehicles.
- Identifying reputable vehicle hire companies as part of preparedness planning that can be utilised during an emergency
- Rectify management support issues by providing the necessary HR, and Financial support to programmes (e.g Shinile).
- Devise joint affiliate advocacy strategy around the recruitment issues with of local skilled technical staff for the implementation of activities in Dollo Addo and Shinile.
- Scenario planning should include a clear plan of action for logistics, HR, and finance scale up, and be supported by a broader HCGG discussion on standardised scale up needs..
- Support functions learning from the current response needs to be fed into contingency planning. For example, discussions with banks around the transfer of cash will assist preparedness for the next crisis and will require ongoing finance team time to facilitate current CFW activities.
- Harmonised employee benefits need to be finalised quickly and clearly articulated to staff, as it is affecting moral in the field.
- All of the affiliates need to look at standardising their inductions within their own affiliates and sharing information for areas where more than one affiliate is working.
- For future response the OGB Operations Director should be an OI focal point on Government Relations, with their time prioritised to support initial set-up of field relations with the government.
- All affiliates should consider the need for an interim financial audit especially in field sites where there has been insufficient logistics and finance support e.g. Dolo Ado. OGB should consider a rolling financial audit

Coordination

Benchmark 5: Our internal Oxfam relationships are productive and well coordinated, under the leadership of the lead agency, and we are having a positive influence on other actors

Oxfam International

Since the regional Horn of Africa emergency was officially categorised in July 7th by the HCGG⁸ all affiliates in Ethiopia have shown a great commitment and constructive will to develop a joint drought response strategy, undertake joint assessments in the different locations, and coordinate planning processes and activities implementation.

OGB and OES have both emphasized during all interviews their excellent relationships and mutual support in the areas where they work. In Dolo Addo OES and OGB share the office and equipment

⁸ Note that a specific categorisation of the emergency in country was not done

such as vehicles. In Oromia Region the fact that OCA, OUS and OGB have agreed to set up an OI coordination office is a positive sign and shows already a strong engagement towards enhanced joint work in the spirit of SMS. Some people interviewed even consider that this open, sensitive and quite new working approach in the country is due to the Category 1 nature of the emergency that requires a close monitoring from the top governance/coordination level (HCGG and ED's). This is felt as a positive although not always manageable pressure on the teams to deliver quality programmes and increase impact. It is also considered as an excellent opportunity to test and implement SMS ways of working.

Although committed to OI and SMS, the challenges for CLT, HCT and OI affiliates are still substantial:

- Although a functional HCT has been in place for a long time, between September 2010 and April 2011 the OGB humanitarian manager position (expected chair) was vacant. An interim person was appointed to lead the HCT and although performing to the best of their ability, they did not have the experience necessary to provide strategic direction to the team especially in terms of proper and close monitoring of the drought situation. Although a permanent OGB Humanitarian Manager took over chair of the HCT in April 2011 some senior staff still found it difficult to know the composition of the HCT since affiliate staff outside the country had input into HCT decisions.
- HCT and CLT distinctive mandates were not clearly defined prior to the emergency. There was little understanding of the humanitarian dossier and of the roles and responsibilities of the HCT, its hierarchical/functional relationship with CLT and difference in mandate. Also there was a lack of clarity around escalating issues to the HCGG. Information regarding the potential Cat 2 emergency which was discussed in May was never formally communicated to the HCGG, which could have triggered an earlier reaction and response.
- In late July, the CLT and HCT TORs were agreed at country level. One of the key responsibilities of the CLT for this response is to ensure quick decision making and problem solving to guarantee quality and timely program implementation. However, a lack of consensus around the OI structure in Borena at the CLT level had still not been resolved at the time of this evaluation. All HCT members had agreed to an OI office in Borena with shared resources, this was blocked at the CLT level by OCA, due to contract management concerns, although they did support it at a HCT level. Some interviewees consider that members of the CLT appeared not to trust the analysis and decision making capacity of HCT in this regard and were very frustrated after the efforts they had made for what could still be an excellent example of joint collaboration. Staff interviewed in Borena felt that this definitely had an impact on the quality of the response and it has hindered the other affiliates taking up joint roles in the area. That said there is one OI role in the office.
- Previous to the crisis being categorised and in the early stages of the response the HCT did not feel greatly supported by the regional lead. In May and June the HCT produced several drought response documents (including an OGB drought strategy) that took six weeks to get approved by the OGB Regional Office. In July, once the emergency was categorised, the OGB staff felt that a lot of pressure was put on them at a time when the assessments were not yet finalised and there was still a lack of understanding of what was really needed to scale up. This situation was reversed however in mid August when the regional lead became far more supportive to the HCT.
- Information sharing in general has not been institutionalised within OI and there are still problems faced with, such things as sharing timely, relevant information on program implementation for the sitreps, and affiliates funding updates.

However, despite the above challenges, some very positive OI collaboration and initiatives have been identified and stressed by some interviewees:

- There has been excellent collaboration between OGB and OES in Dolo Addo in both programming together and sharing space and resources.
- The OI MEAL coordinator position was cited by a number of affiliates as a successful example of inter-affiliate and partner collaboration, especially the agreement and sign off of the OI MEAL strategy. OGB felt the OI MEAL coordinator position was key in facilitating its lead role whilst maintaining neutrality.
- The OI Borena needs assessment and markets assessments (July and August 2011) were felt to be a success by all involved and were cited as good examples of affiliate collaboration. Technical

teams, communications, and logistics across affiliates have been open to working together and informally sharing information.

- The OI PHP position in Borena (which is an OGB secondment) has been effective in building partner capacity for GPDI and SOS Sahel. It is not yet functional with AFD due to the absence of an MOU (although one was not needed for GPDI and SOS Sahel).
- Affiliates felt that the OI secretariat support (both the OI Humanitarian director and humanitarian officer) helped to facilitate the development of the OI strategy and provide clarity around the governance framework.

Government and NGO

Coordination with the government overall is quite good especially at a Woreda level with the main constraint being around employment laws that expect NGOs to employ locally. Although this is understandable from the view of supporting local employment it has hampered accessing the appropriate skills levels for positions needed and for Oxfam to get a good gender balance across the program. NGOs are expected to advertise locally first and if unsuccessful then move to the regional level and then to the national level, this has slowed down recruitment and delayed activity implementation.

In Dollo Ado the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) were very happy with how Oxfam had worked with them, which was a credit to the APD. There are some coordination issues with regard to the provision of information to government bureaus, this seems to be with regard to a high staff turnover in the bureaus and staff not passing information on to new employees. Oxfam feels that it is endlessly having the same conversations and providing the same information time and time again.

Coordination with UNHCR/ UNICEF and other INGOs at field level in Dollo Ado, Gigica and Borena is very good. There is good interagency collaboration. Coordination and task force meetings are regularly undertaken in Dollo Ado and in the five refugee camps. Oxfam is attending coordinator meetings in Dollo Ado and Hilawyne refugee camps.

Recommendations:

- Strengthen regular communication between affiliates and develop modalities in which information is shared periodically (Health risk information, regional weather information etc..)
- Communication with responsible Regional/Zonal/Woreda authorities need to be continuously undertaken so that authorities do not have the opportunity to complain 'we do not know what Oxfam is doing' and hinder programme implementation (e.g. Shinlle and Ayisha Woreda authorities).
- CLT and HCT need to be empowered and current mandates and TORs need to be clearly understood by all implementing affiliates and by all parties involved in decision making to avoid confusion, overlap of responsibilities and ensure accountability.
- It is suggested that a technical OI working group is set up with clear terms of reference to regularly share information from different affiliates EWS, make joint analysis of the humanitarian situation, develop joint assessments, decide on joint triggers for response and inform with technical evidence the HCT decision making processes.
- CLT to unblock situation around the structure and set-up of the OI support office in Borena.
- For CAT 1 & 2 emergencies senior humanitarian programme managers should have access to Emergency Management Network support from the Region and HD, and OI Secretariat coaching.
- Integral to the drought scenario planning exercise recommended, there needs to be a particular focus on affiliate / partner's capacity, coordination and roles and responsibilities.
- Ensure in future responses (i.e. to be included in the Contingency Plan) that OGB as the Humanitarian Lead coordinates by default until there is an OI structure in place (if appropriate), with support from HCT and CLT.
- Affiliates/partners need to share and coordinate information on what activities they are doing, where, and until when to ensure coherent delivery of the OI Oromia programme strategy.
- OI technical working groups for WASH and EFSL need to be established to enable technical standards to be uniformly applied and where appropriate to leverage influence with the

government e.g. current Gov strategy limits CFW to 350 birr, whereas affiliates analysis suggests 700 birr meets immediate needs.

- The set up of the Dolo Addo office and the positive working relationships between affiliates needs to be captured for future learning to assist OI responses.
- OGB ensures stronger, continuous leadership of the HCT.
- OGB reviews its Catfund underwriting process for other affiliates in order to ensure faster decision-making in the future. Integral to this, other affiliates should also review their partner contracting processes in order to ensure that OGB underwriting, once in place, can enable partners to rapidly scale up.

Connectedness to long term programs

Benchmark 6: The program has considered the longer term implications and has taken connectedness into consideration

There were very mixed responses as to how connected the drought response is to Oxfam's longer term development work and to how sustainable Oxfam's activities are. There was a general consensus especially amongst the national staff that Oxfam needs to connect this response to the longer term program.

OGB and OES are working very well together (as mentioned above) with drought affected communities in Dollo Addo and are closely assessing the needs of the community. OGB and OES have considered the longer term implications by planning to transition from water trucking in the short term to burka rehabilitation in the long term to support community resource management. Similarly OES is looking to work long term in Gorobaqaqsa by undertaking livelihood initiatives. That said the staff in Gorobaqaqas (and to a certain extent Dollo Addo) were concerned about the sustainability of water trucking and the need for a clear exit or transition strategy.

As with many large scale ups in a slow onset emergency, the development team feel that there is undue pressure to scale up and spend money, and that this is at the cost of the longer term program strategy. However, in Shinile the OGB approach of placing both humanitarian and development staff into the response organogram (managed by the pastoralist lead) was felt to be an effective approach by development staff, although there were some concerns regarding appropriate handover of programs once the response is scaled down and staff complete contracts.

A number of people felt that the development staff do not have any ownership or linkages to the humanitarian work. At an Addis Ababa level a staff meeting in June informed all of the staff about the impending scale up, and that all of the staff should be involved, but there is a feeling that greater humanitarian sensitisation and leadership could have improved the ways of working between the humanitarian and development teams.

There is little evidence of affiliates working together to link the short term humanitarian response with the longer term partner development programmes. For example it was felt that affiliates could learn from the partners around modalities of working with the government. This was discussed at the day of reflection and one of the first steps will be for Affiliates to share some of the work they have been undertaking with the Government.

Recommendations

- WASH response for drought affected communities need to be appropriately analysed and linked to long term development programmes and Disaster Risk Management interventions.
- Long term implication of interventions need to be analysed appropriately (Water trucking operation vis-à-vis coping mechanism of the beneficiary community, capacity and responsibility of Regional/Zonal/Woreda Water bureaus)
- Scenario planning to build in a phased transition phase that heavily involves the development team from the beginning of the recovery phase.
- Create an OI Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) post to strengthen food security analysis, advocacy, policy and linkages with the development pastoral programme. This person would be part of the humanitarian team, provide timely advice to the HCT, be strongly linked to the development pastoral programme, reflected in the JCAS and play a key role in contingency planning, proposal development, and technical support to partners.
- A system needs to be set up to ensure appropriate handover is undertaken by out going staff.

- Work on a strategy to support partners in the recovery phase and following periods.
- Staff sensitisation for all Ethiopia OI staff on the dual OI mandate, the humanitarian dossier and expectations of all staff during a scale up. As mentioned earlier this would be effective if done through ERT.

Appendix 1: Timeline

| DATE | EVENT |
|--------------|--|
| 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Update of the Contingency plan |
| Sept 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rains Fail: start of drought |
| October 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OGB Drought Response in Afar |
| Nov 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SOS Sahel Proposal to OC (Approved in April 2011) |
| Dec 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OUS Rapid Assessment |
| Jan 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OUS sends concept note to Boston CFW +Water trucking in Borena (GPDI) OC response to Cholera Outbreak Creation of the Emergency Zonal Task Force in Borena Oxfam starts Scenario Planning |
| Feb 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OC approves AFD Proposal Water trucking in Jijiga Oxfam Scenario Planning finalised |
| March 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OI ECHO proposal for Oromiya and Jijiga OGB drought proposal for Shinille and Ayisha (CIDA 2) Rains fail again |
| April 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OI ECHO proposal cntued National Emergency response declared: Humanitarian expectations HCT revise scenario planning OGB new Humanitarian Coordinator appointed: HCT Revamped OUS proposal for Response in Borena |
| May 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OGB Humanitarian Director visit Joint OC/OUS assesement in Borena region Emergency flagged up at PGG level (Potential Cat2) Visit from the Senior Management from OUS Start drafting OI drought response strategy |
| June 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OGB deploys WASH coordinators HSPs deployment OGB humanitarian Director informs HCGG of worsening situation Joint HRF Cida Proposals Drought impact gets the attention of the international media |
| July 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> July 7th: HCGG declares the Horn emergency as Cat 1 OGB rapid assessment in Shinille and Ayisha 10-16th: OI Joint assessment in Borena Proposal to open an OI office in Borena OI Secretariat support deployment HCGG develops the governance outline for Horn response OI MEAL strategy developed OGB assessment in Dollo Ado, Afder and Lieben OI drought response Strategy agreed |
| August 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OI Public Health strategy developed OGB scale up office open in Yabello Scale up in Shinille and Ayisha Refugee camps response in Dollo Addo 9th of august: Oromiya Drought Strategy agreed 11th of August: Start of Water trucking activities in Borena AFD/GPDI proposals approved OGB/OUS market assesements in Borena Start of CIDA activities in Shinille |
| Sept 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shinille and Ayisha EFSL activities starts Rehabilitation of water sources in Shinille and Ayishe AFD/GPDI CFW activities in Borena RTE (1st – 16th september) |
| Nov 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ethiopia Strategy Review |

Appendix 2: Places Visited and People Interviewed

| Date | Activity |
|---------------------------------|---|
| 30 th August 2011 | <p><u>Location Oxford</u> Interview Marion O'Reilly, WASH, OGB Andy Bastable, WASH, OGB Marlies Lensink, Humanitarian Officer, OI</p> |
| 02 nd September 2011 | <p>Arrive in Addis Ababa Meeting with OI MEL Coordinator to plan RTE process</p> |
| 03 rd September 2011 | <p><u>Location Addis Ababa</u> RTE Team briefing: to OGB Country Director & Deputy Country Director to OGB Country Office staff Interview: Yeshiwork Tay: Logistics Coordinator, OGB Phillipo Ortolani: Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, OES Cynan Houghton: Regional Funding Coordinator, OGB Hiwot, Health Promotion Advisor, OGB Eric Sidali, Humanitarian Finance Manager, OGB</p> |
| 05 th September 2011 | <p><u>Location: Adollo Ado</u> Interview: Alister Hillman: Public Health Engineer, OGB Tadle Genti: Adollo Ado Sub office head, ARRA Meeting with OES Andreas Balke: Engineer, THW Meeting WASH community project group Interview Ato Tadale Geneti, Sub office head, ARRA Mr. Surkri, Acting head, Dolo Wereda administration Voitek, mission head, MSF Holland & Jeff, acting head, UNHCR sub office Tim Forster, WASH coordinator, OGB RTE Team briefing To OGB & OES staff <u>Location: Borena</u> Interview: Emma Renowden, Program manager, OGB Head, Zonal Water Board Enwawagow Waleglegn, PHE team leader, OGB Johnson Mubatsi, PHP team leader, OGB Melkamu Guluma, Finance and Economic Officer, OGB Tafadzwa Makate, EFSL team leader, OGB Morshed Golam, PHP coordinator & acting PM Guji, OGB</p> |
| 6 th September 2011 | <p><u>Location: Borena</u> Sonia Sagan, PHP partner support, Oxfam International Amsalu Tilahun, Emergency Coordinator & Manghashaw, Field Office coordinator, AFD Jatani Sora, Country Director & Roba, program manager, GDPI Girma Legesse, interim humanitarian program officer, OI/OUS <u>Location: Dire wareda, Hododasamaro Kebele</u> Focus Group Discussion 50 men and 5 women <u>Location: Hilawyne Camp</u> Field visit to WASH work at camp Attend Hygiene Promotion meeting and discussion with community members Interviews Anna Molino, Camp coordinator, UNHCR Selad Nur Issak, chairman, Hilawyne Kebele Abshir Nur Hussein, Chariman, Refugee committee Etemanchi Chane & Joice Pogo, HPs, OGB</p> |
| 07 th September 2011 | <p><u>Location: Das Wareda, Das Kebele</u> Focus Group Discussion (3) 7 men, 6 women, and 11 men and women Bayour Aderra, EFSL program advisor, OCA Solomon, WASH program advisor, OCA Deputy Pastoral Officer and Emergency Deputy Officer, Dhas Wareda <u>Location: Adollo Ado</u> Interview Ewan, WASH coordinator, UNICEF Mike Taylor, Logistics Team Leader, OGB & Johnny Simpson, Logistics, OGB Abdirisack Idow Mohammed, Warehouse Officer, OGB Sian Watter, HR Manager, OGB Raissa Azzakini, Action Project Manager, OGB Maete, WASH engineer, OES Meeting</p> |

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| | <p>Adolloa Ado Coordination meeting at UNHCR <i>Location: <u>Gorobaqagsa OES field office</u></i> Interview: Peter Okullo: Wash Officer, OES Jimmy Tuhaise: Field Manger, OES Abayneh Asrat: Public Health Promotion Officer, OES Abubaker Adam Elhas Abdullah: Field Logistics Officer, OES Javier Perez: Finance & Administastion Manager (Addis based) OES Theodros Eshetu: Food security Officer, OES Location: Harafama Kabela (community) Women's Focus Group discussion, approx 30 women Men's Focus Group Discussion, approx. 15 men OES staff debrief</p> |
| 08 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location: <u>Qanchoro kebele</u></i> Women's Focus Group Discussions, approx. 15 women Mixed Focus group discussion, approx. 39 men and 15 women Mixed focus group discussion, approx. 9 men and 6 women Interview: Dr. Hooka, Head of office SOS Sahel and Beka Humanitarian coordinator, SOS Sahel Grima, humanitarian coordinator, GOAL <i>Location: <u>Adollo Ado</u></i> Interview Laura Holland, PHE team leader, OGB Issa Osman, PHE Officer, OGB Ali Abdi Diis and Hassan Abdi Rahman, assistant PHPs, OGB Julia Cox, Finance Manager, OGB Gwen, Fleet, Compound welfare logistics, OGB OGB & OES staff debrief</p> |
| 09 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location: <u>Borena</u></i> OGB, OUS, OCA, OI and partners debrief <i>Location: <u>Addis Ababa</u></i> Vikas Goyal, PHP coordinator, OGB</p> |
| 10 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location: <u>Dire Dawa OGB field office</u></i> Field Visit to <u>Gad</u> Public interview Awali Ali Farah, Kabele administrator Visit to Biscay Public interview Munisip Oma Maysani, Chairman of water committee Joint Interview: Justin Okwir: EFS Team Leader & Jonathan Brass: Livelihoods Coordinator (Myanmar) advisor. OGB Interview: Victoria Murtagh: Program manager, OGB</p> |
| 11 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location: <u>Dire Dawa</u></i> Interview: Charles Didier Gnako: Logistics Manager, OGB Bonface A Oktch, PHE, OGB Meriam Asibal PHP, OGB David Njuguna, PHP, OGB</p> |
| 12 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location <u>Addis Ababa</u></i> Interview Blessing Mutsaka, EFSL coordinator, OGB Luz Gomez, Deputy Humanitarian Manager, OES Kirsty Wilson, DRR project manager, OGB Paula Brennan assistant program manager, OGB Hassan Mahmood, MEAL coordinator, OI Charlie Rowlie, ex. Program manager Yabello, OGB Joint interview: William Palmer, John Kerr, Aloysius Prabhao, Logistics, OGB</p> |
| 13 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location: <u>Addis Ababa</u></i> Interview Julia Gilbert, Information Officer, OGB Tewodros Negashi, Communications Officer, OGB Emily Farr, Humanitarian livelihoods specialist, OUS Alberto Ibanez, WASH advisor, OES Daniel Kosha, Country Director, OES Phone interview Valerie Trombolie, Program Manager Dollo Ado, OGB <i>Location <u>Dire Dawa</u></i> Interview: Irena Masheti: Logistics, OGB Daniel Petros: Cashier, OGB Samuel Abayneh: Project manager field office, OGB Group Interview:</p> |

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| | <p>Abdul Malek, Hamza Yusuf Mohammed & Endale Demessie: PHE team, OGB interview</p> <p>Samson Bekele: Natural Resource Management Officer, OGB</p> <p>Aster Alemu: Administration Assistant (also covering HR, finance, logistics), OGB</p> <p><i>Location <u>Ayisha Wereda</u></i></p> <p>Meeting</p> <p>Liban Afel Ali, Ayisha Woreda Administration</p> <p>Hussien Aden, Woreda MoA,</p> <p>Mohammed Hassen, Woreda Water Bureau</p> <p>Abdulkadir Said, Head of Woreda health Bureau</p> <p>Mathewos, Woreda health officer</p> |
| 14 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location <u>Addis Ababa</u></i></p> <p>Interview</p> <p>Dr Abay Bekele, Pastrol Program Manager, OGB</p> <p>Feleke Tadele, Country Director, OCA</p> <p>Melaku, former humanitarian manager , OCA</p> <p>Laura Sewell, humanitarian Program manager, OCA</p> <p>Amber Meikle, humanitarian policy advisor, OGB</p> <p>Thomas Roziro, Head of Finance, OGB</p> <p>Greg Puley, Country Director OGB</p> <p><i>Location <u>Shinile</u></i></p> <p>Meeting</p> <p>Hassan Mohammed Abdi, Woreda livestock and crop officer</p> <p>Kewsar Abdilahi, Woreda DPPD head</p> <p>Abdilahi Jama, Woreda health officer</p> <p>Abdiifatah Mohammed, Woreda Education Head</p> |
| 15 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location <u>Addis Ababa</u></i></p> <p>Interview</p> <p>Dawit Beyene, Former humanitarian manager and HCT chair, OGB</p> <p>Nazreth Fikru, humanitarian manager, OUS</p> <p>Mandefro Negussie, Country Director, OUS</p> |
| 16 th September 2011 | <p><i>Location <u>Addis Ababa</u></i></p> <p>Day of reflection</p> |
| 19 th September 2011 | <p>Phone interview</p> <p>Myra Foster, WASH advisor, OUS</p> <p>Kenny Rae, humanitarian specialist, OUS</p> |

Appendix 3: evaluation of the RTE and Day of Reflection

This exercise was carried out at the end of the Day of Reflection

| Questions | Rating 1= not at all, 5 = very well |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| To what extent did the RTE team accurately capture the experience of this response? | |
| To what extent has to day been useful in helping you discuss the critical issues and challenges of this/future responses? | |
| To what extent has the manner in which the RTE team conducted the exercise worked for you? | |

Comments by participants

The above evaluation was undertaken at the close of the reflection day and of the 26 participants 20 filled in the forms. The average rating for all three questions was 4 with some comments regarding the need for more field staff to attend the reflection, and for the RTE team to elaborate further on their findings. That said most were very happy with key lessons being captured and the facilitation of the day.

An action plan for the day was produced and has been provided separately with this report. The action plan was also sent to the Country Director in order for it to be shared with the CLT so that various points could be actioned immediately.

| Benchmark | Key issues | Plan of Action | Responsibility | By when |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| BM1 Timeliness | Preparedness and Contingency Plans not socialised or up to date | a) Produce phased preparedness plan b) Undertake Contingency Plan process. This will be a whole of OI in Ethiopia process that will require an external (OI secretariat/regional program office) resource | a) Lead: HCT Chair with support from HCT b) Lead: Country Director OGB to initiate with support from HCT | a) March 2012 b) November 2011 |
| | Affiliates in Ethiopia using different early warning systems to gauge threat | a) Create common indicators and systemise early warning information collection (i.e. agree on which internal and external indicators to use across affiliates) b) Information scale-up: Include early warning information in reports to region/PGG | a) Lead: HCT Chair with support of HCT b) Lead: HCT to delegate/ RTE team to recommend at Regional DoR | a) November 2011 b) Ongoing |
| BM2 Appropriateness | Clarity on quantitative and qualitative targeting (realistic overall target figures & capacity to deliver) | a) OGB to Coordinate with affiliates b) Review of OGB capacity/staffing levels | a) Lead: HCT Chair b) Lead: HPC OGB (Dawit) | a) 23 September 2011 b) 19 September 2011 |
| | Consistency of mainstreaming gender and protection | Create Gender working group to unify gender strategy | Lead: OI Gender Coordinator (Aisha) | Start 19 September to be completed 19 October 2011 |
| | Adequacy of accountability mechanisms to beneficiaries | Coordinate affiliates to set up an a single accountability system | Lead: OI MEAL Coordinator (Hassan/Sophie) | Start 01 October 2011 |
| | Integration of WASH and EFSL | Ethiopia OI working groups (WASH/EFSL) to develop integration strategy and include in programming | Lead: OGB EFSL Coordinator (Blessing) | Start 29 September 2011 |
| BM3 Management | Top down decision making and communication | Field to input into HCT agenda | Lead: HCT Chair to initiate discussion | To be decided |
| BM4 Key Support | Quality of support service delivery and adequate resourcing of support services (HR, Logs & Finance) | Support needs to be included in next round of scenario planning | Lead: HCT Chair supported by HCT | Start 19 September 2011 |
| | Safety and Security | a) Disseminate current plans/evacuation procedures to the field b) put together/revise election OI Ethiopia Communication tree | a) CDs All Affiliates b) Lead: CD OGB with support of CLT | a) Immediate b) week ending 23 September 2011 |
| | Systems and procedures | Revisit and strengthen what has been agreed on in the support coordination meetings | Lead: Operations Director OGB (Mesfin) | 19 September – ongoing. |

Action Plan

RTE day of reflection 16th September 2011

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|--|---|---|--|
| BM5 Relationships | Coordination with Government | Share relevant advocacy strategies/experiences across affiliates and add to revised CSO strategy | Lead: CD OGB with input from CLT | Initiate by weekending 23 September 2011 |
| | CLT/HCT relationship | CLT will resolve issue around OI office in Borena | Lead: CD OGB | 19 September 2011 |
| BM6 Connectedness | Link Development and Humanitarian Programming (transition and Exit Strategies) | Revisit Scenario Planning (field offices to look at exit options) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Link with Nov 11 strategy review (include Advocacy) | Lead: HCT Chair with support from HCT | 19 September 2011 |
| | Advocacy around long term issues and inclusion of programmatic areas | <p>a) continue actions with regional campaigns</p> <p>b) Gain an agreement on action plan</p> <p>c) Link to Grow campaign</p> <p>d) Advocacy across the affiliates to be resourced adequately</p> | <p>a) Lead: HCT Chair to delegate</p> <p>b) Lead: HCT Chair</p> <p>c) Lead: CD OGB to delegate</p> <p>d) Lead: HCT Chair to initiate discussion</p> | <p>Ongoing</p> <p>b) 19 September 2011</p> <p>c) ongoing</p> <p>d) To be decided</p> |